Provably Secure Steganography with Imperfect Sampling

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Abstract. The goal of steganography is to pass secret messages by disguising them as innocent-looking covertexts. Real world stegosystems are often broken because they make invalid assumptions about the system's ability to sample covertexts. We examine whether it is possible to weaken this assumption. By modeling the covertext distribution as a stateful Markov process, we create a sliding scale between real world and provably secure stegosystems. We also show that insufficient knowledge of past states can have catastrophic results.

Keywords: Information hiding, steganography, digital signatures, Markov processes.

1   Introduction

The goal of steganography is to pass secret messages by sending innocuous data. The sender may give the receiver *covertexts* that are distributed according to a *covertext distribution*. A covertext is made up of multiple *documents*. For example, a digital camera can define a covertext distribution of photographs, in which pixels, tiles, or even entire pictures can be considered documents. A *stegosystem* transforms a secret message, called a *hiddentext*, into a *stegotext* that looks like a covertext.

Real-world stegosystems are broken because they make invalid assumptions about the covertext distribution. Often, this is an assumption about an *adversary's lack of knowledge* about the distribution. For example, for a long time, modifying the least significant bits of pixels values in bitmaps was considered a good idea because these bits looked random. Then Moskowitz, Longdon and Chang [MLC01] showed that there is a strong correlation between the least significant bit and the most significant bit (see Figures 7-10 in their paper for an instructive example).

Provably secure steganography attacks the problem by quantifying the *stegosystem's need for knowledge*. Anderson and Petitcolas [AP98] observe that every covertext can be compressed to generate a hiddentext. Therefore, to hide a message, we can "decompress" it into a stegotext. Le [Le03] and Le and Kurosawa [LK03] construct a provably secure compression-based stegosystem that assumes both the sender and receiver know the covertext distribution exactly.

Independently, Sallee [Sal03] implemented a compression-based stegosystem for JPEG images that lets the sender and receiver estimate the covertext distribution. Compression-based schemes need to know the exact probability of every possible covertext.

Cachin [Cac98] proposed using rejection-sampling to generate stegotexts that look like covertexts. A publicly known hash function assigns a bit value to documents. To send one bit, the stegosystem samples from the covertext distribution until it selects a document that evaluates to the message XOR K, where K is a session key both parties derive from their shared secret key. Sending multiple bits requires stringing several documents together. Cachin's scheme is secure if the hash function is unbiased. Because the stegosystem only needs to be able to sample from the covertext distribution, it is known as a *black-box* stegosystem. This paper examines the nature of the black-box required for steganography.

Hopper, Langford and von Ahn [HLvA02] improve on Cachin's results. They give the first rigorous definition of steganographic security by putting it in terms of computational indistinguishability from the covertext distribution. Their stegosystem uses Cachin's rejection-sampling technique, but generalizes it to be applicable to any distribution, assuming it (1) has sufficient entropy and (2) can be sampled perfectly based on prior history. Reyzin and Russell [RR03] improve the robustness and efficiency of the Hopper et al. scheme. Von Ahn and Hopper [vAH04] create a public-key provably secure stegosystem and Backes and Cachin [BC05] and Hopper [Hop05] consider chosen covertext attacks. Despite these improvements, the two assumptions necessary for provably secure steganography remain in the literature. The entropy assumption appears inherent to the problem. We address the possibility of weakening the sampling assumption.

Some prior work focuses on the performance measures of black-box stegosystems. In particular, there is the *rate* of a stegosystem, which measures how many bits of the message you can pack per document transmitted. There is also the *query complexity per document* which measures how many times you need to query the sampler in order to create a document of the stegotext. Notably, Dedic et al. [DIRR05] showed that if the rate is w, then the query complexity per document is 2^w. We do not worry about query complexity, but rather about the very nature of the sampler at the disposal of a stegosystem, so the underlying question is very different.

Black-box stegosystems [Cac98, HLvA02, RR03, vAH04, BC05, Hop05] assume that they have access to an *adaptive* sampler. The sampler must be able to take an arbitrary history of documents as input and output a document distributed according to the covertext distribution conditioned on the prior history. For example, if our covertext distribution consists of images of teddy-bears, and each document is an 8×8 pixel tile, then the sampler's input is the first $k - 1$ tiles of the image (say, the ears of the teddy bear), and the output is the kth tile of the image (say, the nose). The stegosystem needs to be able to query the sampler multiple times on the same input: it continues to sample until it gets a document that corresponds to the message it wants to hide. The sampler must output many noses that correspond to the same set of ears.

Sampling teddy-bear noses based on teddy-bear ears is an absurd example. We use it because in the real world there are no known naturally occuring distributions that can be sampled based on history.[1] Our work examines whether accurate adaptive sampling is really neccessary. We come to the somewhat unsurprising conclusion that a stegosystem must assume that the sampler it uses is accurate. Our chief contribution is to examine what it really means to have a bad sampler.

There are many ways to characterize the abilities of a sampler. It can be contextual: given documents $d_i, \ldots, d_{j-1}, d_{j+1}, \ldots, d_k$, it produces possible values for d_j. A special case of a context sampler is a history-based sampler: given $d_i, \ldots, d_{j-1}$, it produces possible values for d_j. Since history-based samplers are sufficient for secure steganography, we limit our examination to those. Past experience has shown that stegosystems are broken when there is a statistical correlation between documents of the covertext distribution. For example, the least-significant and most-significant bits in a bitmap are correlated, which leads to Moskowitz et al's [MLC01] attack. Therefore, a history-based sampler might make a mistake *when it does not consider some of the history* (usually, due to either ignorance or memory and computational limitations). This means we can characterize a history-based sampler by the length of history it considers. We call a sampler that considers only some of the history a *semi-adaptive* sampler, while one that ignores the history entirely is called *non-adaptive*.

Some samplers may be limited by the number of times they can be queried on the same input. For example, Hopper et al [HLvA02] point out that human beings have difficulty generating multiple independent samples of e-mails on the same topic. The distribution of the output of the sampler and the covertext distribution may gradually (or even sharply) diverge after several draws. This problem can be analyzed in terms of query complexity, which is discussed in [DIRR05]. We do not consider it further.

Semi-adaptive samplers lead us naturally to consider Markov processes. Suppose the actual covertext distribution is D. The distribution D' from which a semi-adaptive sampler draws is a Markov process. Since a stegosystem approximates the distribution it samples, security requires that D and D' are sufficiently close. We introduce the concept of an *α-memoryless distribution*, a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable from some Markov process of order α. We design the definition of α-memorylessness so that it is necessary and sufficient for secure black-box steganography with semi-adaptive sampling.

We have three results:

1. We analyze what happens to the von Ahn and Hopper public key stegosystem [vAH04] when the sampler only considers the last α documents of the history. We calculate how inaccuracy in the sampler translates into insecurity in the stegosystem. Our results show that assuming the covertext distribution is α-memoryless is neccessary and sufficient for maintaining security.

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[1] Artificial distributions, such as the output of randomized algorithms and encryption functions, can be sampled perfectly. However, they tend to arouse suspicion, thus making them unsuitable for steganography.

2. We analyze the security of non-adaptive black-box stegosystems. Independently,[2] Petrowski et al. [PKSM] implemented a non-adaptive stegosystem for JPEG images, giving empirical evidence that memoryless distributions exist and can be used for secure steganography.

3. We construct a pathological α-memoryless high-entropy distribution for which black-box steganography is infeasible if the stegosystem's sampler considers only the last $\alpha - 1$ documents of the history (under the discrete logarithm assumption). An efficient adversary can detect any attempt at covert communication with overwhelming probability.

Organization: Section 2 presents notation and definitions. Section 3 analyzes the von Ahn and Hopper stegosystem [vAH04] in the context of semi-adaptive sampling. Section 4 examines non-adaptive stegosystems. Section 5 constructs a pathological covertext distribution for which black-box steganography is infeasible. Section 6 concludes. We have omitted some of the proofs; they can be found in the full paper [LM05].

2   Notation

We call a function $\nu \colon \mathbb{N} \to (0, 1)$ *negligible* if for all $c > 0$ and for all sufficiently large k, $\nu(k) < 1/k^c$.

The hiddentext will always be in $\{0, 1\}^*$. A covertext is composed of a sequence of documents. Each document comes from the alphabet $\mathbb{A}$; $|\mathbb{A}|$ may be exponential. We denote concatenation with the $\circ$ operator; a string s can be parsed to $s = s_1 \circ s_2 \circ ... \circ s_n$, where $|s| = n$. The symbol λ denotes the empty string.

Our main results measure the security of stegosystems; we calculate the probability of a stegosystem being broken in terms of the probability of an adversary breaking other cryptographic primitives. The term $\mathbf{Adv}_P^{\mathsf{game}}(A, k)$ refers to the probability of adversary A breaking the security of primitive P in the context of a scenario defined by game when the security parameter is k. For example, $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{DSA}}^{\mathsf{sig}}(A, 160)$ is the probability that A forges a 160-bit DSA signature. What we really care about is attacks by an a large class of adversaries, where each class defines the maximum amount of time and other resources an adversary can use. $\mathbf{InSec}_P^{\mathsf{game}}(class)$ is the maximum probability that any adversary in *class* can break the security of primitive P while in the scenario defined by game. For example, $\mathbf{InSec}_F^{\mathsf{owf}}(t, k)$ is the maximum probability of any adversary inverting the one-way function F if it runs in $t(k)$ time, where k is the security parameter. Therefore, if we say $3\mathbf{InSec}_\Sigma^{\mathsf{sig}}(t, q, k) \leq \mathbf{InSec}_F^{\mathsf{owf}}(t, k)$, this means that signature scheme Σ is three times as hard to break as one-way function F.

To define the probability of an attacker winning in a scenario, we need to consider the outcome of several events. The expression $Pf[e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n : c]$ is the probability that condition c holds given that events $e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n$ occured (and in that order). For example, let A be some algorithm that takes as input an integer

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[2] We presented preliminary results of this work in August 2004 [LM04].

and outputs a single bit. The expression $Pr[x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}; b \leftarrow A(x) : b = x \bmod 2]$ is the probability that $b = x \bmod 2$, given that first x was randomly chosen from $\mathbb{Z}$ and then b was generated by executing $A(x)$. In other words, it is the probability that A correctly calculates $x \bmod 2$ on a randomly chosen integer x.

We say that a function $f : \mathbb{A} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is ϵ-*biased* with respect to distribution D if $|Pr[d \leftarrow D : f(d) = 0] - 1/2| < \epsilon$. A $\epsilon(k)$-biased function is called an *unbiased* function if ϵ is a negligible function.[3] A covertext distribution that has sufficient minimum entropy for steganography is called *always informative* (see Hopper et al [HLvA02] for details).

We write $x \leftarrow D\langle h, n \rangle$ to denote sampling n documents from D conditioned on the prior history h; $D\langle h, n \rangle$ defines a distribution over $\mathbb{A}^n$. A semi-adaptive sampler samples one document from the distribution D conditioned only on the last α documents of h. $D^\alpha \langle h, n \rangle$ generates an n-document string by calling a semi-adaptive samper n times, each time appending the result to h. When we give a player sampling access to a distribution, we use $\cdot$ to denote the parameters that the player can pick. For example, the oracle $D\langle \cdot, 2 \rangle$ samples two documents from D based on a history supplied by the player.

An α-memoryless distribution is indistinguishable from a Markov process of order α. (A sequence of random variables $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ such that for $\alpha < i \leq n$, the conditional distribution $\{X_i \mid X_{i-\alpha}, \ldots, X_{i-1}\}$ is identical to the conditional distribution $\{X_i \mid X_1, \ldots, X_{i-1}\}$.) Since we require computational indistinguishability, we parameterize everything by k (e.g. D_k, a family of distributions).

Definition 1 (α-Memoryless). *Let D_k be a family of distributions indexed by a public parameter k and let D_k^α be the best Markov model of order α that approximates D_k. We define the advantage of an adversary A against the Markov model as:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathrm{mem}}(A, k) = |Pr[h \leftarrow D_k\langle \lambda, n(k) - 1 \rangle; x \leftarrow D_k^\alpha \langle h, 1 \rangle : A(h \circ x) = 1]$$
$$-Pr[x \leftarrow D_k\langle \lambda, n(k) \rangle : A(x) = 1]|$$

We let $\mathbf{InSec}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathrm{mem}}(t, n, k) = \max_{A \in \mathcal{A}(t,n,k)} \mathbf{Adv}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathrm{mem}}(A, k)$, where $\mathcal{A}(t, n, k)$ is the set of all adversaries that run in time $t(k)$ and get a sample $n(k)$ documents long. We say that D_k is α-memoryless if $\mathbf{InSec}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathrm{mem}}(t, n, k) \leq \nu(k)$ for some negligible function ν. D_k is strictly α-memoryless if $\mathbf{InSec}_{D,\beta}^{\mathrm{mem}}(t, n, k)$ is non-negligible for all $\beta < \alpha$.

Remark 1. This property is necessary and sufficient for steganography with semi-adaptive sampling.

The following definitions are either standard or come from von Ahn and Hopper [vAH04]. We assume that all adversaries are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines. However, the distributions we work with are arbitrary and may act as arbitrarily powerful adversaries. For example, someone who can adaptively sample a distribution might be able to use it to calculate discrete logarithms.

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[3] The function f is typically chosen after we fix the distribution (and the security parameter). A universal hash function is often used in practice.

We define $\mathbf{InSec}_{X,Y}^{\mathsf{dist}}(t, n, k)$ as the maximum probability that an adversary can distinguish distribution X_k from Y_k if it runs in time $t(k)$ and gets a $n(k)$ document long sample. Steganography requires an IND\$-CPA cryptosystem whose ciphertext is indistinguishable from random. $\mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\mathsf{cpa}}(t, q, n, k)$ is the insecurity of cryptosystem $\mathcal{E}$ against a chosen plaintext attack by an adversary that runs in $t(k)$ time, makes $q(k)$ queries and gets responses totaling $n(k)$ bits (see Hopper et al. [HLvA02] or full paper for details).

The standard specification [vAH04] of a public-key stegosystem is:

Definition 2 (Public Key Stegosystem). *A public key stegosystem is the triple $\mathcal{S} = (SG, SE, SD)$. $SG(1^k)$ generates a key-pair (SK, PK). $SE(PK, m)$ takes the public key PK and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and returns some stegotext s. $SD(SK, s)$ takes the secret key SK and stegotext s and returns a hiddentext m. For all $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, the probability that $SD(SK, SE(PK, m))$ fails to recover m should be negligible.*

Von Ahn and Hopper [vAH04] define the security of a public-key stegosystem against a chosen hiddentext attack. An adversary A queries an oracle with hiddentexts. The oracle responds either with stegotexts generated by $SE(PK, \cdot)$ or with covertexts of the appropriate length, generated by $D^*(\cdot)$. A should not be able to distinguish the two cases.

Definition 3 (SS-CHA). *The advantage of an adversary A against a public-key stegosystem $\mathcal{S} = (SG, SE, SD)$ in a chosen hiddentext attack (CHA) is:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(A, k) = \left| Pr[PK \leftarrow SG(1^k) : A_k^{SE(PK,\cdot),D} = 1] - Pr[A_k^{D^*(\cdot),D} = 1] \right|$$

We let $\mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t, q, n, k) = \max_{A \in \mathcal{A}(t,q,n,k)} \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(A, k)$ where $\mathcal{A}(t, q, n, k)$ is the set of all adversaries that run in $t(k)$ time, make $q(k)$ queries and get responses totaling $n(k)$ bits. A stegosystem is considered secure against a chosen hiddentext attack (SS-CHA) if $\mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t, q, n, k) \leq \nu(k)$ for some negligible function ν.

Remark 2. We restrict the usual definition of security. Typically, the adversary is allowed to query the stegosystem with any history and message. In our model, we assume that an adaptive sampler does not exist. A stegosystem that is secure against such an attack is an adaptive sampler (see Hopper [Hop04] Section 3.3.2). We force the adversary to always query the stegosystem with history λ (the empty string).

3   Semi-adaptive Stegosystem

In this section we examine what happens to the von Ahn and Hopper [vAH04] public-key stegosystem when we replace the adaptive sampling oracle with a semi-adaptive one. We show that if the oracle samples based on the last α documents of the history, then an α-memoryless distribution is necessary and sufficent for maintaining security.

3.1 The vAH04 Stegosystem with Semi-adaptive Sampling

The von Ahn and Hopper stegosystem [vAH04] (Construction 2 in their paper) is a public-key provably secure stegosystem; See Algorithm 3.1. and 3.2 for the encoding and decoding algorithms (we have modified them slightly to fit our notation). Their stegosystem uses an IND\$-CPA public-key cryptosystem $\mathcal{E} = (G, E_{PK}, D_{SK})$ and a publicly known function $f : \Sigma \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ that is ϵ-biased with respect to the covertext distribution D_k. The encoder first encrypts the message using E_{PK}. Next, for each bit b of ciphertext, the encoder samples the covertext distribution until it gets a document d such that $f(d) = b$. The encoder appends all of the resulting documents together to form the stegotext. The decoder extracts the ciphertext by evaluating f on every document of the stegotext and then decrypts the ciphertext.

Algorithm 3.1. Encode

Input: Public key PK, message m, number of times to sample T

```
step 1: Encrypt message
```
  $c \leftarrow E_{PK}(m)$;

```
step 2: Stegocode ciphertext
```
  parse c as $c_1 \circ c_2 \circ ... \circ c_n$;
  $h \leftarrow \lambda$;
  for $j \leftarrow 1$ **to** n **do**
      $i \leftarrow 1$;
      repeat
          $s_j \leftarrow D_k \langle h, 1 \rangle$, increment i ;
      until $f(s_j) = c_j$ **or** $i > T$;
      $h \leftarrow h \circ s_j$;
  end
  $s \leftarrow s_1 \circ s_2 \circ ... \circ s_n$;
  return s ;

Algorithm 3.2. Decode

Input: Secret key SK, stegotext s

```
step 1: Extract ciphertext
```
  $c \leftarrow f(s_1) \circ f(s_2) \circ ... \circ f(s_n)$;

```
step 2: Decrypt message
```
  $m \leftarrow D_{SK}(c)$;
  return m

For the remainder of Section 3, we will refer to the von Ahn and Hopper stegosystem as $\mathcal{S} = (SG, SE, SD)$ and assume that D_k is the covertext distribution. We define a length function $\mathcal{L} : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ that calculates the length of a ciphertext for a message m: $\mathcal{L}(|m|) = |E_{PK}(m)|$. Von Ahn and Hopper [vAH04] prove that their stegosystem is secure:

Theorem 1 ([vAH04]). *If D_k is an always informative distribution and f is ϵ-biased on D_k, then $\mathcal{S}$ is a SS-CHA secure stegosystem:*

$$\mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cha}}_{\mathcal{S},D}(t,q,n,k) \le \mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(t+O(kn),q,n,k) + \mathcal{L}(n)\epsilon$$

Remark 3. What Theorem 1 really states is that the output of $\mathcal{S}$ is indistinguishable from the distribution it samples.

$\mathcal{S}$ uses a perfect sampler. We now consider the stegosystem $\mathcal{T} = (TG, TE, TD)^4$ that functions identically to $\mathcal{S}$, except that its only access to D_k is via D_k^α, an oracle that only considers the last α documents of the history. The main result of this section is the proof that $\mathcal{T}$ is correct and that $\mathcal{T}$ is secure if and only if D_k is α-memoryless.

3.2 Analysis of $\mathcal{T}$

Lemma 1. *Assume that D_k is an always informative α-memoryless distribution and f is an ϵ-biased function on D_k. For all hiddentexts $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, the probability that $\mathcal{T}$ fails to encode m is negligible:*

$$Pr[(PK, SK) \leftarrow TG(1^k); s \leftarrow TE(PK, m); m' \leftarrow TD(SK, s) : m' \ne m]$$
$$\le \mathcal{L}(|m|)(1/2 + \epsilon + \mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{mem}}_{D,\alpha}(O(1), \mathcal{L}(|m|), k))^k$$

Proof. The probability of error is at most the length of the ciphertext multiplied by the probability that any individual bit of ciphertext is encoded incorrectly. See full paper for details.

Theorem 2. *If D_k is an always informative α-memoryless distribution and f is ϵ-biased on D_k, then $\mathcal{T}$ is a SS-CHA secure stegosystem:*

$$\mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cha}}_{\mathcal{T},D}(t,q,n,k) \le \mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(t+O(kn),q,n,k)$$
$$+ n\mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{mem}}_{D,\alpha}(t+O(n),n,k) + \mathcal{L}(n)\epsilon$$

Proof. The probability that $\mathcal{T}$ can be broken is the probability that an adversary distinguishes the IND\$-CPA cryptosystem $\mathcal{E}$ from random plus the probability that an adversary can distinguish D_k from D_k^α; both these values are negligible. See full paper for details.

Theorem 3. *Let D_k be an always informative distribution and f an ϵ-biased function on D_k. If D_k is not α-memoryless then $\mathcal{T}$ is not a SS-CHA secure stegosystem:*

$$\mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cha}}_{\mathcal{T},D}(t+O(1),1,n,k) \ge \mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{mem}}_{D,\alpha}(t,n,k)$$
$$- \mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(t+O(kn),1,n,k) - n\epsilon$$

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[4] As a mnemonic device, think of $\mathcal{S}$ as the stegosystem with a Standard sampler and $\mathcal{T}$ as having a sampler that considers only the Tail of the history.

Remark 4. Note that $\mathbf{InSec}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathsf{mem}}(t, n, k)$ is not negligible because D_k is not α-memoryless. Any adversary that can distinguish D_k from D_k^α can be used to attack $\mathcal{T}$.

Proof. Assume D_k is not α-memoryless. By definition, there exists an adversary A such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathsf{mem}}(A, k)$ is non-negligible. Let A run in time t and require a challenge sample of length n. We use A to create an adversary B that can tell whether it is querying an oracle representing $\mathcal{T}$ or D_k. B will ask its oracle for a single covertext of length n and pass the output to A. B will output whatever A outputs. B's advantage in distinguishing $\mathcal{T}$ from D_k is at least as much as A's advantage in distinguishing D_k^α from D_k minus the probability of distinguishing $\mathcal{T}$ from D_k^α:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{T},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(B, k) \geq \mathbf{Adv}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathsf{mem}}(A, k) - \mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{T},D^\alpha}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t, 1, n, k)$$

Using Theorem 1, we get:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{T},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(B, k) \geq \mathbf{Adv}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathsf{mem}}(A, k) - \mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\mathsf{cpa}}(t + O(kn), 1, n, k) - n\epsilon$$

B runs in time $t + O(1)$ and gets 1 challenge string of length n, therefore:

$$\mathbf{InSec}_{S,D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t + O(1), 1, n, k) \geq \mathbf{InSec}_{D,\alpha}^{\mathsf{mem}}(t, n, k)$$
$$- \mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\mathsf{cpa}}(t + O(kn), 1, n, k) - n\epsilon$$

This means that if D_k is not α-memoryless, then there exists an adversary that can launch a successful SS-CHA attack on $\mathcal{T}$ with non-negligible probability.

Remark 5. The above proof would probably work for any black-box stegosystem. However, because it is unclear how to deal with a stegosystem that somehow uses outside information (or how to rule out this possibility), we limit our analysis to the stegosystem $\mathcal{T}$.

4   Non-adaptive Stegosystems

In this section, we show how to apply public-key black-box steganography as proposed by von Ahn and Hopper [vAH04] to real world covertext distributions. (Independently, Petrowski et. al. [PKSM] implemented a similar system for JPEG images, but their work has no security analysis.) The key insight is that multiple digital photographs of a still scene are almost but not completely identical. We can break up each image into 8×8 pixel tiles.[5] A cryptographic hash function assigns a value to each tile. The stegosystem choses the appropriate tiles to create a composite photo that encodes the secret message. The scheme assumes each 8×8 pixel tile is independent of its neighbors.

This stegosystem is equivalent to using D_k^0 to sample D_k and assuming that the covertext distribution is 0-memoryless, as shown in Algorithm 4.1. Non-adaptive steganography can be applied to any digital image format, TCP time-stamp intervals, etc.

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[5] The dimensions of the tile are an artifact of the JPEG compression algorithm.

Algorithm 4.1. Non-adaptive stegosystem

Input: Public key PK, message m, T covertexts $x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(T)}$ (each covertext
$\quad\quad x^{(i)}$ is of length $|E_{PK}(m)|$

step 1: Encrypt message
$\quad c \leftarrow E_{PK}(m)$;

step 2: Stegocode ciphertext
$\quad$ parse c as $c_1 \circ c_2 \circ \ldots \circ c_n$;
$\quad$ **for** $j \leftarrow 1$ **to** n **do**
$\quad\quad i \leftarrow 1$;
$\quad\quad$ **repeat**
$\quad\quad\quad s_j \leftarrow x_j^{(i)}$, increment i ;
$\quad\quad$ **until** $f(s_j) = c_j$ **or** $i > T$;
$\quad$ **end**
$\quad s \leftarrow s_1 \circ s_2 \circ \ldots \circ s_n$;
$\quad$ **return** s ;

The analysis of Algorithm 4.1 follows directly from Section 3. Correctness: The probability that the stegosystem fails to encode a hiddentext m is: $\mathcal{L}(|m|)(1/2 + \epsilon + \mathbf{InSec}_{D,0}^{\mathrm{mem}}(O(1), \mathcal{L}(|m|), k))^k$. Security: Algorithm 4.1 is secure if and only if D is 0-memoryless: an independent, but not necessarily identically distributed, sequence of random variables.

5   Pathological Covertext Distribution

In this section, we construct a pathological strictly α-memoryless distribution and prove that no computationally bounded algorithm can use it to hide messages without access to D_k^α. The distribution will publish a verification key that can be used by anyone to check if a covertext is legitimate. The probability that steganography will be detected is $1 - \nu(k)$, where ν is a negligible function.

We give a stegosystem a list of covertexts generated by $D\langle\lambda, \cdot\rangle$ and access to $D^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$, a semi-adaptive oracle with insufficient memory. For example, a stegosystem might store a database of photographs (this corresponds to $D\langle\lambda, \cdot\rangle$) and maintain an internal Markov model about pixel color distributions based on the 8 adjacent pixels (this corresponds to $D^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$, where $\alpha - 1 = 8$). We show that any stegotext produced by a stegosystem is really just a quote of a covertext in its database.

5.1   The Distribution

Our goal is to devise a covertext distribution where (1) each document depends on only the α documents that came before it (so it is α-memoryless); (2) a stegosystem cannot by itself compute the ith document d_i in a legitimate covertext; finally (3) it is very unlikely that the output of $D^{\alpha-1}\langle h, 1\rangle$ is a valid continuation of the last α documents of h.

The first construction that comes to mind is to make each document be a concatenation of a random number r_i and a signature on the previous α random numbers: $\sigma_i = \sigma(r_{i-\alpha}, \ldots, r_i)$. This will meet requirements (1) and (2). There is a subtle problem with this as far as requirement (3) is concerned. Suppose we are given $\alpha - 1$ documents $r_{n-\alpha+1}\sigma_{n-\alpha+1}, \ldots, r_{n-1}\sigma_{n-1}$. The signatures $\sigma_{n-\alpha+1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n-1}$ can leak partial information about the value $r_{n-\alpha}$. As a result, $D^{\alpha-1}\langle \cdot, 1 \rangle$, even though not explicitly given $d_{n-\alpha}$, may nevertheless calculate $r_{n-\alpha}$ and compute the correct signature $\sigma_n = \sigma(r_{n-\alpha}, \ldots, r_n)$.

In order to fix this problem, we need to construct a signature function σ for which the following property holds: We fix a sequence of $2\alpha - 1$ integers $r_1, \ldots, r_{2\alpha-1}$. Then the sequence of $\alpha - 1$ documents $r_{\alpha+1}\sigma_{\alpha+1}, \ldots, r_{2\alpha-1}\sigma_{2\alpha-1}$ should be information theoretically independent of r_α. This property ensures that $D^{\alpha-1}$ cannot learn r_α and so will be unable to compute the correct signature $\sigma_{2\alpha}$ based on the previous α documents of h, as required by (3) above.

Consider the following hash function $h : \mathbb{Z}_p^\alpha \to G$, where p is a k-bit prime and G is a group of order p. The hash function $h_{p,G,g_1,\ldots,g_{\alpha+1}}$ is parameterized by p, G and $\alpha + 1$ generators of G: $g_1, \ldots, g_{\alpha+1}$. (We will omit the subscript of h in the future). On input $(r_1, \ldots, r_{\alpha+1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\alpha+1}$ the hash function returns:

$$h(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{\alpha+1}) \doteq g_1^{r_1} \cdot g_2^{r_2} \cdot \cdots \cdot g_{\alpha+1}^{r_{\alpha+1}}$$

The hash function h has the information hiding property that we need because it reveals only a linear combination of its inputs (see the proof of Lemma 4 in the full paper).

We now formalize the above discussion. We define a secure stateless signature scheme, show how to combine it with h and prove the result is secure under the discrete logarithm assumption. Then we construct our pathological distribution.

Definition 4 (Stateless Signature Scheme). *A stateless signature scheme $\Sigma = (G, \sigma, V)$ is a triple of polynomial time algorithms where: $G(1^k)$ is the key generation algorithm, $\sigma : \{0,1\}^k \times \mathcal{M}_k \to \{0,1\}^{poly(k)}$ is a probabilitic algorithm that on input (SK, m) outputs a $poly(k)$ bit signature, and $V : \{0,1\}^k \times \mathcal{M}_k \times \{0,1\}^{poly(k)} \to \{0,1\}$ is the signature verification function that accepts valid signatures.*

We define $\mathbf{InSec}_\Sigma^{\mathsf{sig}}(t, q, k)$ as the insecurity of signature scheme Σ against an adaptive chosen message attack by an adversary that runs in time $t(k)$ and makes $q(k)$ queries to the signing oracle (see Goldreich [Gol04] for details).

Goldreich [Gol04] shows that *stateless* signature schemes exist if one-way functions exist. It is also known that the discrete logarithm assumption implies one-way functions. Therefore, the discrete logarithm assumption also implies the existence of stateless signature schemes. We let $\mathbf{DL}(t, k)$ be the maximum probability that any algorithm running in time $t(k)$ can solve the discrete logarithm problem.

We construct a signature scheme using the hash function h:

Construction 1. *Let $\Sigma' = (G', \sigma', V')$ be a secure stateless signature scheme that takes messages in $\{0,1\}^{2k}$ and outputs signatures in $\{0,1\}^{poly(k)}$. We use (G', σ', V') and the hash function h to construct a new stateless signature scheme $\Sigma = (G, \sigma, V)$. We let $G = G'$.*
The signature function $\sigma : \{0,1\}^k \times (\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^{\alpha+1} \to \{0,1\}^{poly(k)}$:

$$\sigma(SK, r_1 \circ \cdots \circ r_{\alpha+1}) = \sigma'(SK, h(r_1, \ldots, r_{\alpha+1}))$$

The verification function $V : \{0,1\}^k \times (\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^{\alpha+1} \times \{0,1\}^{poly(k)} \to \{0,1\}$:

$$V(VK, s, r_1 \circ \cdots \circ r_{\alpha+1}) = V'(VK, s, h(r_1, \ldots, r_{\alpha+1}))$$

We further define σ on input from $(\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^\beta$, where $\beta < \alpha + 1$ as follows: $\sigma(r_1, \ldots, r_\beta) = \sigma'(h(0, \ldots, 0, r_1, \ldots, r_\beta))$. V extends in the obvious way.

Lemma 2. *$\Sigma = (G, \sigma, V)$ from Construction 1 is a secure stateless signature scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption:*

$$\mathbf{InSec}_\Sigma^{\mathsf{sig}}(t, q, k) \leq \mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma'}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t + O(q), q, k) + \mathbf{DL}(t + O(q), k).$$

Proof. The intuition behind the proof is that any adversary that can attack Σ can be used to either attack the underlying signature scheme or calculate discrete logarithms. See full paper for details.

We use the signature scheme from Construction 1 to construct a distribution D_{VK} over the alphabet $\{\mathbb{Z}_p^* \times \{0,1\}^{poly(k)}\}^*$, where p is a k bit prime and $poly(k)$ is the length of a signature in Σ. Each document consists of an element in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and a signature on the previous $\alpha + 1$ elements.

Construction 2 (Pathological Distribution D_{VK}). *Let $\Sigma = (G, \sigma, V)$ be a secure stateless signature scheme from Construction 1. We use G to generate the keys (SK, VK) and index distribution D_{VK} via the public verification key. If d_i is the ith document, then $d_i = r_i \sigma(SK, r_{i-\alpha} \circ \cdots \circ r_i)$, where r_i is chosen randomly from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The output of $D_{VK}\langle \lambda, n \rangle$ looks like:*

$$
\begin{aligned}
D_{VK}\langle \lambda, n \rangle \to & r_1 \sigma(SK, r_1) \\
& \circ r_2 \sigma(SK, r_1 \circ r_2) \circ \cdots \\
& \cdots \circ r_{\alpha+1} \sigma(SK, r_1 \circ r_2 \circ \cdots \circ r_{\alpha+1}) \circ \cdots \\
& \cdots \circ r_n \sigma(SK, r_{n-\alpha} \circ \cdots \circ r_n)
\end{aligned}
$$

We define $\sigma_i = \sigma(SK, r_{i-\alpha}, \ldots, r_i)$.

Definition 5 (Γ). *Suppose we query $D_{VK}\langle \lambda, n \rangle$ q times and record the result on tape Q. We define the probability that any one sequence $r_1, \ldots, r_d$ appears two or more times in Q as $\Gamma(d, n, q, k)$.*

Lemma 3. *$\Gamma(d, n, q, k)$ is a negligible function in k.*

Proof. The proof relies on the fact that $|\mathbb{Z}_p| = \Theta(2^k)$. See full paper for details.

5.2   Pathology of the Distribution

We now show that any computationally bounded stegosystem for D_{VK} is guaranteed to be caught with overwhelming probability.

Theorem 4. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial time stegosystem for distribution D_{VK} that has a database of q_1 covertexts of length n generated by $D_{VK}\langle\lambda,\cdot\rangle$ and is allowed to make q_2 queries to $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$. Suppose it takes $\mathcal{S}$ time t to generate a stegotext of length $N > \alpha$. Then there exists an adversary that can distinguish $\mathcal{S}$ from D_{VK} with probability $1-\nu(k)$, for a negligible function ν. The adversary uses only the verification key VK and q_1+1 samples from the oracle of length N each; it runs in time $O((t+N)(q_1+1))$.*

Remark 6. The stegosystem needs to forge signatures if it wants to generate more than q_1 distinct stegotexts. All the adversary does is ask for q_1+1 samples and checks them for duplicates and/or invalid signatures.

We will prove Theorem 4 in three steps. First we will construct an oracle $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}$ that is information theoretically indistinguishable from $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$. Then we will show that a stegosystem whose only resource is $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}$ cannot create stegotexts longer than α with more than negligible probability. Finally, we will augment the stegosystem by giving it access to $D_{VK}\langle\lambda,\cdot\rangle$ and prove Theorem 4 by showing that it still cannot generate new stegotexts.

Algorithm 5.1. $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ with oracle access to $\sigma(SK,\cdot)$

Input: history: $h = r_1\sigma_1,\ldots,r_{n-1}\sigma_{n-1}$
If the history is more than $\alpha-1$ documents long, $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}$ randomly
chooses $\hat{r}_n$ and $\hat{r}_{n-\alpha}$ and signs the result.
if $n \leq \alpha-1$ **then return** $D_{VK}\langle h,1\rangle$;
else
    $\hat{r}_n \leftarrow$ Random ;
    $\hat{r}_{n-\alpha} \leftarrow$ Random ;
    $\hat{u} \leftarrow h(\hat{r}_{n-\alpha}, r_{n-\alpha+1}, \ldots, r_{n-1}, \hat{r}_n)$;
    $\hat{\sigma}_n \leftarrow \sigma(\hat{u})$;
end
return $\hat{r}_n\hat{\sigma}_n$;
We use $\hat{x}$ to signify that the value of x was assigned by $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$

Lemma 4. *Consider $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ (Algorithm 5.1). $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle = D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$.*

Proof. Lemma 4 follows from the information-theoretic hiding property of h, see full paper for proof.

Lemma 5. *D_{VK} is strictly α-memoryless.*

Proof. Lemma 5 follows from Lemma 4, see full paper for proof.

Lemma 6. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be any stegosystem that has oracle access to $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$, but with no direct access to D_{VK} - i.e. $\mathcal{S}$ does not know SK and has no oracle access to $\sigma(SK,\cdot)$. Suppose it takes $\mathcal{S}$ t time and q queries to $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ to output a stegotext $s = r_1\sigma_1 \circ \cdots \circ r_n\sigma_n$ of length $n > \alpha$. Then there exists an efficient adversary that can distinguish $\mathcal{S}$ from D_{VK} with overwhelming probability using only one sample of length α and running in time $O(t)$:*

$$\mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t,1,\alpha+1,k) \geq 1 - \mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t+O(1),q,k) - \mathbf{DL}(t+O(q),k)$$

Furthermore, $\forall i > \alpha$, the probability that an arbitrary signature σ_i is valid is at most:

$$\mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t+O(1),q,k) + \mathbf{DL}(t+O(q),k).$$

Proof. Assume we have a secure stegosystem $\mathcal{S}$ with no direct access to D_{VK}. We construct an adversary A that uses $\mathcal{S}$ to forge signatures or calculate discrete logs. A tells S to generate a single stegotext of any length $n > \alpha$. While $\mathcal{S}$ is working, A intercepts all of $\mathcal{S}$'s queries to $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ and redirects them to $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$. Finally, $\mathcal{S}$ outputs a stegotext $s = r_1\sigma_1 \circ r_2\sigma_2 \circ \cdots \circ r_n\sigma_n$.

Choose any $i > \alpha$. We have three cases to consider:

1. If σ_i is not a valid signature on $r_{i-\alpha} \circ \cdots \circ r_i$ then the stegosystem is insecure. The probability that this happens is $\mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t+O(1),1,n,k)$.
2. If σ_i is a valid signature on $r_{i-\alpha} \circ \cdots \circ r_i$ and it was not generated by $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ then $\mathcal{S}$ violated the security of Σ. The probability that this happens is $\mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t+O(1),q,k)$.
3. If σ_i is a valid signature that was generated by $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ then we use $\mathcal{S}$ and $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ to calculate discrete logarithms. We set up a reduction algorithm

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Algorithm 5.2. $D**_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$ with oracle access to $\sigma(SK,\cdot)$

Input: history: $r_1\sigma_1,\ldots,r_{n-1}\sigma_{n-1}$
if $n < \alpha$ **then return** $D_{VK}\langle h,1\rangle$;
else
    $\hat{r}_n \leftarrow$ Random ;
    $\boxed{\hat{r} \leftarrow \text{ Random }}$;
    $\boxed{\hat{u} \leftarrow y \cdot g^{\hat{r}} \cdot h(1, r_{n-\alpha+1}, \ldots, r_{n-1}, \hat{r}_n)}$;
    $\hat{\sigma}_n \leftarrow \sigma(\hat{u})$;
end
return $\hat{r}_n\hat{\sigma}_n$;
$D**_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle h,1\rangle$ is almost identical to $D*_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle h,1\rangle$. We highlighted the differences.

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that uses the stegosystem as a black box and controls the actions of $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$. The reduction would get a challenge string $y = g^x$, where g is a generator of the group G and x is unknown. Next, the reduction would ask the stegosystem to generate a stegotext. Whenever the stegosystem queries $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot,1\rangle$, the

reduction would redirect the call to $D * *_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$. Algorithm 5.2 shows how $D * *_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$ inserts y into every signature. $D * *_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$ ensures that the returned signature $\hat{\sigma}_n$ is valid only if $r_{n-\alpha} = \log_g(y \cdot g^{\hat{r}}) = \log_g(g^{x+\hat{r}}) = x + \hat{r}$, where $\hat{r}$ is chosen by $D * *_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$. Since the signature σ_i is generated by $D * *_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$, we know that $s_{i-\alpha} = x + \hat{r}$. The reduction outputs $s_{i-\alpha} - \hat{r}$, thereby calculating the discrete logarithm. As a result, the probability that this case occurs is $\mathbf{DL}(t + O(q), q, k)$.

Based on our case analysis, we see that $\mathbf{InSec}_{\mathcal{S},D}^{\mathsf{cha}}(t, 1, n, k) \geq 1 - \mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t + O(1), q, k) - \mathbf{DL}(t + O(q), k)$. Substituting $n = \alpha + 1$ proves the first part of Lemma 6. Furthermore, we've shown that $\forall i \geq 1$, the probability that an arbitrary signature σ_i is valid is at most $\mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t + O(1), q, k) + \mathbf{DL}(t + O(q), k)$.

Proof (Theorem 4). Assume a stegosystem $\mathcal{S}$ has a database of q_1 covertexts generated by $D_{VK}\langle\lambda, n\rangle$ and the ability to query $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$ q_2 times. We can create an adversary A that distinguishes the output of D_{VK} from $\mathcal{S}$. A gets VK as input and permission to query a mystery oracle that is either D_{VK} or $\mathcal{S}$. A will ask its oracle to generate $q_1 + 1$ covertexts of length N. A outputs 1 if the oracle returns any duplicate or invalid covertexts. If the oracle is $D_{VK}\langle\lambda, \cdot\rangle$, then A outputs 1 with probability $\Gamma(N, N, q_1 + 1, k)$ (the probability that duplicate covertexts occur). We examine what happens when the oracle is $\mathcal{S}$.

$\mathcal{S}$ can use its covertext database to generate stegotexts. Each covertext of length n can generate at most 1 valid stegotext of length N (the stegosystem can take an N document prefix). The stegosystem cannot take an arbitrary substring of a covertext because it would have to forge a signature on the new first integer and the α dummy arguments.

$\mathcal{S}$ gives A a list of $q_1 + 1$ stegotexts: $s^{(1)}, \ldots, s^{(q_1+1)}$. Each stegotext $s^{(i)}$ can be parsed as $r_1^{(i)}\sigma_1^{(i)} \circ \cdots \circ r_N^{(i)}\sigma_N^{(i)}$. $\mathcal{S}$ can easily create q_1 distinct stegotexts from its covertext dictionary. We examine how $\mathcal{S}$ generates the $q_1 + 1$st stegotext. There are 3 cases:

1. $\mathcal{S}$ has generated a new message signature pair that is not in the covertext database and that did not come from $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$. Then $\mathcal{S}$ has broken the security of the signature scheme Σ. $\mathcal{S}$ ran in $(q_1 + 1)t$ time and made $nq_1 + q_2$ queries to $\sigma(SK, \cdot)$ (via its queries to $D_{VK}\langle\lambda, \cdot\rangle$ and $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$). Therefore, this case occurs with probability at most $\mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}((q_1 + 1)t, nq_1 + q_2, k)$.
2. $\mathcal{S}$ used a signature generated by $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$. By Lemma 6, we know that $\forall i, j > \alpha$, $\mathcal{S}$ can use $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$ to generate a valid $\sigma_j^{(i)}$ with probability at most $\mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t+O(1), q_2, k) + \mathbf{DL}(t+O(q_2), k)$. Therefore, the probability that this case occurs is the total number of such signatures $(N - \alpha)(q_1 + 1)$ times the probability that any particular one was generated by $D_{VK}^{\alpha-1}\langle\cdot, 1\rangle$. This gives a total probability of: $(N-\alpha)(q_1+1)(\mathbf{InSec}_{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{sig}}(t+O(1), q_2, k) + \mathbf{DL}(t+O(q_2), k))$
3. The covertext database contains two identical sequences of α integers, thus letting $\mathcal{S}$ cut and paste two covertexts. This occurs with probability $\Gamma(\alpha, n, q_2, k)$.

Adding up the probabilities from the case analysis above, we get that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cha}}_{\mathcal{S},D}(A,k) \geq 1 - \Gamma(N, N, q_1 + 1, k) - \mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{sig}}_{\Sigma}((q_1 + 1)t, nq_1 + q_2, k)$$
$$- (N - \alpha)(q_1 + 1)(\mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{sig}}_{\Sigma}(t + O(1), q_2, k) + \mathbf{DL}(t + O(q_2), k))$$
$$- \Gamma(\alpha, n, q_2, k)$$

A runs in $O((t+N)(q_1+1))$ time and makes q_1+1 queries of total length $N(q_1+1)$. Therefore, $\mathbf{InSec}^{\mathsf{cha}}_{\mathcal{S},D}(O((t+N)(q_1+1)), q_1+1, N(q_1+1)) \geq \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cha}}_{\mathcal{S},D}(A,k) \geq 1 - \nu(k)$ for the negligible function ν defined above. This gives us the lower bound of $1 - \nu(k)$ on the insecurity of $\mathcal{S}$.

6   Conclusion

Our results link current theoretical research to real world stegosystems. We show that a stegosystem must assume that its approximation of the covertext distribution is correct. A slight error, or a missed correlation, can lead to almost certain detection. It is impossible to leverage incomplete or incorrect information to somehow create properly distributed covertexts.

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