I went into Guadalcanal in VF-121. Major "Duke" Davis was Commanding Officer and I was the Exec. We flew off a converted carrier, about 350 miles off Guadalcanal, arriving October 9. Our second day there, we started air operations.

       At that time the [Japanese] attacks were with the Type 1 high-altitude bomber, coming in in formations of from 27 up to 35, with fighter escort; altitudes from 22,000 to 26,000 feet. They would send down a fighter sweep before the bombing attack. About 12 Zeros would arrive 30 to 45 minutes ahead of the bombers, apparently to draw up all our fighters to start an engagement. About the time an engagement started the second wave of Zeros would come in. They always came in at high altitude, somewhere about 30,000. By the time they arrived, they were hoping you were down at a good low altitude where they could work on you.

       The first outfit that came in would always spar around; they wanted to draw you down so that the high altitude boys could get a good pass at you. Once of that was enough to cure me and everyone in our outfit. We went in to get something that looked like easy bait and as we started in the Zeros that were above us came down on us. They had a little bit too much speed to do much damage. They didn't shoot down many, but they hit just about all of us.

       So whenever we'd see about six [Japanese] planes that seemed to want to engage us, we were quite sure they had plenty of high cover. If the fighting was on even terms, they weren't at all anxious to engage us. But whenever they had the long end of the deal, they were anxious to engage. Along with the bombers there would be six to eight more Zeros. They'd fly to the rear and above, about 3,000 feet above the bombers, doing loops and slow rolls, to slow them down so they could stay with the bombers. They were usually up around 30,000 feet. Then there were another six just prowling around. You never could tell where they were; they would circle wide and try to come in from the opposite direction.

       When I got there, we seemed to be getting off late. The [Japanese] got wise to the fact that if they made a circle and came in over the mountains we couldn't pick them up on the Radar as soon as we used to when they came right down the channel. With the mountain interference on the Radar we hadn't quite enough warning to make it up there. On several occasions I reached the same altitude as the bombers, a bad situation. We didn't have time to climb into a position to get a pass at the bombers. Sometimes my outfit made a parallel run to the bombing formation but couldn't gain a bit on them; we stayed right there just out of range. Their gunners would be shooting at us while Zeros stayed up and didn't seem to want to come down. Finally they could come down, and then we'd get to fight the Zeros. One reason why my squadron had [a] lot of Zeros to its credit is that we always wanted to get into a scrap. When there was nothing else around, we always went after the Zeros, if they didn't come after us.

       Instead of scrambling all the fighters on the first warning, we would send up one flight of eight and sometimes twelve planes just to spar around with these first fighters. They circle around for a long time before they engage; they never press the attack. We were just trying to hold off 'til we could get some more fighters with plenty of oxygen and gas up there in time for the bombers.

       At that time, we were allowed 40 F4Fs on the field, about 30 of which were operating. Out of these 30, we could guarantee to have 24 in the air.

       The P-38s didn't arrive until late in October. The day they arrived was the last time that the [Japanese] came in with their big formations for high-altitude bombing.

       Until October 25 we had air combat every day, sometimes two and three times a day. On October 25 we knocked down 17 Zeros and 5 bombers. That attack was the last that came into the field. Every day we picked them up on the Radar. They'd come down to within 40 miles of the field and orbit. We covered the field, and went out in their direction far enough to intercept them, if they came in. That went on for about a week. After that we decided to see what was out farther. As soon as we'd start out, they'd evidently see us coming and turn around, for our Control would call us and say they were departing...

Q. In strafing a destroyer, what is the maximum distance for attack?

A. I would start shooting at 3,000 feet. Some of them start shooting at 5,000 feet, but in my opinion that is just wasting time and ammunition. I go right down and pull up below l,000 feet. After I pass the destroyer, I am right on the water. In strafing a troop transport, I'd drop over the bow or the stern, so that when I went out I was right on the water. I just cleared the ship, went over it, and then really snaked along. We shot all the way in, down to 500 feet -- by that time you're really going, high speeds -- we were always upward of 300 when we came by. On the way out none of us were hit; it was when you were coming down that you were in a bad spot. You have to look out for crossfire. The ship that you're strafing isn't the dangerous one, there's one on each side; they start playing a crossfire into you, and they pretty well put it to you. When six or seven or eight destroyers and cruisers were escorting transports and cargo ships, we'd come in and attack the corner warships so that we'd draw fire from these ships and give the dive-bombers a chance to go in and drop on the cargo and transport ships. They used to shoot the fighters in preference to the dive-bombers. Whether they couldn't tell a dive-bomber from a fighter, I don't know. The Grumman looked so chubby that they right away thought it was a dive-bomber with a bomb on it!...

       They have a rather unusual way in their attacks. The leader always shies around; his wing mate flies back far enough so you can hit him off without the leader's ever knowing it. They fly more or less in a column -- the wing man is supposed to stay with that leader. How he does it I don't know. When you stay 200 or 300 yards behind your leader and try to follow him, you've really got something on your hands. The wing man has a tough time of it. I talked to some of the Japanese through an interpreter, some of the Japanese pilots, and they'd always shake their heads about following their leader, and talk about their heads going around and around. I see their point.

       In our attacks, we'd move in close. Eight planes right close together. If we broke up it would be first one four-plane section and then the other four-plane section, then into two planes. In the end it's just a big dogfight. My wing man would stay right on me until there'd be a plane in front of me that I was chasing.

       Then a plane would be coming from one side or the other, and that was a farewell for my wing man. He just made a quick swing out, and he'd always get a head-on shot -- probably not such a good shot -- but he'd put out a shot and make a quick turn. I'd turn around the other way and hope that we'd come back together; if we didn't see each other, we joined up on the first Grumman we saw. And always branch out from that again. I had my boys fly up more or less on line when they were going into an attack; they flew pretty well up. If the attack moved in from the tail end, I'd just call to him; and he would lead the attack in -- he'd be first man in, and I'd be last. Instead of all having to slide over, I'd just call him, and he could take over. We had very good luck that way. We were never surprised. He flew back about 30° I'd say, or as much as 45° but never any of this column stuff. I always want to know where all my wing men are.

Q. Are the [Japanese] pilots who have been taken prisoner high-grade people?

A. The Zero pilot seems to be the better of the two, bomber and combat pilots. They were very young, lads of 19-21, with very good builds. …The [Japanese] are pretty well broken up when they're taken prisoner. One told me the only reason he ever joined up in the Air Corps was so he could fly. Now he couldn't fly anymore -- by that he meant that he'd never be able to fly for Japan again; and we won't take him on. He was out of luck. He was a 21-year chap who had gone to the University of Tokio [sic].