Handling Multitude of Nash Equilibria in Voting Games


November 28, 2012


Handling Multitude of Nash Equilibria in Voting Games

Following an introduction to voting and to the Nash equilibrium concept we will present two papers which attempt to deal with the multitude of Nash equilibria in voting games in different ways. First, we will expand on an iterative process which enables us (or doesn’t…) to reach a specific equilibrium in the game, under different voting systems and depending on various criteria. Further on, we examine some of the characteristics of the equilibria in simple plurality games, using empirical work, which we manage to examine by making a small, natural change to the voters’ incentives, which turns out helps the game quite significantly.


Omer Lev

Omer Lev is currently doing his Ph.D in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, working on algorithmic game theory, auctions and online services.