12 Reorienting categories as a members’ phenomena

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Edwards’ paper, ‘Categories are for talking’ (1991), is a critical dissection of the static role of categories as conceived in traditional Cognitive Psychology and the then-recent work of Lakoff’s *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (1987) through the use of Harvey Sacks’ (1974; 1992) work on membership categorisation. Edwards uses Sacks to take aim at the prominent theoretical and methodological trends at the time, seeking to liberate members’ category work from ironically external conceptions of a shrouded realm located inside the head. However, while the focus for Edwards was on psychology, his detailed understanding of Sacks’ work served to open a conceptual space for those working in discursive psychology to engage with members categorisation work as fundamental to the epistemological and methodological repertoires of Discursive Psychology (DP) in ways that ally with the emergence of Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA: Eglin and Hester, 1992; Watson, 1994; Hester and Francis, 1994).

In the discussion below we focus on how the paper shows three areas of intersection in the emergence of DP and MCA. First, we outline how the initial use of Sacks’ category work in the paper was directed towards psychological topics at a time when his ideas were largely confined to the sociological fields of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Second, we trace Edwards’ work to embed Sacks’ categorial work as an analytic method for DP while running parallel to the emergence and development of MCA. Finally, we situate the contemporary influence of Edwards’ paper and use of Sacks’ work in the creation of a rich confluence and openness to ideas that have become a hallmark of the contemporary DP approach – an approach that not only incorporates a deep understanding of Sacks’ categorisation work but, in turn, contributes significantly to the further development of MCA.
Social categories are social actions

In ‘Categories are for talking’, Edwards (1991) sets out to engage critically with the notions of categorisation derived from and reflecting mental semantic schema. Focusing on the way that categories and categorisation are used in Cognitive Psychology, including Lakoff’s Women, fire and dangerous things (1987), Edwards introduces ideas from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, in particular Sacks’ work on membership categories. Edwards argues that the then-current models of Cognitive Psychology treat the person speaking as simply a conduit for their (somehow) held in common semantic schema, rather than treating the speaker as a complex social actor for whom descriptions and categorisations are context sensitive and locally occasioned.

The paper comes in the early stages of Edwards’ work with Potter and others fleshing out DP’s principles and focus. Coming four years after Discourse and social psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), the paper initially adopts a more conciliatory and collaborative tone than the intense critique of Cognitive Psychology found in Potter and Wetherell. In his discussion of categories Edwards tracks a path between treating categories as derived from mental schemas on the one hand and the more discursive understanding of social categories argued by Potter and Wetherell. Edwards’ opening gambit is that each could learn from the other. Only later in the paper does he take a more critical stance towards theories of categories and categorisation and language found in cognitive psychology. At the heart of the paper, then, is a subtle and skillfully argued critique of the prevailing view from Cognitive Psychology of how categorisation resides in the head and how it is manifest in language.

Edwards begins by acknowledging the then-recent shifts in conceptualising categorisation sparked by Lakoff and particularly the view that language is not only a vehicle for expressing mental classifications, but also that the act of linguistic categorisation is important in and of itself. He then charts a conciliatory path between these two positions through a critique of Cognitive Psychology’s semantic schemas and a conceded critique of DP’s focus on stereotypes, rather than a more subtle form of categorisation and social action. By suggesting this middle way, Edwards begins to shift the locus of attention from the brain towards social action: ‘One of the aims of this paper is to develop the discursive perspective on categorization while recognizing the well-documented and even ‘obvious’ referentiality of categories’ (Edwards 1991, p. 516).

As he suggests, it is possible to accommodate both perspectives as travelling side by side, one explaining categorisations in the head; the other explaining the occasioned linguistic categorisations. From this middle position it simply becomes a matter of the researcher deciding on a socio-linguistic focus or cognitive-linguistic focus. However, as he then goes onto point out, either way the meeting point is the utterance – or rather a person uttering forms of categorisation drawn from mental schemas in response to experiential stimuli. Edwards, in writing this, is developing DP’s position that language is primarily a medium for accomplishing social action, and thus opens up the necessary
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condition of this position that the semantics of categories cannot be analysed from imagined artificial cases but only through the collection and study of naturally-occurring situated cases.

From this Edwards then returns to how ‘categories’ are commonly understood in Cognitive Psychology with a view to examining them in relation to their use in language. The first type of categorisations identified are words that classify and label objects, events, space etc., which are referred to as a semantic schema of categorisations. The second type of categorisation in Cognitive Psychology is propositional, where a named entity is collected with another one such that ‘dogs are animals’, ‘I am a truck driver’. For cognitive psychology, according to Edwards, the two are inextricably linked and hierarchically organised, whereby the verbalisation of categories in the world presupposes a semantic schema from which such propositional categorisations are to be constructed.

The theory of a hierarchically organised semantic schema is then explored by Edwards in relation to emerging arguments from DP, especially Billig (1987). Edwards relates the argument that the natural inclination to classify objects into ever simpler categories necessarily leads to social stereotyping and prejudice as an inevitable outcome of normal mental functioning. That is to say our mental categorial schema is naturally inclined to reflect a categorisation process where people are categorised into large groups for cognitive ease. However, as Billig points out, people not only have the ability to treat people as belonging to large groups they also have the ability to particularise an individual (‘the exception that proves the rule’). Therefore, analysis of categorisation needs to reflect a more subtle locally reactive experiential categorisation rather than just a generalised stock of common knowledge that draws upon an elementary mental schema. With the role of language given more prominence and the subtlety of categorial expression raised, Edwards then begins to tease out further the tension between a ‘stock of knowledge’ and how this knowledge is manifest in any particular situation. This shifts the locus of attention to language in use.

In the next phase of the paper Edwards begins by recounting Lakoff’s argument that while mental categories are seen to be arranged through different levels, basic (chair), super (furniture) and subordinate (dining chair) of organisation, when an object is identified through this schema the categorisation is able to be modified in any particular encounter. If this is so for any particular object or category then the categories in the schema must be ‘fuzzy’ as they need to allow for further parsing work and exceptions. This provides Edwards with an opening to focus the argument towards the actual lived encounter where a person in the world expresses these forms of categorisation:

The idea that semantic categories have fuzzy membership boundaries, inequalities of membership and permit multiple and even contrasting possibilities for description suggests that language’s category system functions not simply for organising our understanding of the world, but
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for talking about it in ways that are adaptable to the situated requirements of the description, and the differences of perspective, and to the need to put words to work in the pragmatics of social action.

(1991, p. 523)

From this point Edwards then shifts the focus of categorisation squarely to the person producing categorisations in response to a specific context of the occasioned situation and interactional purpose based upon selection from the relevant fuzzy mental categories. Thus, descriptions of the world and their linguistic vehicle cannot simply be treated as ‘see (select from schema (say)’ but involve what is said about what, to whom, and for what locally occasioned purpose. Thus occasioned relevance becomes the center of analytic interest. That is to say categorisations are not simply labels attached to objects but motivated interactional work invested in by the participant at any particular time and where stake and outcome shape the selection and interactional engagement of participants. Thus the occasioned work of categorisation is an accountable matter with possibilities flowing from the particular descriptions or categorisations produced. Through this shift Edwards positions talk, hitherto treated largely as a resource for seeing into the head, as the topic of analysis; a topic where the focus becomes the flexibility of category use in any particular instance, as well as the accountable normative reasoning underpinning particular categorial choice.

It is at this point that Edwards introduces Sacks’ discussion of normativity and sequentiality underpinning category use in the child’s story ‘The baby cried. The mommy picked it up’ (Sacks, 1974). Treating references to ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ as normative categories, he goes on to shows how these categories involve assumptions of attributes and behaviour, and expected behaviour between the categories. Likening these category references to Lakoff’s ‘Idealized Cognitive Models’ (ICM), Edwards argues that Sacks provides a way of analysing how idealisations are both observable through descriptions where such references are used and, more importantly, how to examine the divergences and flexibility expressed in response to such ‘norms’.

Edwards then moves on to develop his argument further by suggesting that any understanding of the deployment of categorisations in situated talk requires attention to both its situatedness (indexicality) and its orientation (rhetoric). He illustrates this with the category ‘car’. While ‘car’ may serve as an idealised category for Lakoff, he points out that there are not only many types of car but also that different cars have socially deployed semiotic significances of what it means own them, i.e., what the object ‘says’ about the owner or driver. Here Edwards introduces Sacks’ discussion of ‘hotrodding’ as discussed by a group of 1960s teenagers (1992 (Vol. 1), p. 169–74). For the teenagers a ‘Pontiac station wagon’ is not a ‘hotrodder’ but rather an ordinary adult car, or the more negatively evaluated ‘mommy’s car’ (p. 137). However, this category is also a category for any police officer happening upon the scene with a different set of assumptions about the object (car) and activity (hotrodding) (1992 (Vol. 1),
The indexicality of local categorisation practices thus also allows the teenager to rhetorically appreciate how the police officer would categorise the station wagon as ‘not a hotrodder’, the driver as ‘not doing hotrodding’, and consequently not ‘stopping the hotrodder’ because car and driver can be treated as not in a category necessitating law enforcement. Of course the point is that categories are inherently flexible and so trying to preconceive mental idealisation prior to any particular use is of little analytic value.

What this highlights is that while the teenagers in Sacks’ data were able to shift around and play with different descriptions for the same object, Cognitive Psychology has difficulty accounting for such categorial variation between different people’s descriptions of an object or event or even the same person describing the object differently at different times. That is, ICM’s or mental models and schemas cannot account very well for different descriptions of the same object because they are based on there being an accurate or correct description. As Sacks’ transcript demonstrates this is an erroneous pursuit because people are quite able to shift between descriptions have different descriptions and even see the object from someone else’s viewpoint, or indeed deliberately not. Thus, Cognitive Psychology’s models are left to argue that while the linguistic expression may include fuzziness, the mental model provides a base-line categorisation that may never be actually described. If the ICM category system is only ever idealised then it is a theory based on projecting what the world is expected to be rather than how it actually unfolds in any particular situation. This is more than a concession to categorial fuzziness in spoken expression, argues Edwards, it is more akin to folk theorisation.

The overall aim of the paper is thus to advance DP’s remedial critique of psychology using Sacks’ categorial work with, one can imagine, the hope of challenging Cognitive Psychology’s focus on mental schemas of categorisation and shifting towards a focus that treats categorisation as a social action.

Following ‘Categories are for talking’, Edwards continued to embed Sacks’ categorial work as a thread through DP’s project (1995). What is notable about this period is that, in 1992, Sacks’ lectures became available for the first time in published form. The impact of this is clearly seen in Edwards’ subsequent detailed writings on Sacks (1995; 1997) and also in the emerging systematic development of Sacks’ approach to categorisation in interaction, eventually known as Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) (Hester and Eglin, 1997a).

Sacks as remedial respecification of psychology and the emergence of MCA

Sacks’ lectures were first fully published in 1992 in two volumes. Previous to this there were a few publications (e.g., 1974, 1986), a short collection of his lectures in the journal *Human Studies* (1989), and some photocopies shared between those who knew who to ask. Following his introduction of Sacks’ work in ‘Categories are for talking’, Edwards provides an extended review of Sacks’
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lectures (1992) in Sacks and psychology (1995), introducing more aspects of Sacks’ work as they relate to some conceptual, analytic, and programmatic areas of Cognitive Psychology.

The overall aim of Sacks and Psychology (1995), building on ‘Categories are for talking’, is to argue how Sacks directs our attention towards understanding members’ category work as social action rather than mental schemas, i.e., that it is erroneous to view language simply as a *vehicle for thought*. Instead language, or rather the activity of *talking*, should be the focus of understanding categorisation. Edwards reiterates that categories are not to be seen as residing in the head, awaiting stimulation by some experiential object to then return in verbalised form, that they are always *categories in use*. The locally produced interactional work of description reveals the way categories are used, assembled, deployed, negotiated and managed in particular situations. As such they are not so much a fuzzy representation of a typological schema in the brain but are in themselves a reflection of a society’s culture, i.e., a culture *in action*. Edwards goes onto explore what the payoff would be for treating talk as a *topic* of enquiry rather than a *resource* by which to gain access to inner mental schemas. For Edwards this ‘respecification’ of topic and resource falls into three main areas; what ‘member’ and ‘membership’ entails as part of any locally accomplished membership category work; the value of using transcripts of naturally occurring talk to examine how intersubjectivity is displayed; and the use by Sacks of a metaphor of machinery to understand how local category work is put together.

Members, intersubjectivity and machinery

The notion of ‘member’ for psychology, and some other social sciences, is often used by analysts to group sections of populations together, often for research purposes. For Sacks, however, ‘member’ and ‘membership’ are seen as routine actions used to accomplish social organisation in such a way as to display local sense-making to each other. As such everyday categorisation work is part and parcel of enacting and engaging with the world. As Edwards points out in Sacks and psychology, to take this seriously means orienting to how people categorise or describe themselves and others, and understanding this as always contingent and occasioned against possible alternatives within a purposeful orientation.

The second theme that Edwards raises is the use of transcripts of naturally occurring interaction, rather than invented or imagined interactional events. Edwards’ argument is that even for psychology the use of naturally occurring transcripts of actual interaction provide another version of the ‘second turn proof’ procedure (Edwards, 1995) for people’s descriptions and categorisations. Obviously this also serves to respecify intersubjectivity as a members concern, as it shifts the focus from what analysts can say about achieving intersubjectivity to how a display of intersubjectivity is attended to and achieved for the members talking. Edwards, of course, steers clear of suggesting that this is a window into ‘intersubjectivity’ by emphasizing how intersubjectivity is displayed and attended to *in situ*. 
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The third major theme Edwards raises is Sacks’ metaphor of the machine for analysing sense-making in interaction. The treatment of this metaphor is interesting for our discussion because it intersects with the emergence of MCA. The metaphor is described by Sacks:

[... ] the image I have is of this machinery, where you would have some standardized gadget that you can stick in here and there and can work to in a variety of different machines. And you go through the warehouse picking them up to build some given thing you want to build.


Edwards notes how this metaphor could sound very much like a feature of Cognitive Psychology’s ‘script-based remindings’ (1995, p. 588). Sacks even extends the metaphor to individuals whereby the task of the analyst is to try and reassemble the sense-making through identifying the components and rebuilding the machine. Edwards downplays this possible understanding of Sacks by noting that the machine metaphor is belied by the overall thrust of Sacks’ emphasis on talk as overwhelmingly produced for and contingent upon the local orientations of participants.

In summary, from ‘Categories are for talking’ (1991), through the extended review in *Sacks and psychology* (1995), and the subsequent work including *Discourse and cognition* (1997), Edwards increasingly embeds Sacks’ categorial work as an essential component of DP. However, while increasingly drawing upon Sacks’ work, his orientation is primarily focused on using Sacks to critique Cognitive Psychology through DP. Moreover, while Sacks’ work is used to great effect as part of DP’s project, Edwards tends to treat Sacks’ observations largely uncritically. For example, the problems with the machinery metaphor are raised but are not given systematic critical examination. Thus, while some of Sacks’ observations might lead in ostensibly opposite analytic directions, these implications tend to be raised in passing. In the developing parallel field of MCA, however, where Sacks’ lectures provide an equally rich source of interest, some of his ideas were also subject to critical re-examination.

**Discursive Psychology and Membership Categorisation Analysis**

Edwards’ goal, as part of DP, is the respecification of psychological concepts, especially around the use of language as a window into the brain. With this stated goal Edwards uses Sacks’ work and insights to offer a skillful critique of Cognitive Psychology and the understanding of how categorisation is used. However, at the same time that Edwards engages in remedial respecification of psychology, ethnomethodologists in sociology working with Sacks’ ideas took a different tack. While Sacks’ work provided an illustrative critique of sociology his work was also beginning to be considered as a coherent approach to understanding how social categories were embedded in social action rather than a
foil for a critique of sociology or a useful methodological addition to conversation analysis. For Watson (1994, 1997), and then Eglin and Hester (1992), Hester and Francis (1994), Hester and Eglin (1997b), Sacks’ work was something to build upon, develop and critique where necessary. An interesting illustration of this emerging development is the way the machinery metaphor is tackled by Edwards in *Sacks and psychology* (1995) and by Hester and Eglin in their Introduction chapter to *Culture in action* (1997a, b). Both of these discussions come after the publication of Sacks’ lectures (initially in 1992, and in paperback in 1995) and both draw upon them. For Edwards the focus is on psychology, for Hester and Eglin the focus becomes Sacks’ work itself.

As mentioned above, in *Sacks and psychology* (1995) Edwards discusses Sacks’ ‘machinery’ metaphor and the image of someone going through a warehouse selecting various bits to build a machine, according to the task at hand. The analytic task is to disassemble the parts of the machine into their components to be able to then reproduce the machine that produced the observations in context. Edwards observes that this may sound like it is compatible with ‘straightforward cognitive science’ (p. 588), in that it suggests a background standard stock of knowledge that is then able to be re-selected and assembled in explaining the way categories are used in any particular occasion. As Edwards points out, this potential schema model reading of Sacks, which Schegloff also raises (Schegloff, ‘Introduction to Sacks’, 1992 (V1) p. xxi), belies the emphasis on occasioned-ness that Sacks gives his observations. Hester and Eglin (1997b), also drawing on the then recently published *Lectures on conversation* (1992), take up a similar exploration though their emphasis becomes somewhat different as they tackle some of Sacks’ own writings head-on.

In their Introduction to the book *Culture in action* (1997b) Hester and Eglin undertake a shift towards treating Sacks’ work as offering a more programmatic method of analysis. The Introduction covers three main parts, each of which serves to move attention to Sacks’ work in itself rather than in service for a different task. In outlining this programmatic orientation to Sacks’ ‘method’ they include a critique of some aspects of Sacks’ work, including the ‘machinery’ metaphor.

Before embarking on their critique of Sacks, Hester and Eglin first offer a step-through introduction of Sacks’ (1974) observations in ‘On the analysability of children’s stories’. The authors largely delimit Sacks’ ‘method’ to this one paper, thereby curtailing the large amounts of observations contained in the lectures while also creating a framework from which to further examine the wealth of analysis in the lectures. Indeed, while the *Lectures* offer a vast array of brilliant observations they suffer from a lack of systematic coherence as Sacks works through various observations with some subsequent iterations over the semesters and years. They are, however, an excellent insight into Sacks’ working through these occasioned observations.

The ‘method’ discussion is followed by a list of previous work using Sacks’ category ideas. While each of these research papers uses Sacks’ observations, for the most part they are largely single papers employing an aspect drawn from
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Sacks. This ad hoc collection is assembled together with a number of people who have used Sacks’ work extensively (for example Caroline Baker, Lena Jayyusi and Rod Watson). By assembling this work Hester and Eglin provide a recognisable corpus, both establishing a device and one that is able to be added to.

Having provided a coherent method and a collection of research that uses Sacks’ category work, the third part of the chapter identifies and explores three areas where Sacks’ work seems problematic. Particularly where his observations could be seen as suggesting a ‘decontextualised’ model of category analysis. Here Hester and Eglin identify the machinery metaphor as being problematic in the same way that Edwards had done. For Hester and Eglin, however, this is reason to explore Sacks’ work further and offer a critique of Sacks’ ‘analytic stages’. The stages identified by Sacks are first to see some action being done, second to make these categories strange for analysis, and finally in the third stage, to try to reassemble the category work using a selection of pre-existing device. While Hester and Eglin agree with the first two stages they contend that the third stage is problematic. Here there is a potential reification of members in situ category through the possible separation of the analysis from the local context in which it occurs. That is, at this point there is a danger of analysts producing decontextualised accounts of category work. Or, as Schegloff argues, there is the potential to be analytically promiscuous where such analysis relies upon the analyst’s understanding rather than the participants’ (see also Stokoe, 2012; Fitzgerald, 2012; Fitzgerald and Rintel, 2013). Thus, the sense-making metaphor of a ‘warehouse full of pre-existing gadgets’, serves to undermine Sacks’ insistence on always locally occasioned work. In order to maintain the locally occasioned emphasis, Hester and Eglin argue that rather than a static ‘stock of knowledge’ it would be better to conceive of social knowledge as ‘knowledge in action’, or indeed as ‘culture in action’. Hester and Eglin then go onto critique a number of specific points that lead from this. First that there are ‘natural’ and ‘occasioned’ collections of categories, whereby ‘natural’ are treated as pre-formed prior to their use and occasioned are treated as produced in situ. If this were the case it would again suggest static forms of categorisation that pre-exist their use in any particular occasion. Thus if categories are always and in every case assembled and deployed in the occasion of their use then the idea of pre-existing ‘natural’ collections cannot be sustained.

Although acknowledging that Sacks’ own words contribute to the perceptions of static forms of knowledge and analytic decontextualisation, Hester and Eglin’s critique re-emphasises the always occasioned thrust of Sacks’ in his analysis of social categorisation. Moreover, this discussion and critique of Sacks’ ideas provides the groundwork for the approach they introduced as MCA. From this reconsideration (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002) of Sacks’ category work, MCA begins to emerge as a workable method capable of building cumulative findings and observations as well as a stable methodological framework from which to further mine Sacks’ lectures.
Contemporary influences on MCA

While Edwards’ use of Sacks ran largely parallel to Hester and Eglin’s development of MCA, it can argued that Sacks’ influence on DP from Edwards was an openness to different approaches (of which Sacks’ work was a part). Moreover, that this openness influenced later DP research that incorporated sensitivity to membership categories and which reflexively contributes to MCA as an approach.

It could be argued that Edwards’ insistence of inserting Sacks’ category work as a methodological attentiveness within DP contributed to an appreciation of a repertoire of analytic approaches to the occasioned production of social meaning. This in turn provides a space for, rather than simply incorporating, related language and talk-focused fields approaches such as Conversation Analysis, Membership Categorisation Analysis, Multimodal Analysis, and more broadly Discourse Analysis. In some respects this separate yet collectable group of approaches resembles some of the different elements of ethnomethodology brought together in Roy Turner’s (1974) edited collection *Ethnomethodology*. In this collection Ryave and Schenkein’s *Notes on the art of walking* (1974) sits alongside Schegloff and Sacks’ *Opening up closings* (1974), Turner’s *Words, utterances and activities* (1974), and Sacks’ *On the analyzability of stories by children* (1974). What remains remarkable about this collection of studies under the heading of ‘Ethnomethodology’ is that philosophical, theoretical, and empirically detailed studies are brought together under the one heading, *Ethnomethodology*. In some respects this collection provides a salutary contrast to recent trends where these approaches have become separate, distinct, and even hostile to each other. However, DP’s agnosticism towards disciplinary boundaries has established an openness to various approaches and a willingness to move between and across multiple approaches. In turn it can be argued that this has provided an increasingly rich and detailed approach to the study of language in use, which has contributed back to these approaches, including MCA.

DP, underpinned by Edwards’ interest in Sacks, informs and now contributes to the developing methodological richness to MCA both as an approach in itself and in combination with other approaches. By focusing on the approaches as tools for analysis it is notable how DP demands a level of understanding across all the approaches it utilises. For categorisation work this means both a deep understanding of locally displayed social categorisation in action and also as an approach that can be combined with related approaches, depending on the analytic focus. While this is evident in much of the recent work in DP a number of particular examples where MCA is used in combination with other approaches to great effect is found in Butler’s (2008) work on children’s play, in Stokoe and Edwards’ (2007) on race, and Stokoe’s (2003; 2010) work around gender and more recently Reynolds’ multi-dimensional examination of arguments (Reynolds, 2013).

Reynolds’ use is particularly telling, coming as it does very much as DP is in an ascendant period. Reynolds examines how his found practice of ‘enticing
a challengable’ relies on the occasioned deployment of proposedly normative membership categories (and associated membership actions) of the target interlocutor by the challenger to trap the target into a position of hypocrisy, and thereby forward an argumentative goal of the challenger. In his chapter exploring the frames of this proposed normativity, he demonstrates how the analytical flexibility of DP’s treatment of the deployment of norms as accountable resources allows for a more principled explanation of social action than other similar psychological approaches, specifically Social Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1987).

Most interestingly for the purposes of this discussion, Reynolds captures both the distinctions and interconnections between the concepts of normativity in MCA and DP.

Reynolds uses MCA to illustrate the way in which challengers categorise targets in the preface phase in order to make the enticing questions more ‘obvious’, and then how challengers:

employ the ‘second viewers’ maxim’ as a resource for both constituting that a norm, a moral ‘rule’, is relevant and also that the arguable constitutes the basis of a challenge to the status of the target’s adherence to the norm enacted in the pre-challenge phase.

(Reynolds, 2013, p. 15)

However, to more fully flesh out the description of the practice, Reynolds turns to DP ‘to illustrate the way in which challengers employ “generic” norms, as well as the category-related norms [...] as resources for challenging the target’s normativity,’ highlighting ‘the important role of consensus in the work of enticing a challengeable and the way in which norms, specifically normative challenges, are the central thrust of the practice of enticing a challengeable’ (p. 15, emphasis added). This combination provides Reynolds with principled and detailed tools to demonstrate his central claim that ‘the practice of enticing a challengeable is enacted to challenge the target’s adherence to a norm, at once making the challenger an agent of social order, and the target a violator of social order’ (p. 15).

Finally then, these examples, and other work, demonstrate not only an open analytic ease within DP but also reflexive contribution to the development of MCA and ongoing interaction between analytic approaches. Indeed it is then testament to Edwards’ initial and ongoing understanding of Sacks’ category work, while others focused on his contribution to sequential analysis, that DP continues to be one of a vibrant and rich area engaged in interactional analysis.

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