A key to the success of the American daytime strategic bombing campaign against Germany was the evolving bomber formation called the "combat box." Designed to maximize defensive firepower and concentrate the group's bomb load, variations of the combat box included 18, 27, 36, or 54 heavy bombers. Devised at the end of 1942, the basic 18-plane formation, called the Group Javelin Down, consisted of high, middle, and low six-plane squadrons stepped diagonally downward toward the sun.

Originally USAAF planners had hoped that 200-plus .50-caliber machine guns mounted in 18 Flying Fortresses would produce an impenetrable screen of fire around the formation. Even when later formations expanded to include 54 aircraft, their nearly 700 guns could not ensure that the majority of the bombers would reach their target, let alone survive the return trip. It took effective fighter escort, combined with the combat box, to make the ongoing strategic bombing campaign possible.

These large bomber formations provided distinct challenges to fighter pilots on both sides of the struggle. For Allied fighter pilots, the job of escorting the bombers to and from the target was an evolving task as the formations, enemy tactics, and the escort fighters' combat range changed over time. For German fighter pilots, the task of attacking massive streams of bombers flying in ever more effective formations and escorted by fighters with increasing range and freedom of action was a daunting one.

Escorting U.S. Bomber Formations

When it became clear early in the strategic bombing campaign that German fighters were making mincemeat of the heavy bomber formations, American fighter pilots were ordered to stick close-as close as 50-75 feet-to the slow-moving bombers. This very close escort robbed them of the advantages of altitude and speed, but provided opportunities to dive on enemy fighters below the formation. However, by early 1944 the American escort pilots were allowed greater freedom of movement, ranging out to the sides and front above the formation, sometimes scissoring to stay near the slower bombers. As described by Mike Spick in Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, the three squadrons in the fighter group escorting the bomber combat box usually arranged themselves as follows:

• One squadron would overtake the bombers and position above, dividing into two sections, one some miles ahead of the other.
• A second squadron also divided into two sections and positioned above and about a mile out from the bombers on each side of their box.
• The third squadron acted as top cover some 4,000 feet above the bombers, one section directly above and the other about ten miles ahead towards the sun where it would be ready to intercept any attacks from this "blind spot."

By the end of 1942 the Luftwaffe had perfected the head-on attack against heavy bombers. Escort pilots had to anticipate these attacks, breaking them up before they could close to within 900 yards of the formation. Escort pilots also had to watch out for attacks from the rear of the bomber formation, usually by one four-fighter Schwarm after another. Again, a looser, ranging escort made it easier to find the enemy first, rather than simply reacting to an attack in progress from a position close to the bombers.

Another virtue of the looser escort doctrine was that escort pilots could pursue attacking fighters, down to the deck, if necessary, to destroy them. Better still, the relay escort system assigned a fighter group to escort each combat box along part of its route. When the next fighter group showed up, the preceding group was free to attack ground targets-airfields, or road, rail, and river transport.

Attacking U.S. Bomber Formations

While it may sound as if German fighter pilots had the advantage in their freedom to form up at a distance, then hit fast and hard from the most advantageous angle, leaving their opposition little time to react, in reality there was plenty of fear to go around-for the attackers, their intended victims, and the shepherding escort pilots. The combat box formation bristled with heavy machine guns, and in the course of the war gunners aboard the bombers shot down far more enemy fighters than their fighter escort did. As Luftwaffe pilot Hans Philipp noted, " ...curve in toward 40 Fortresses and all your past sins flash before your eyes."

The frontal attack promised the best chance of survival. The German fighters would fly alongside the bomber formation, out of range of the gunners tracking them. About three miles ahead of the formation they would turn 180 degrees and attack from out of the sun at 12 o'clock high, aiming for the big bombers' cockpits. Sometimes they flew so close to their target that they had to zoom at the last instant to avoid the towering tail of the B-17. A two-gun chin turret was added to the B-17G model specifically to counter this head-on attack.

When attacking bombers from behind, the idea was to concentrate the attack by hurling one four-plane Schwarm after another at the target aircraft, quickly firing and then flying over the formation. Whether attacking from in front or behind, the German fighters often finished their attack with a split-S, while taking fire from the bombers' dorsal, tail, and belly guns, to open up as much distance from those guns as quickly as possible.

Other Luftwaffe tricks made life difficult for the American escorts. For example, as Mike Spick notes in Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, " ...one flight of ...FW 190s was sent down through the formation as a decoy; the remainder stayed above to fall on the Americans when they dove after the sacrificial flight." In the sudden, violent and confusing world of aerial combat, it was hard to resist the urge to follow any fighter that flew through the formation.

While German weaponry and tactics improved, the German fighter force was being worn down, with fewer and fewer experienced pilots left to lead the attack against the bombers. Bf 110s and Fw 190s armed with rockets and cannon, accompanied by Bf 109s flying top cover, broke up bomber formations and fell on the stragglers like wolves. These tactics were effective, but it was finally attrition that decided the outcome. The Allies could quickly replace their lost machines and men; the combination of industrial might and an apparently unending supply of fresh, well-trained pilots turned the tide in the long and deadly air war over Europe.

Download the Bremen Missions and get a first-hand feel for what it was like to both defend and attack Heavy Bomber formations. You can get up and flying immediately by following the instructions included in the Bremen Mission tutorial, or use the provided resources to recreate your own Eighth Air Force attack on Bremen.

Download the Bremen Missions