GNM2013: Posted Prices Exchange for Display Advertising Contracts


June 7, 2013


Yagil Engel


MSR Advanced Technology Lab


We propose a new market design for display advertising contracts, based on posted prices. Our model and algorithmic framework address several major challenges: (i) the space of possible impression types is exponential in the number of attributes, which is typically large, therefore a complete price space cannot be maintained; (ii) advertisers are usually unable or reluctant to provide extensive demand (willingness-to-pay) functions, (iii) the levels of detail with which supply and demand are specified are often not identical. We propose a price space over compact set of market goods, each is a statement over a subset of the attributes. This implies a complex relationship between the way goods are represented in the market, and the goods on which players’ utility functions are defined. We propose a market that supports this model, and prove that under reasonable assumptions on advertisers’ utility equilibrium prices exist and can be computed in polynomial time. To facilitate elicitation, we show how utility functions can be extrapolated by observing advertiser’s demand statements in response to current prices. Joint work with Moshe Tennenholtz.


Yagil Engel

Yagil Engel joined MSR Advanced Technology Lab in Israel as a senior researcher in April 2012; at ATLI he is working on various problems in monetization and on the design of online mechanisms. Yagil completed his PhD in computer science at the University of Michigan in 2008, focusing on multi-attribute preference representation and mechanism design. Prior to that Yagil worked for several years in the software industry on electronic commerce systems, and visited MS LiveLabs for internship in the summer of 2007. More recently, he worked at IBM Research, Haifa, after a two-year postdoc at the Technion, Israel.