ConfLLVM: A Compiler for Enforcing Data Confidentiality in Low-Level Code

Abstract
We present a compiler-based scheme to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data in low-level applications (e.g. those written in C) in the presence of an active adversary. In our scheme, the programmer marks sensitive data by lightweight annotations on the top-level definitions in the source code. The compiler then uses a combination of static dataflow analysis, runtime instrumentation, and a novel taint-aware form of control-flow integrity to prevent data leaks even in the presence of low-level attacks. To reduce runtime overheads, the compiler uses a novel memory layout.

We implement our scheme within the LLVM framework and evaluate it on the standard SPEC-CPU benchmarks, and on larger, real-world applications, including the NGINX web-server and the OpenLDAP directory server. We find that performance overheads introduced by our instrumentation are moderate (average 12% on SPEC), and the programmer effort to port the applications is minimal.

1 Introduction
Many programs compute on private data: Web servers use private keys and serve private files, medical software processes private medical records, and many machine learning models are trained on private inputs. Bugs or exploited vulnerabilities in these programs may leak the private data to public channels that are visible to unintended recipients. For example, the OpenSSL buffer-overflow vulnerability Heartbleed [7] can be exploited to exfiltrate a web server’s private keys to the public network in cleartext. Generally speaking, the problem here is one of information flow control [27]: We would like to enforce that private data, as well as data derived from it, is never sent out on public channels unless it has been intentionally classified by the program.

The standard solution to this problem is to use static dataflow analysis or runtime taints to track how private data flows through the program. While these methods work well in high-level, memory-safe languages such as Java [35, 38] and ML [45], the problem is very challenging and remains broadly open for low-level compiled languages like C that are not memory-safe. First, the cost of tracking taint at runtime is prohibitively high for these languages (see Section 9).

Second, static dataflow analysis cannot guarantee data confidentiality because the lack of memory safety allows for buffer overflow and control-flow hijack attacks [2, 3, 5, 10, 48, 53], both of which may induce data flows that cannot be anticipated during a static analysis.

One possible approach is to start from a safe dialect of C (e.g. CCured [40], Deputy [23], or SoftBound [39]) and leverage existing approaches such as information-flow type systems for type-safe languages [31, 49]. The use of safe dialects, however, (a) requires additional annotations and program restructuring that cause significant program size overhead [36, 40], (b) are not always backward compatible with legacy code, and (c) have prohibitive runtime overhead making them a non-starter in practical applications (see further discussion in Section 9).

In this paper, we present the first end-to-end, practical compiler-based scheme to enforce data confidentiality in C programs even in the presence of active, low-level attacks. Our scheme is based on the insight that complete memory safety and perfect control-flow integrity (CFI) are neither sufficient nor necessary for preventing data leaks. We design a compiler that is able to guarantee data confidentiality without requiring these properties.

Our design supports the entire C language including pointer casts, aliasing, function pointers, varargs, variable length arrays, etc. We require the programmer to mark sensitive data in top-level function signatures and global variable declarations using a new keyword private. Our compiler then performs dataflow analysis, statically propagating taint from programmer’s declarations to the rest of the program. At each memory access, the analysis infers the expected taint (public or private) of the pointer being dereferenced, and flags a violation if it detects a leak. However, since pointers can be computed in C, the static analysis cannot be certain that its expectation will hold at runtime. To enforce the expectation, the compiler inserts a runtime check to verify that the pointer actually dereferences memory of the expected taint. To optimize this check, we use a careful memory layout—we place public and private data in two separate contiguous regions. These checks are sufficient to guard against incorrect casts, memory errors, and low-level attacks. Importantly, our design does not require any alias analysis, which is often hard to get right with acceptable precision.

A technical novelty of our work is a mechanism that prevents control-flow hijacks from leaking private data. The key idea is that at each indirect call and at each return, the compiler inserts a runtime check which ensures that expected register taints at the source and the target of the call/return are consistent. This is enough to prevent data leaks even if the call offset or the return address is overwritten by an attack (see Section 4).
Finally, since a compiler is very large and complex, we would prefer to not trust it for data confidentiality. Accordingly, we design and implement a much simpler low-level verifier, which disassembles a binary (compiled with our compiler) and re-checks the compiler’s data flow analysis as well as its runtime instrumentation. This much simpler verifier removes the compiler from the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). We have also formalized a core model of machine instructions, and formally proved that the checks performed by the verifier are sufficient to enforce data confidentiality.

We have implemented our compiler, ConfLLVM, as well as the complementary low-level verifier, ConfVerify, within the LLVM framework [34]. We evaluate our implementation on the standard SPEC-CPU benchmarks and three large applications—the web server NGINX, the directory server OpenLDAP, and a neural-network-based image classifier built on Torch [12, 13]. All three applications have private data—private user files in the case of NGINX, stored passwords in OpenLDAP, and a model trained on private inputs in the classifier. In all cases, we are able to enforce confidentiality for the private data with a moderate overhead on performance and a small amount of programmer effort for adding annotations and declassification code.

2 Overview

Threat model. We consider C applications that work with both private and public data. Applications interact with the external world using the network, disk and other channels. They communicate public data in clear, but want to protect the confidentiality of the private data by, for example, encrypting it before sending it out. However, the application could have logical or memory errors, or exploitable vulnerabilities that may cause private data to be leaked out in clear.

The attacker interacts with the application and may send carefully-crafted inputs that trigger bugs in the application. The attacker can also observe all the external communication of the application. Our goal is to prevent the private data of the application from leaking out in clear. Specifically, we address explicit information flow: any data directly derived from private data is also treated as private. While this addresses most commonly occurring exploits [42], optionally, our scheme can be used in a stricter mode where it disallows branching on private data, thereby preventing implicit leaks too. We ran all our experiments (Section 7) in this stricter mode. Side-channels (such as execution time and memory-access patterns) are outside the scope of this work.

Our scheme can also be used for integrity protection in a setting where an application computes over trusted and untrusted data [18]. Any data (explicitly) derived from untrusted inputs cannot be supplied to a sink that expects trusted data (Section 7.5 shows an example).

Example application. Consider the code for a web server in Figure 1. The server receives requests from the user (main:7), where the request contains the username and a file name (both in clear text), and the encrypted user password. The server decrypts the password and calls the handleReq helper routine that copies the (public) file contents into the out buffer. The server finally prepares the formatted response (format), and sends the response (buf), in clear, to the user.

The handleReq function allocates two local buffers, passwd and fcontents (handleReq:4). It reads the actual user password (e.g., from a database) into passwd, and authenticates the user. On successful authentication, it reads the file contents into fcontents, copies them to the out buffer, and appends a message to it signalling the completion of the request.

The code has several bugs that can cause it to leak the user password. First, at line 10, the programmer leaks the clear-text password to a log file by mistake (memory-safety alone would not prevent this kind of bugs). Second, at line 14, memcpy reads out_size bytes from fcontents and copies them to out. If out_size is greater than SIZE, this can cause passwd to be copied to out because an overflow past fcontents would go into the passwd buffer. Third, if the format string fmt in the sprintf call (line 16) contains extra formatting directives, it can print stack contents into out ([55]). The situation is worse if out_size or fmt can be influenced by the attacker.

Our goal is to prevent such vulnerabilities from leaking out sensitive application data. Below we discuss the three main components of our approach.

Identifying trusted code. Figure 2 shows the workflow of our toolchain. The programmer starts by identifying code that must be trusted. This code, called $\mathcal{T}$ (for trusted), consists of functions that legitimately or intentionally declassify private data, or provide I/O. The remaining bulk of code, is untrusted, denoted $\mathcal{U}$, and subjected to our compilation scheme. A good practice is to contain most of the application logic in $\mathcal{U}$ and limit $\mathcal{T}$ to a library of generic routines that can be hardened over time, possibly even formally verified [56].

In the web server example from Figure 1, $\mathcal{T}$ would consist of: recv, send, read_file (network, I/O), decrypt (cryptographic primitive), and read_passwd (source of sensitive data). The remaining web server code (parse, format, and even printf and memcpy) would be in $\mathcal{U}$.

The programmer compiles $\mathcal{T}$ with any compiler (or even uses pre-compiled binaries), but $\mathcal{U}$ is compiled with our compiler ConfLLVM.

Partitioning $\mathcal{U}$’s memory. To enforce confidentiality in $\mathcal{U}$, we minimally require the programmer to tell ConfLLVM where private data enters and exits $\mathcal{U}$. Since $\mathcal{U}$ relies on $\mathcal{T}$ for I/O and communication, the programmer does so by marking private data in the signatures of all functions exported from $\mathcal{T}$ to $\mathcal{U}$ with a new type qualifier private [28]. Additionally, to help ConfLLVM’s analysis, the programmer must annotate private data in $\mathcal{U}$’s top-level definitions, i.e., globals, function signatures, and in struct definitions. These latter annotations within $\mathcal{U}$ are not trusted. Getting them wrong may cause a static error or runtime failure, but
```c
void handleReq (char *uname, char *upassword, char *fname,
               char *out, int out_size)
{
    char password[SIZE], fcontents[SIZE];
    read_file (uname, password, SIZE);
    if (!authenticate (uname, upassword, password)) {
        return;
    }
    // inadvertently copying the password to the log file
    send (log_file, passwd, SIZE);
    read_file (fname, fcontents, SIZE);
    // (out_size > SIZE) can leak passwd to out
    memcpy (out, fcontents, out_size);
    // a bug in the fmt string can print stack contents
    sprintf (out + SIZE, fmt, "Request complete");
}
```
programmer. On successful inference, ConRLlVM proceeds to compile \( U \) with a custom memory layout and runtime instrumentation. We have developed two different memory layout, and hence, runtime instrumentation, schemes. The schemes have different trade-offs, but they share the common idea – all private and all public data are stored in their own respective contiguous regions of memory and the instrumentation ensures that at runtime each pointer respects its statically inferred taint. We describe these schemes next.

**MPX scheme.** This scheme relies on the Intel MPX ISA extension [8] and uses the memory layout shown in Figure 3b. The memory is partitioned into a public region and a private region, each with its own heap, stack and global segments. The ranges of these regions are determined by the values stored in the MPX bound registers \( bnd0 \) and \( bnd1 \), respectively, but they must be contiguous to each other (\( bnd0\_lower == bnd1\_upper \)). Each memory access is preceded with MPX instructions (\( bndcu \) and \( bndcl \)) that check their first argument against the (upper and lower) bounds of their second argument. The concrete values to be stored in \( bnd0 \) and \( bnd1 \) are determined at load time (Section 6).

The user selects the maximum stack size \( OFFSET \) at compile time (at most \( 2^{31} - 1 \)). The scheme maintains the public and private stacks in lock-step: their respective top-of-stack points to the top of the public stack. Because the two stacks are kept at constant \( OFFSET \) to each other, \( x \) is accessed simply as \( \text{rsp} + 4 \_ \text{OFFSET} \). The code also shows the instrumented MPX bound check instructions.

**Segmentation scheme.** x64 memory operands are in the form \([base + index \_ scale + displacement]\), where \( base \) and \( index \) are 64-bit unsigned registers, \( scale \) is a constant with maximum value of 8, and \( displacement \) is a 32-bit signed constant. The architecture also provides two segment registers \( fs \) and \( gs \) for the base address computation; conceptually, \( fs:base \) simply adds \( fs \) to \( base \).

We use these segment registers to store the lower bounds of the public and private memory regions, respectively, and prefix the base of memory operands with these registers. The public and private regions are separated by (at least) 36GB of guard space (unmapped pages that cause a fault when accessed). The guard sizes are chosen so that any memory operand whose \( base \) is prefixed with \( fs \) cannot escape the public segment, and any memory operand prefixed with \( gs \) cannot escape the private segment (Figure 3a).

The segments are each aligned to a 4GB boundary. The usable space within each segment is also 4GB. We access the \( base \) address stored in a 64-bit register, say a private value stored in \( rax \), as \( fs + eax \), where \( eax \) is the lower 32 bits of \( rax \). Thus, in \( fs + eax \), the lower 32 bits come from \( eax \) and the upper 32 bits come from \( fs \) (because \( fs \) is 4GB aligned). This additionally implies that the maximum offset within a segment that \( U \) can access is 38GB \((4 + 4 \times 8 + 2)\). This is rounded up to 40GB for 4GB alignment, with 4GB of usable space and 36GB of guard space. Since the \( displacement \) value can be negative, the maximum negative offset is 2GB, for which we have the guard space below the public segment.

The usable parts of the segments are restricted to 4GB because it is the maximum addressable size using a single 32-bit register. This restriction also ensures that we don’t have to translate \( U \) pointers when the control is passed to \( T \), thus avoiding the need to change or recompile \( T \). Generated code for our example under this scheme is shown in Figure 4b. The figure uses the convention that \( e_i \) (resp., \( esp \)) represents the lower 32 bits of the register \( r_i \) (resp., \( esp \)). The public and private stacks are still maintained in lock-step. Taking the address of a private stack variable requires extra support: the address of variable \( x \) in our example is \( \text{rsp} + 4 + \text{size} \), where \( \text{size} \) is the total segment size (40GB).

The segmentation scheme has a lower runtime overhead than the MPX scheme as it avoids doing bound-checks (Section 7.1). However, it restricts the segment size to 4GB.

**Multi-threading support.** Both our schemes support multi-threading. All inserted runtime checks (including those in Section 4) are thread-safe because they check values of registers. However, we do need additional support for thread-local storage (TLS). Typically, TLS is accessed via the segment register \( gs \): the base of TLS is obtained at a constant offset from...
We design a custom, taint-aware CFI scheme to ensure that the instrumented checks and leak sensitive data.

Uan attacker cannot alter the control flow of rsp make sure that _chkstk instrumenting an inlined-version of the T to use the same stack in _stk called from T ever.

gs simply masks the lower 20-bits of rsp to zeros to obtain the base of the stack and access TLS.

The segment-register scheme further requires switching of the gs register as control transfers between U and T. We use appropriate wrappers to achieve this switching, however T needs to reliably identify the current thread-id when called from U (so that U cannot force two different threads to use the same stack in T). ConFLLVM achieves this by instrumenting an inlined-version of the _chkstk routine1 to make sure that rsp does not escape its stack boundaries.

4 Taint-aware CFI

We design a custom, taint-aware CFI scheme to ensure that an attacker cannot alter the control flow of U to circumvent the instrumented checks and leak sensitive data.

Typical low-level attacks that can hijack the control flow of a program include overwriting the return address, or the targets of function pointers and indirect jumps. Existing approaches use a combination of shadow stacks or stack canaries to prevent overwriting the return address, or use fine-grained taint tracking to ensure that the value of a function pointer is not derived from user (i.e. attacker-controlled) inputs [25, 33, 56]. While these techniques may prevent certain attacks, our goal is purely to ensure confidentiality. Thus, we designed a custom taint-aware CFI scheme.

Our CFI scheme ensures that for each indirect transfer of control: (a) the target address is some valid jump location, i.e., the target of an indirect call is some valid procedure entry, and the target of a return is some valid return site, (b) the register taints expected at the target address match the current register taints (e.g., when the rax register holds a private value then a ret can only go to a site that expects a private return value). These suffice for our goal of data confidentiality, our scheme does not ensure, for instance, that a return matches the previous call.

CIF for function calls and returns. We use a magic-sequence based scheme to achieve this CFI. We follow the x64 calling convention for Windows that has 4 argument registers and one return register. Our scheme picks two bit sequences M_call and M_ret of length 59 bits each that appear nowhere else in U’s binary. Each procedure in the binary is preceded with a string that consists of M_call followed by a

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5-bit sequence encoding the expected taints of the 4 argument registers and the return register, as per the function signature. Similarly, each valid return site in the binary is preceded by \( M_{\text{ret}} \) followed by a 1-bit encoding of the taint of the return value register, again according to the callee’s signature. To keep the length of the sequences uniform at 64 bits, the return site tag is padded with four zero bits.

Callee-save registers are also live at function entry and exit and their taints cannot be determined statically by the compiler. ConfLLVM forces their taint to be public by making the callee save and clear all the private-tainted callee-saved registers before making a call. All dead registers (e.g., unused argument registers and callee-saved registers at the beginning of a function) are conservatively marked private to avoid accidental leaks. The 64-bit instrumented sequences are collectively referred to as magic sequences. We note that our scheme can be extended easily to support other calling conventions.

Consider the following \( U \):

```c
private int add (private int x) { return x + 1; }
private int incr (private int *p, private int x) {
    int y = add (x); *p = y; return y;
}
```

The compiled code for these functions is instrumented with magic sequences as follows. The 5-bit taints for the `add` procedure are `11111` as its argument \( x \) is private, unused argument registers are conservatively treated as private, and its return type is also private. On the other hand, the taint bits for `incr` are `01111` because its first argument is a public pointer (note that the private annotation on the argument is on the int, not the pointer), second argument is private, unused argument registers are private, and the return value is also private. For the return site in `incr` after the call to `add`, the taint bits are `11111` to indicate the private return value register (with 4 bits of padding). The sample instrumentation is as shown below:

```c
#M_call#11111#
add: ... ;assembly code for add
#M_call#01111#
incr: ... ;assembly code of incr
call add
#M_ret#00001# ;private-tainted ret with padded 0s
... ;assembly code for rest of incr
```

Our CFI scheme adds runtime checks using these sequences as follows. Each ret is replaced with instructions to: (a) fetch the return address, (b) confirm that the target location has \( M_{\text{ret}} \) followed by the taint-bit of the return register, and if so, (c) jump to the target location. For our example, the ret inside `add` is replaced as follows:

```c
#M_call#11111#
add: ... 
r1 = pop ;fetch return address
r2 = #M_ret_inverted#11110# ;we use bitwise nega-
```

For direct calls, ConfLLVM statically verifies that the register taints match between the call site and the call target. At indirect calls, the instrumentation is similar to that of a ret: check that the target location contains \( M_{\text{call}} \) followed by taint bits that match the register taints at the call site.

**Indirect jumps.** ConfLLVM does not generate indirect (non-call) jumps in \( U \). Indirect jumps are mostly required for jump-table optimizations, which we currently disable. We can conceptually support them as long as the jump tables are statically known and placed in read-only memory.

The insertion of magic sequences increases code size but it makes the CFI-checking more lightweight than the shadow stack schemes. The unique sequences \( M_{\text{call}} \) and \( M_{\text{ret}} \) are created post linking when the binaries are available (Section 6).

5  Implementation

5.1 ConfLLVM

We implemented ConfLLVM as part of the LLVM framework [34], targeting Windows and Linux x64 platforms.

**Compiler front-end.** We introduce a new type qualifier, `private`, in the language that the programmers can use to annotate types. For example, a private integer-typed variable can be declared as `private int x`, and a (public) pointer pointing to a private integer as `private int *p`. The `struct` fields inherit their `outermost` annotation from the corresponding `struct`-typed variable. For example, consider a declaration `struct st { private int *p; }, and a variable x of type `struct` st. Then x.p inherits its qualifier from x: if x is declared as `private st x`, then x.p is a private pointer pointing to a private integer. This convention ensures that despite the memory partitioning in public and private, each object is laid out contiguously in memory in only one of the regions.

We modified the Clang [4] frontend to parse the private type qualifier and generate the LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR) instrumented with this additional metadata. Once the IR is generated, ConfLLVM runs standard LLVM IR optimizations that are part of the LLVM toolchain. Most of the optimizations work as-is and don’t require any change. Optimizations that change the metadata (e.g., remove-dead-args changes the function signatures), need to be modified. While we found that it is not much effort to modify an optimization, we chose to modify only the most important ones in order to bound our effort. We disable the remaining optimizations in our prototype.

**LLVM IR and type inference.** After all the optimizations are run, our compiler runs a type qualifier inference [28] pass
over the IR. This inference pass propagates the type qualifier annotations to local variables, and outputs an IR where all the intermediate variables are optionally annotated with `private` qualifiers. The inference is implemented using a standard algorithm based on generating subtyping constraints on dataflows, which are then solved using an SMT solver [26]. If the constraints are unsatisfiable, an error is reported to the user. We refer the reader to [28] for details of the algorithm.

After type qualifier inference, ConfLLVM knows the taint of each memory operand for `load` and `store` instructions. With a simple dataflow analysis [16], the compiler statically determines the taint of each register at each instruction.

**Register spilling and code generation.** We made the register allocator taint-aware: when a register is to be spilled on the stack, the compiler appropriately chooses the private or the public stack depending on the taint of the register. Once the LLVM IR is lowered to machine IR, ConfLLVM emits the assembly code inserting all the checks for memory bounds and taint-aware CFI.

**MPX Optimizations.** ConfLLVM optimizes the bounds-checking in the MPX scheme. MPX instruction operands are identical to x64 memory operands, therefore one can check bounds of a complex operand using a single instruction. However, we found that bounds-checking a register is faster than bounds-checking a memory operand (perhaps because using a memory operand requires an implicit 1ea). ConfLLVM optimizes the checks to be on a register as much as possible. It reserves 1MB of space around the public and private regions as guard regions and eliminates the displacement from the memory operand of a check if its absolute value is smaller than $2^{20}$. Usually the displacement value is a small constant (for accessing structure fields or doing stack accesses) and this optimization applies to a large degree. Further, by enabling the _chkstk enforcement for the MPX scheme also (Section 3), ConfLLVM eliminates checks on stack accesses altogether because the rsp value is bound to be within the public region (and rsp+offset is bound to be within the private region).

ConfLLVM further coalesces MPX checks within a basic block. Before adding a check, it confirms if the same check was already added previously in the same block, and there are no intervening call instructions or subsequent modifications to the base or index registers.

**Implicit flows.** By default, ConfLLVM tracks explicit flows. It additionally produces a warning when the program branches on private data, indicating the presence of a possible implicit flow. Such a branch is easy to detect: it is a conditional jump on a private-tainted register. Thus, if no such warning is produced, then the application indeed lacks both explicit and implicit flows. Additionally, we also allow the compiler to be used in an all-private scenario where all data manipulated by $U$ is tainted private. In such a case, the job of the compiler is easy: it only needs to limit memory accesses in $U$ to its own region of memory. Implicit flows are not possible in this mode. All our applications (Section 7) do not have implicit flows.

### 5.2 ConfVerify

ConfVerify checks that a binary produced by ConfLLVM has the required instrumentation in place to guarantee that there are no (explicit) private data leaks. The design goal of ConfVerify is to guard against bugs in ConfLLVM; it is not a general-purpose verifier meant for arbitrary binaries. ConfVerify actually helped us catch bugs in ConfLLVM during its development.

ConfVerify is only 1500 LOC in addition to an off-the-shelf disassembler that it uses for CFG construction. (We use the LLVM disassembler.) This is three orders of magnitude smaller than ConfLLVM’s 5MLOC. Moreover, ConfVerify is much simpler than ConfLLVM; ConfVerify does not include register allocation, optimizations, etc. and uses a simple dataflow analysis to check all the flows. Consequently, it provides a higher degree of assurance for the security of our scheme.

**Disassembly.** ConfVerify requires the unique prefixes of magic sequences (Section 4) as input and uses them to identify procedure entries in the binary. It starts disassembling the procedures and constructs their control-flow graphs (CFG). ConfVerify assumes that the binary satisfies CFI, which makes it possible to reliably identify all instructions in a procedure. If the disassembly fails, the binary is rejected. Otherwise, ConfVerify checks its assumptions: that the magic sequences were indeed unique in the procedures identified and that they have enough CFI checks.

**Data flow analysis and checks.** Next, ConfVerify performs a separate dataflow analysis on every procedure’s CFG to determine the taints of all the registers at each instruction. It starts from the taint bits of the magic sequence preceding the procedure. It looks for MPX checks or the use of segment registers to identify the taints of memory operands; if it cannot find a check in the same basic block, the verification fails. For each store instruction, it checks that the taint of the destination operand matches the taint of the source register. For direct calls, it checks that the expected taints of the arguments, as encoded in the magic sequence at the callee, matches the taints of the argument registers at the call site (this differs from ConfLLVM which uses functions signatures). For indirect control transfers (indirect calls and ret), ConfVerify confirms that there is a check for the magic sequence at the target site and that its taint bits match the inferred taints for registers. After a call instruction, ConfVerify picks up taint of the return register from the magic sequence (there should be one), marks all caller-save registers as private, and callee-save registers as public (following ConfLLVM’s convention).

**Additional checks.** ConfVerify additionally makes sure that a direct or a conditional jump can only go a location in the same procedure. ConfVerify rejects a binary that
has an indirect jump, a system call, or if it modifies a segment register. ConfVerify also confirms correct usage of _chkstk to ensure that rsp is kept within stack bounds. For the segment-register scheme, ConfVerify also checks that each memory operand uses only the lower 32-bits of registers.

**Formal analysis.** Although ConfVerify is fairly simple, to improve our confidence in its design, we built a formal model consisting of an abstract assembly language with all essential features like indirect calls, as well as ConfVerify’s checks. We prove formally that any program that passes ConfVerify’s checks satisfies a standard information flow security property, termination-insensitive noninterference [49]. In words, this property states that data leaks are impossible. We defer the details of the formalization to a technical report [1].

**6 Toolchain**

This section describes the overall flow to launch an application using our toolchain.

**Compiling U using ConfLLVM.** The only external functions for U’s code are those exported by T. U’s code is compiled with an (auto-generated) stub file, that implements each of these T functions as an indirect jump from a table externals, located at a constant position in U (e.g., jmp (externals + offset)_i for the i-th function). The table externals is initialized with zeroes at this point, and ConfLLVM links all the U files to produce a U dll.

The U dll is then postprocessed to patch all the references to globals, so that they correspond to the correct (private or public) region. The globals themselves are relocated by the loader. The postprocessing pass also sets the 59-bit prefix for the magic sequences (used for CFI, Section 4). We find these sequences by generating random bit sequences and checking the magic sequences (used for CFI, Section 4). We find these

**Wrappers for T functions.** For each of the functions in T’s interface exported to U, we write a small wrapper that:

1. (a) performs the necessary checks for the arguments (e.g. the send wrapper would check that its argument buffer is contained in U’s public region), (b) copies arguments to T’s stack, (c) switches gs, (d) switches rsp to T’s stack, and (e) calls the underlying T function (e.g. send in libc). On return, it the wrapper switches gs and rsp back and jumps to U in a similar manner to our CFI return instrumentation. Additionally, the wrappers include the magic sequences similar to those in U so that the CFI checks in U do not fail when calling T. These wrappers are compiled with the T dll, and the output dll exports the interface functions.

**Loading the U and T dlls.** When loading the U and T dlls, the loader: (1) populates the externals table in U with addresses of the wrapper functions in T, (2) relocates the globals in U to their respective, private or public regions, (3) sets the MPX bound registers for the MPX scheme or the segment registers for the segment-register scheme, and (4) initializes the heaps and stacks in all the regions, marks them non-executable, and jumps to the main routine.

**Memory allocator.** ConfLLVM uses a customized memory allocator to enclose the private and public allocations in their respective sections. We modified dlmalloc [6] to achieve this.

**7 Evaluation**

The goal of our evaluation is four-fold: (a) Quantify the performance overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumentation, both for enforcing bounds and for enforcing CFI; (b) Demonstrate that ConfLLVM scales to large, existing applications and quantify changes to existing applications to make them ConfLLVM-compatible; (c) Check that our scheme actually stops confidentiality exploits in applications.

**7.1 CPU benchmarks**

We measured the overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumentation on the standard SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks [11]. We treat the code of the benchmarks as untrusted (in U) and compile it with ConfLLVM. We use the system’s native libc, which is treated as trusted (in T). These benchmarks use no private data, so we added no annotations to the benchmarks, which makes all data public by default. Nonetheless, the code emitted by ConfLLVM ensures that all memory accesses are actually in the public region, it enforces CFI, and switches stacks when calling T functions, so this experiment accurately captures ConfLLVM’s overheads. We ran the benchmarks in the following configurations.

- **Base:** Benchmarks compiled with vanilla LLVM, with O2 optimizations. This is the baseline for evaluation.2
- **BaseOA:** The configuration BaseOA is the benchmarks compiled with vanilla LLVM but running with our custom allocator.
- **OurBare:** Compiled with ConfLLVM, but without any runtime instrumentation. However, all optimizations unsupported by ConfLLVM are disabled, the memories of T and U are separated and, hence, stacks are switched in calling T functions from U.
- **OurCFI:** Like OurBare but additionally with CFI instrumentation, but no memory bounds enforcement.
- **OurMPX:** Full ConfLLVM, memory-bounds checks use MPX.
- **OurSeg:** Full ConfLLVM, memory-bounds checks use segmentation.

Briefly, the difference between OurCFI and OurBare is the cost of our CFI instrumentation. The difference between OurMPX (resp. OurSeg) and OurCFI is the cost of enforcing bounds using MPX (resp. segment registers).

All benchmarks were run on a Microsoft Surface Pro-4 Windows 10 machine with an Intel Core i7-6650U 2.20 GHz 64-bit processor with 2 cores (4 logical cores) and 8 GB RAM.

2O2 is the standard optimization level for performance evaluation. Higher levels include “optimizations” that don’t always speed up the program.
Table 5 shows the results, averaged over ten runs. The numbers in the first column are run times in seconds. The remaining columns report percentage changes, relative to the first column. The standard deviations were all below 3%.

The overhead of ConfLLVM using MPX (OurMPX) is up to 74.03%, while that of ConfLLVM using segmentation (OurSep) is up to 24.5%. As expected, the overheads are almost consistently significantly lower when using segmentation than when using MPX. Looking further, some of the overhead (up to 10.2%) comes from CFI enforcement (OurCFI−Our bare). The average CFI overhead is 3.62%, competitive with best known techniques [25]. Stack switching and disabled optimizations (Ourbare) account for the remaining overhead. The overhead due to our custom memory allocator (BaseOA) is negligible and, in many benchmarks, the custom allocator improves performance.

We further comment on some seemingly odd results. On mcf, the cost of CFI alone (OurCFI, 4.17%) seems to be higher than that of the full MPX-based instrumentation (OurMPX, 4.02%). We verified that this is due to an outlier in the OurCFI experiment. On hmr, the overhead of Ourbare is negative because the optimizations that ConfLLVM disables actually slow it down. Finally, on milc, the overhead of ConfLLVM is negative because this benchmark benefits significantly from the use of our custom memory allocator. Indeed, relative to BaseOA, the remaining overheads follow expected trends.

7.2 Web server: NGINX

Next, we demonstrate that our method and ConfLLVM scale to large applications. We cover three applications in this and the next two sections. We first use ConfLLVM to protect logs in NGINX, the most popular web server among high-traffic websites [9]. NGINX has a logging module that logs time stamps, processing times, etc. for each request along with request metadata such as the client address and the request URI. An obvious confidentiality concern is that sensitive content from files being served may leak into the logs due to bugs. We use ConfLLVM to prevent such leaks.

We annotate NGINX’s codebase to place OpenSSL in $T$, and the rest of NGINX, including all its request parsing, processing, serving, and logging code in $U$. The code in $U$ is compiled with ConfLLVM (total 124,001 LoC). Within $U$, we mark everything as private, except for the buffers in the logging module that are marked as public. To log request URLs, which are actually private, we add a new encrypt_log function to $T$ that $U$ invokes to encrypt the request URI before adding it to the log. This function encrypts using a key that is isolated in $T$’s own region. The key is pre-shared with the administrator who is authorized to read the logs. The encrypted result of encrypt_log is placed in a public buffer.

In total, we added or modified 160 LoC in NGINX (0.13% of NGINX’s codebase) and added 138 LoC to $T$.

Our goal is to measure the overhead of ConfLLVM on the sustained throughput of NGINX. We run our experiments in 6 configurations: Base, Our1Mem, Ourbare, OurCFI, and OurMPX-Sep, OurMPX. Of these, Base, Ourbare, OurCFI, and OurMPX are the same as those in Section 7.1. We use MPX for bounds checks (OurMPX), as opposed to segmentation, since we know from Section 7.1 that MPX is worse for ConfLLVM. Our1Mem is like Ourbare (compiled with ConfLLVM without any instrumentation), but also does not separate memories for $T$ and $U$. OurMPX-Sep includes all instrumentation, but does not separate stacks for private and public data. Briefly, the difference between Ourbare and Our1Mem is the overhead of separating $T$’s memory from $U$’s and switching stacks on every call to $T$, while the difference between OurMPX and OurMPX-Sep is the overhead of increased cache pressure from having separate stacks for private and public data.

We host NGINX version 1.13.12 on an Intel Core i7-6700 3.40GHz 64-bit processor with 4 cores (8 logical cores), 32 GB RAM, and a 10 Gbps Ethernet card, running Ubuntu v16.04.1 with Linux kernel version 4.13.0-38-generic. Hyperthreading was disabled. NGINX is configured to run a single worker core hosting NGINX in all setups. The numbers reported below are averages of 10 runs. The standard deviations are all below 0.3%, except in Base for file sizes 0 KB and 1 KB, where the standard deviations are below 2.2%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Base(s)</th>
<th>BaseOA</th>
<th>Ourbare</th>
<th>OurCFI</th>
<th>OurSep</th>
<th>OurMPX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gcc</td>
<td>272.36</td>
<td>-5.92%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
<td>12.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gobmk</td>
<td>395.62</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>4.32%</td>
<td>13.66%</td>
<td>20.90%</td>
<td>33.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hmr</td>
<td>128.63</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>-2.54%</td>
<td>-2.50%</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
<td>65.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h264ref</td>
<td>365.13</td>
<td>-0.63%</td>
<td>6.96%</td>
<td>17.12%</td>
<td>22.20%</td>
<td>74.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbm</td>
<td>208.80</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>7.06%</td>
<td>10.63%</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bzip2</td>
<td>406.33</td>
<td>-0.47%</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
<td>4.62%</td>
<td>10.19%</td>
<td>40.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mcf</td>
<td>280.06</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>3.69%</td>
<td>4.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milc</td>
<td>438.60</td>
<td>-8.81%</td>
<td>-7.61%</td>
<td>-7.17%</td>
<td>-6.40%</td>
<td>-3.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libquantum</td>
<td>263.8</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
<td>3.83%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>17.89%</td>
<td>40.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sjeng</td>
<td>424.46</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
<td>19.75%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spfinx3</td>
<td>438.6</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
<td>9.93%</td>
<td>30.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The overheads of MPX may seem high, especially given that MPX was designed to make memory-bounds checking efficient. However, Oleksenko et al.’s recent investigation of MPX has found very similar overheads [43].
### Table 6. NGINX throughput in req/s for different request sizes.

Percentages are overheads relative to the first column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File size</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>OurIMem</th>
<th>OurBare</th>
<th>OurCFI</th>
<th>OurMPX-Sep</th>
<th>OurMPX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>72,917</td>
<td>-3.19%</td>
<td>6.56%</td>
<td>14.30%</td>
<td>18.86%</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 KB</td>
<td>65,891</td>
<td>-2.34%</td>
<td>6.37%</td>
<td>14.17%</td>
<td>15.80%</td>
<td>20.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 KB</td>
<td>50,959</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>10.15%</td>
<td>19.40%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>29.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 KB</td>
<td>38,158</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>8.39%</td>
<td>11.40%</td>
<td>12.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 KB</td>
<td>24,938</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-2.68%</td>
<td>-0.33%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. NGINX throughput in req/s for different request sizes. Figures are percentage changes relative to the first column.

Figure 6 shows the steady-state throughputs in the six configurations for file sizes ranging from 0 to 40 KB. The throughput for Base is reported in requests/s and the remaining columns are percentage changes relative to Base. For file sizes beyond 40 KB, the 10 Gbps network card saturates in the base line before the CPU, and the excess CPU cycles absorb our overheads.

Overall, ConfLLVM’s overhead on throughput ranges from 3.25% to 29.32%. The overhead is not monotonic in file size or base line throughput, indicating that there are compensating effects at play. For large file sizes, the relative amount of time spent outside \( \mathcal{U} \), e.g., in the kernel in copying data, is substantial. Since code outside \( \mathcal{U} \) is not subject to our instrumentation, our relative overhead falls for large file sizes (>10 KB here) and eventually tends to zero. The initial increase in overhead up to file size 10 KB comes mostly from the increased cache pressure due to the separation of stacks for public and private data (the difference Our\(_{MPX}\)−Our\(_{MPX-Sep}\)). This is unsurprising: As the file size increases, so does the cache footprint of \( \mathcal{U} \). In contrast, the overheads due to CFI (difference Our\(_{CFI}\)−Our\(_{Bare}\)) and the separation of the memories of \( \mathcal{T} \) and \( \mathcal{U} \) (difference Our\(_{Bare}\)−Our\(_{IMem}\)) are relatively constant for small file sizes.

Note that these overheads are moderate and we expect that they can be reduced further by using segmentation in place of MPX for bounds checks.

### 7.3 OpenLDAP

Next, we apply ConfLLVM to OpenLDAP [44], an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [52]. LDAP is a standard for organizing and accessing hierarchical information. Here, we use ConfLLVM to protect root and user passwords stored in OpenLDAP version 2.4.45. By default, the root password (which authorizes access to OpenLDAP’s entire store) and user passwords are all stored unencrypted. We added new functions to encrypt and decrypt these passwords, and modified OpenLDAP to use these functions prior to storing and loading passwords, respectively. The concern still is that OpenLDAP might leak in-memory passwords without encrypting them. To prevent this, we treat all of OpenLDAP as untrusted (\( \mathcal{U} \)), and protect it by compiling it with ConfLLVM. The new cryptographic functions are in \( \mathcal{T} \). Specifically, decryption returns its output in a private buffer, so ConfLLVM prevents \( \mathcal{U} \) from leaking it. The part we compile with ConfLLVM is 300,000 lines of C code, spread across 728 source files. Our modifications amount to 52 new LoC for \( \mathcal{T} \) and 100 edited LoC in \( \mathcal{U} \). Together, these constitute about 0.5% of the original codebase.

We configure OpenLDAP as a multi-threaded server (the default) with a memory-mapped backing store (also the default), and simple username/password authentication. We use the same machine as for the SPEC CPU benchmarks (Section 7.1) to host an OpenLDAP server configured to run 6 concurrent threads. The server is pre-populated with 10,000 random directory entries. All memory-mapped files are cached in memory before the experiment starts.

In our first experiment, 80 concurrent clients connected to the server from another machine over a 100Mbps direct Ethernet link issue concurrent requests for directory entries that do not exist. Across three trials, the server handles on average 26,254 and 22,908 requests per second in the baseline (Base) and ConfLLVM using MPX (Our\(_{MPX}\)). This corresponds to a throughput degradation of 12.74%. The server CPU remains nearly saturated throughout the experiment. The standard deviations are very small (1.7% and 0.2% in Base and Our\(_{MPX}\), respectively).

Our second experiment is identical to the first, except that 60 concurrent clients issue small requests for entries that exist on the server. Now, the baseline and ConfLLVM handle 29,698 and 26,895 queries per second, respectively. This is a throughput degradation of 9.44%. The standard deviations are small (less than 0.2%).

The reason for the difference in overheads in these two experiments is that OpenLDAP does less work in \( \mathcal{U} \) looking for directory entries that exist than it does looking for directory entries that don’t exist. Again, the overheads of ConfLLVM’s instrumentation are only moderate and can be reduced further by using segmentation in place of MPX.

### 7.4 ConfLLVM with Intel SGX

Hardware features, such as the Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [24], allow isolating sensitive code and data into a separate enclave, which cannot be read or written directly from outside. Although this affords strong protection (even against a malicious operating system), bugs within the isolated code can still leak sensitive data out from the enclave. This risk can be mitigated by using ConfLLVM to compile the code that runs within the enclave.

We experimented with a proprietary system of our organization called SEC-INF (name anonymized for the submission). SEC-INF performs image classification by running a pre-trained model on a user-provided image. It treats both the model (its parameters) and the user input as sensitive information, therefore, these appear unencrypted only inside an enclave. SEC-INF contains a port of Torch [12, 13] that was made compatible with a proprietary enclave SDK. The image classifier is an eleven layer neural network (NN) that categorizes images into ten classes.
We treat both Torch and the NN as untrusted code $U$ and compile them using ConRLVM. We mark all data in the enclave private, and map $U$’s private region to a block of memory within the enclave. $U$ contains roughly 36K Loc. The trusted code ($T$) running inside the enclave only consists of generic application-independent logic: the enclave SDK, our memory allocator, and the stubs to switch between $T$ and $U$. Outside the enclave, we deploy a web server that takes encrypted images from clients and classifies them inside the enclave. The use of ConRLVM crucially reduces trust on the application-sensitive logic that is all contained in $U$.

We ran this setup on an Intel Core i7-6700 3.40GHz 64-bit processor with an Ubuntu 16.04 OS (Linux 4.15.0-34-generic kernel). We connect to our application from a client that issues 10,000 sequential requests to classify small (3 KB) files, and measure the response time per image within the enclave (thus excluding latencies outside the enclave, which are common to the baseline and our enforcement). We do this in 5 configurations of Section 7.1: Base, Base$_{DA}$, Our$_{base}$, Our$_{CFI}$ and Our$_{MPX}$. Figure 7 shows the average response time for classifying an image in each of these five configurations. The standard deviations are low, all below 1%. For Base, we use the optimization level O2, while the remaining configurations use O2 except for 2 source files (out of 13) where a bug in ConRLVM (still under investigation) forces us to use O0. This means that the overheads reported in Figure 7 are higher than actual.

Even this overestimated overhead (26.87%) is much lower than many of the latency experiments of Section 7.1. This is because, in the classifier, a significant amount of time (almost 70%) is spent in a tight loop, which contains mostly floating point instructions and our instrumentation’s MPX bound-check instructions. These two classes of instructions can execute in parallel on the CPU, so the overhead of our instrumentation is masked within the loop.

### 7.5 Data integrity and scaling with parallelism

The goal of our next experiment is two-fold: to verify that ConRLVM’s instrumentation scales well with thread parallelism, and to test that ConRLVM can be used to protect data integrity, not just confidentiality. We implemented a simple multithreaded userspace library that offers standard file read and write functionality, but additionally provides data integrity by maintaining a Merkle hash tree of file system contents. A security concern is that a bug in the application or the library may clobber the hash tree to nullify integrity guarantees. To prevent this, we compile both the library and its clients using ConRLVM (i.e. as part of $U$). All data within the client and the library is marked private. The only exception is the hash tree, which is marked public. As usual, ConRLVM prevents the private data from being written to public data structures accidentally, thus providing integrity for the hash tree. To write hashes to the tree intentionally, we place the hashing function in $T$, allowing it to “declassify” data hashes as public.

We experiment with this library on a Windows 10 machine with an Intel i7-6700 CPU (4 cores, 8 hyperthreaded cores) and 32 GB RAM. Our client program creates between 1 and 6 parallel threads, all of which read a 2 GB file concurrently. The file is memory-mapped within the library and cached previously. This gives us a CPU-bound workload. We measure the total time taken to perform the reads in three configurations: Base, Our$_{Seg}$ and Our$_{MPX}$. Table 8 shows the total runtime (in seconds) as a function of the number of threads and the configuration, averaged across 5 runs. The standard deviations are negligible (< 3%). Until the number of threads exceeds the number of cores (4), the time and relative overhead of both the MPX and segmentation schemes remains nearly constant, establishing linear scaling with the number of threads. The actual overhead of Our$_{Seg}$ is below 10% and that of Our$_{MPX}$ is below 17%.

### 7.6 Vulnerability-injection experiments

To test that ConRLVM stops data extraction vulnerabilities from being exploited, we hand-crafted three vulnerabilities: (1) a buffer-bounds vulnerability in the Mongoose web server that allows reading stale data from the stack, (2) a bug in the compression tool MiniZip that leaks the encryption password to a log file, and (3) a simple function that uses printf’s varargs to leak private data to the screen. In all cases, compiling the applications with ConRLVM (with suitable annotations to mark private data) prevented the exploit from succeeding. We defer details to a technical report [1].

### 8 Discussion and Future Work

Currently, our scheme allows classifying data into two levels—public and private. It cannot be used for finer classification, e.g., to separate the private data of Alice, the private data of Bob and public data at the same time. We also do not support label polymorphism at present, although that can potentially be implemented using C++-like templates.

In our scheme, $T$ is trusted and therefore must be implemented with care. ConRLVM guarantees that $U$ cannot access $T$’s memory or jump to arbitrary points in $T$, so
the only remaining attack surface for $T$ is the API that it exposes to $U$. $T$ must ensure that stringing together a sequence of these API calls cannot cause leaks. We recommend the following (standard) strategies. First, $T$ should be kept small, mostly containing application-independent functionality, e.g., communication interfaces, cryptographic routines, and optionally a small number of libc routines (mainly for performance reasons), moving the rest of the code to $U$. Such a $T$ can be re-used across applications and can be subject to careful audit/verification. Further, declassification routines in $T$ must provide guarded access to $U$. For instance, $T$ should disallow an arbitrary number of calls to a password checking routine to prevent probing attacks.

We rely on the absence of the magic sequence in $T$’s binary to prevent $U$ from jumping inside $T$. We ensure this by selecting the magic string when the entire code of $U$ and $T$ is available. While dynamic loading in $U$ can simply be disallowed, any dynamic loading in $T$ must ensure that the loaded library does not contain the magic sequence. Since the (59-bits) magic sequence is generated at random, the chances of it appearing in the loaded library is minimal. A stronger defense is to instrument indirect control transfers in $U$ to remain inside $U$’s own code.

ConfLLVM supports callbacks from $T$ to $U$ with the help of trusted wrappers in $U$ that return to a fixed location in $T$, where $T$ can restore its stack and start execution from where it left off (or fail if $T$ never called into $U$).

9 Related Work

Our work bears similarities to Sinha et al. [56] who proposed a design methodology for programming secure enclaves (e.g., those that use Intel SGX instructions for memory isolation). The code inside an enclave is divided into $U$ and $L$. $U$’s code is compiled via a special instrumenting compiler [22] while $L$’s code is trusted and may be compiled using any compiler. This is similar in principle to our $U$-$T$ division. However, there are several differences. First, even the goals are different: their scheme does not track taints; it only ensures that all unencrypted I/O done by $U$ goes through $L$, which encrypts all outgoing data uniformly. Thus, the application cannot carry out plain-text communication even on public data without losing the security guarantee. Second, their implementation does not support multi-threading (it relies on page protection to isolate $L$ from $U$). Third, they maintain a bitmap of writable memory locations for enforcing CFI, resulting in time and memory overheads. Our CFI is taint-aware and without these overheads. Finally, their verifier does not scale to SPEC benchmarks, whereas our verifier is faster and scales to all binaries that we have tried.

In an effort parallel to ours, Carr et al. [21] present DataShield, whose goal, like ConfLLVM’s, is information flow control in low-level code. However, there are several differences between DataShield and our work. First and foremost, DataShield itself only prevents non-control data flow attacks in which data is leaked or corrupted without relying on a control flow hijack. A separate CFI solution is needed to prevent leaks of information in the face of control flow hijacks. In contrast, our scheme incorporates a customized CFI that provides only the minimum necessary for information flow control. One of the key insights of our work is that (standard) CFI is neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent information flow violations due to control flow hijacks. Second, DataShield places blind trust in its compiler. In contrast, in our work, the verifier ConfVerify eliminates the need to trust the compiler ConfLLVM. Third, DataShield enforces memory safety at object-granularity on sensitive objects. This allows DataShield to enforce integrity for data invariants, which is mostly outside the scope of our work. However, as we show in Section 7.5, our work can be used to prevent untrusted data from flowing into sensitive locations, which is a different form of integrity.

Rocha et al. [47] and Banerjee et al. [17] use combination of hybrid and static methods for information flow control, but in memory- and type-safe languages like Java. Simplifier by Rastogi et al. [46] tracks information flow only at the level of process binaries by using separate docker containers.

Region-based memory partitioning has been explored before in the context of safe and efficient memory management [29, 58], but not for information flow. In ConfLLVM, regions obviate the need for dynamic taint tracking [37, 50, 54]. TaintCheck [42] first proposed the idea of dynamic taint tracking, and forms the basis of Valgrind [41]. DECAF [32] is a whole system binary analysis framework including a taint-tracking mechanism. However, such dynamic taint trackers incur heavy performance overhead. For example, DECAF has an overhead of 600%. Similarly, TaintCheck can impose a 37x performance overhead for CPU-bound applications. Suh et al. [57] report less than 1% overheads for their dynamic taint-tracking scheme, but they rely on custom hardware.

Static analyses [19, 20, 30, 51] of source code can prove security-relevant criteria such as safe downcasts in C++, or the correct use of variadic arguments. When proofs cannot be constructed, runtime checks are inserted to enforce relevant policy at runtime. This is similar to our use of runtime checks, but the purposes are different.

Memory-safety techniques for C such as CCured [40] and SoftBound [39] do not provide confidentiality in all cases and already have overheads higher than those of ConfLLVM (see [21, Section 2.2] for a summary of the overheads). Techniques such as control flow integrity (CFI) [15] and code-pointer integrity (CPI) [33] prevent control flow hijacks but not all data leaks. While our new taint-aware CFI is an integral component of our enforcement, our goal of preventing data leaks goes beyond CFI and CPI. Our CFI mechanism is similar to Abadi et al. [15] and Zeng et al. [59] in its use of magic sequences, but our magic sequences are taint-aware.
References


