I am a Researcher at Microsoft Research, New England. I study algorithmic game theory, social networks, and other topics in the intersection of economics and theoretical computer science. I’m especially interested in developing ways to sell complex goods and services using simple, transparent pricing methods and auction rules.
[01/2017] Slides from my WINE 2016 tutorial on prophet inequalities and pricing can be found online here.
- Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities. Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier. In Submission. View external link
- The Price of Anarchy in Large Games. Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis. STOC 2016.
- Non-Optimal Mechanism Design. Jason Hartline, Brendan Lucier. American Economics Review, 2015. View external link
A conference version titled Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design appeared in STOC 2010, and is available here.
- Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier. SODA 2015.
- Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time. Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, Brendan Lucier. SODA 2014.
- Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions. Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin. SICOMP 2017.
A conference version titled Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions appeared in SODA 2010, and is available here.
- Spring 2016: cs234r – Markets for Networks and Crowds