Delegatable Anonymous Credentials


February 8, 2008


Melissa Chase


Brown University


Anonymous credential systems allow users to anonymously obtain credentials from organizations, and to anonymously and unlinkably prove possesion of valid credentials. Often in practice, however, a user authenticates using some credential chain: a root organization gives a credential to an intermediate party who can in turn use this to issue credentials to user.
We address this problem by presenting the first efficient delegatable anonymous credential scheme. In such a scheme, a party can receive credentials from an organization, and then anonymously and unlinkably issue delegated credentials to other users, who can in turn delegate these credentials to another level. Then a user can prove possession of a valid chain of credentials of a given length without revealing any other identifying information. This talk will describe our result and outline some of the main techniques used to achieve it.


Melissa Chase

Melissa is a PhD candidate at Brown University working with Prof Anna Lysyanskaya and expects to earn a PhD in Computer Science in May. She has a BS in Mathematics and Computer Science from Harvey Mudd College and a MS in Computer Science from Brown. At Brown, she has worked in a number of different areas, including anonymous credentials, electronic cash, and attribute based encryption as well as more theoretical areas like general non-interactive zero knowledge and Universal Composability security definitions.