Cyber Signals Issue 2: Ransomware’s new business model
Cybercriminals are emboldened by underground ransomware economy
While ransomware continues to be a headline-grabbing topic, there’s ultimately a relatively small, connected ecosystem of players driving this sector of the cybercrime economy. The specialization and consolidation of the cybercrime economy has fueled ransomware as a service (RaaS) to become a dominant business model, enabling a wider range of criminals, regardless of their technical expertise, to deploy ransomware.
Watch the Cyber Signals digital briefing where Vasu Jakkal, CVP of Microsoft Security, interviews top threat intelligence experts on the ransomware economy and how organizations can help protect themselves.
New business model offers fresh insights for defenders
Just as many industries have shifted toward gig workers for efficiency, cybercriminals are renting or selling their ransomware tools for a portion of the profits, rather than performing the attacks themselves.
The Ransomware as a Service allows cybercriminals to purchase access to Ransomware payloads and data leakage as well as payment infrastructure. Ransomware ”gangs” are in reality RaaS programs like Conti or REvil, used by many different actors who switch between RaaS programs and payloads.
RaaS lowers the barrier to entry and obfuscates the identity of the attackers behind the ransoming. Some programs have 50+ “affiliates,” as they refer to the users of their service, with varying tools, tradecraft, and objectives. Just as anyone with a car can drive for a rideshare service, anyone with a laptop and credit card willing to search the dark web for penetration testing tools or out-of-the-box malware can join this economy.
This industrialization of cybercrime has created specialized roles, like access brokers who sell access to networks. A single compromise often involves multiple cybercriminals in different stages of the intrusion.
RaaS kits are easy to find on the dark web and are advertised in the same way goods are advertised across the internet.
A RaaS kit may include customer service support, bundled offers, user reviews, forums and other features. Cybercriminals can pay a set price for a RaaS kit while other groups selling RaaS under the affiliate model take a percentage of the profits.
Ryuk 2020-June 2021; Conti July- October 2021; Hive October 2021 – present; BlackCat March – June 2022; Nokoyawa May 2022 – present; Agenda etc. June 2022 (experiment) Source: Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence Team and Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
Ransomware attacks involve decisions based on configurations of networks and differ for each victim even if the ransomware payload is the same. Ransomware culminates an attack which can include data exfiltration and other impact. Because of the interconnected nature of the cybercriminal economy, seemingly unrelated intrusions can build upon each other. Infostealer malware that steals passwords and cookies get treated with less severity, but cybercriminals sell these passwords to enable other attacks.
These attacks follow a template of initial access via malware infection or exploitation of a vulnerability then credential theft to elevate privileges and move laterally. Industrialization allows prolific and impactful ransomware attacks to be performed by attackers without sophistication or advanced skills. Since the shutdown of Conti we’ve observed shifts in the ransomware landscape. Some affiliates who were deploying Conti moved to payloads from established RaaS ecosystems like LockBit and Hive, while others simultaneously deploy payloads from multiple RaaS ecosystems.
New RaaS like QuantumLocker and Black Basta are filling the vacuum left by Conti’s shutdown. Since most Ransomware coverage focuses on payloads instead of actors, this payload switching is likely to confuse governments, law enforcement, media, security researchers, and defenders about who is behind the attacks.
Reporting on ransomware may seem like an endless scaling problem; however, the reality is a finite set of actors using the set of techniques.
- Build credential hygiene: Develop a logical network segmentation based on privileges that can be implemented alongside network segmentation to limit lateral movement.
- Audit credential exposure: Auditing credential exposure is critical in preventing ransomware attacks and cybercrime in general. IT security teams and SOCs can work together to reduce administrative privileges and understand the level at which their credentials are exposed.
- Reduce the attack surface: Establish attack surface reduction rules to prevent common attack techniques used in ransomware attacks. In observed attacks from several ransomware associated activity groups, organizations with clearly defined rules have been able to mitigate attacks in their initial stages while preventing hands on keyboard activity.
Defending against attacks
Cybercriminals add double extortion to attack strategy
Ransomware exists to extort payment from a victim. Most current RaaS programs also leak stolen data, known as double extortion. As outages cause backlash and government disruption of ransomware operators increases, some groups forgo ransomware and pursue data extortion.
Two extortion focused groups are DEV-0537 (aka LAPSUS$) and DEV-0390 (a former Conti affiliate). DEV-0390’s intrusions initiate from malware but use legitimate tools to exfiltrate data and extort payment. They deploy penetration testing tools like Cobalt Strike, Brute Ratel C4, and the legitimate Atera remote management utility to maintain access to a victim. DEV-0390 will escalate privileges by stealing credentials, locate sensitive data (often on corporate backup and file servers), and send the data to a cloud file sharing site using a file backup utility.
DEV-0537 uses a very different strategy and tradecraft. Initial access is obtained by purchasing credentials on the criminal underground or from employees at targeted organizations.
- Stolen passwords and unprotected identities
More than malware, attackers need credentials to succeed. In nearly all successful ransomware deployments, attackers gain access to privileged, administrator-level accounts granting broad access to an organizations’ network.
- Missing or disabled security products
In almost every observed ransomware incident, at least one system exploited in the attack had missing or misconfigured security products that allowed intruders to tamper with or disable certain protections.
- Misconfigured or abused applications
You might use a popular app for one purpose, but that doesn’t mean criminals can’t weaponize it for another goal. Too often, “legacy” configurations mean an app is in its default state, allowing any user wide access across entire organizations. Don’t overlook this risk or hesitate to change app settings for fear of disruption.
- Slow patching
It’s a cliché, like “Eat your vegetables!” – but it’s a critical fact: The best way to harden software is to keep it updated. While some cloud-based apps update with no user action, companies must apply other vendor patches immediately. In 2022 Microsoft observes that older vulnerabilities are still a primary driver in attacks.
- Authenticate identities
Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on all accounts, prioritize administrator and other sensitive roles. With a hybrid workforce, require MFA on all devices, in all locations, at all times. Enable passwordless authentication like FIDO keys or Microsoft Authenticator for apps that support it.
- Address security blind spots
Like smoke alarms, security products must be installed in the correct spaces and tested frequently. Verify that security tools are operating in their most secure configuration, and that no part of a network is unprotected.
- Harden internet facing assets
Consider deleting duplicative or unused apps to eliminate risky, unused services. Be mindful of where you permit remote helpdesk apps like TeamViewer. These are notoriously targeted by threat actors to gain express access to laptops.
- Keep systems up to date
Make software inventory a continuous process. Keep track of what you are running and prioritize support for these products. Use your ability to patch quickly and conclusively to gage where transitioning to cloud-based services is beneficial.
Understanding the interconnected nature of identities and trust relationships in modern technology ecosystems, they target telecommunications, technology, IT services, and support companies to leverage access from one organization to gain entry into partner or supplier networks. Extortion only attacks demonstrate that network defenders must look beyond end-stage ransomware and keep a close eye on data exfiltration and lateral movement.
If a threat actor is planning to extort an organization to keep their data private, a ransomware payload is the least significant and least valuable part of the attack strategy. Ultimately, it’s an operator’s choice what they choose to deploy, and ransomware is not always the big-ticket payout every threat actor is after.
While ransomware or double extortion can seem an inevitable outcome from an attack by a sophisticated attacker, ransomware is an avoidable disaster. Reliance on security weaknesses by the attackers means that investments in cyber hygiene go a long way.
Microsoft’s unique visibility gives us a lens into threat actor activity. Rather than rely on forum posts or chat leaks, our team of security experts study new ransomware tactics and develop threat intelligence that informs our security solutions.
Integrated threat protection across devices, identities, apps, email, data and the cloud help us identify attacks that would have been labeled as multiple actors, when they’re in fact a single set of cybercriminals. Our Digital Crimes Unit composed of technical, legal, and business experts continues to work with law enforcement to disrupt cybercrime.
Harden the cloud: As attackers move towards cloud resources, it’s important to secure these resources and identities as well as on-premises accounts. Security teams should focus on hardening security identity infrastructure, enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) on all accounts, and treating cloud admins/tenant admins with the same level of security and credential hygiene as domain admins.
Prevent initial access: Prevent code execution by managing macros and scripts and enabling Attack Surface Reduction Rules.
Close security blind spots: Organizations should verify that their security tools are running in optimum configuration and perform regular network scans to ensure a security product protects all systems.
Hear from Threat Intelligence Analyst Emily Hacker on how her team stays on top of the changing ransomware as a service landscape.
Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU):
Directed the removal of more than 531,000 unique phishing URLs and 5,400 phish kits between July 2021 and June 2022, leading to the identification and closure of over 1,400 malicious email accounts used to collect stolen customer credentials. 1
Median time for an attacker to access your private data if you fall victim to a phishing email is one hour, 12 minutes. 1
Median time for an attacker to begin moving laterally within your corporate network if a device is compromised is one hour, 42 minutes. 1
1 Methodology: For snapshot data, Microsoft platforms, including Defender and Azure Active Directory, and our Digital Crimes Unit provided anonymized data on threat activity, such as malicious email accounts, phishing emails, and attacker movement within networks. Additional insights are from the 43 trillion daily security signals gained across Microsoft, including the cloud, endpoints, the intelligent edge, and our Compromise Security Recovery Practice and Detection and Response teams.