[01/2017] Slides from my WINE 2016 tutorial on prophet inequalities and pricing can be found online here.
- Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities. Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier. In Submission. View external link
- The Price of Anarchy in Large Games. Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis. STOC 2016. View external link
- Non-Optimal Mechanism Design. Jason Hartline, Brendan Lucier. American Economics Review, 2015. View external link
A conference version titled Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design appeared in STOC 2010, and is available here.
- Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier. SODA 2015. View external link
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg. FOCS 2014. View external link
- On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism. Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme. EC 2014. View external link
- Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient. Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier. STOC 2014. View external link
- Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time. Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, Brendan Lucier. SODA 2014. View external link
- Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions. Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin. SICOMP 2017.
A conference version titled Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions appeared in SODA 2010, and is available here.