Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces

We present a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the true values of the agents and we develop online winner-pays-bid and all-pay mechanisms that implement the same outcome of the algorithm with the aid of a bidding dashboard. The bidding dashboards that we develop work in conjunction with the mechanism to guarantee that bidding according to the dashboard is strategically equivalent (with vanishing utility difference) to bidding truthfully in the sequential truthful implementation of the allocation algorithm. Our dashboard mechanism makes only a single call to the allocation algorithm in each stage.

Joint work with Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, and Onno Zoeter


Speaker Details

Professor Hartline’s research introduces design and analysis methodologies from computer science to understand and improve outcomes of economic systems. Prof. Hartline received his Ph.D. in 2003 from the University of Washington under the supervision of Anna Karlin. He was a postdoctoral fellow at Carnegie Mellon University under the supervision of Avrim Blum; and subsequently a researcher at Microsoft Research in Silicon Valley. He joined Northwestern University in 2008 where he is a Professor of Computer Science. He was on sabbatical at Harvard University in the Economics Department during the 2014 calendar year and visiting Microsoft Research, New England for the Spring of 2015.

Jason Hartline
Northwestern University