The Lotus-Eater Attack

Ian A. Kash
Computer Science Dept.
Cornell University
kash@cs.cornell.edu

Eric J. Friedman
School of Operations Research
and Information Engineering
Cornell University
ejf27@cornell.edu

Joseph Y. Halpern
Computer Science Dept.
Cornell University
halpern@cs.cornell.edu

They started at once, and went about among the Lotus-eaters, who did them no hurt, but gave them to eat of the lotus, which was so delicious that those who ate of it left off caring about home, and did not even want to go back and say what had happened to them, but were for staying and munching lotus with the Lotus-eater without thinking further of their return.

The Odyssey [9]

Abstract

Many protocols for distributed and peer-to-peer systems have the feature that nodes will stop providing service for others once they have received a certain amount of service. Examples include BitTorrent’s unchoking policy, BAR Gossip’s balanced exchanges, and threshold strategies in scrip systems. An attacker can exploit this by providing service in a targeted way to prevent chosen nodes from providing service. While such attacks cannot be prevented, we discuss techniques that can be used to limit the damage they do. These techniques presume that a certain number of processes will follow the recommended protocol, even if they could do better by “gaming” the system.

1 Introduction

Many current distributed and peer-to-peer systems have the feature that they are satiable; they have users that (by design) will stop providing service to others if they are themselves receiving a sufficient quantity of service. In many cases this is the product of “tit-for-tat-like” designs, which attempt to combat free riding by denying service to those who are not providing it. While this approach provides an incentive for cooperation, it has the unfortunate side effect that if there is no service for a peer to provide, then he will generally receive reduced or no service. Ironically, this opens the systems up to an attack that we call the lotus-eater attack: the attacker does no direct harm to any peer; instead he supplies the service to some peers, thus satiating them. Once those peers are satiated, they stop providing service to others. The peers not being satiated by the attacker then receive reduced or no service.

A wide range of systems are satiable and thus potentially vulnerable to this attack. In direct reciprocity systems like BitTorrent [4] and BAR Gossip [16], peers trade with the best partners they can find (BitTorrent) or stop trading when there is nothing they want (BAR Gossip). An attacker can prevent a peer from serving others by being a good trading partner and satisfying all of its requests. In indirect reciprocity systems, such as reputation systems [7, 12] and scrip systems [10, 19], peers need to perform service for others often enough to maintain a good reputation or supply of money. If an attacker can ensure that a peer maintains a good reputation or supply of money despite any requests the peer makes, then that peer will no longer provide service for others. Even systems not designed to be tit-for-tat-like may be satiable. For example, a node in a sensor network might shut down to save power if it has received all the updates it needs.

All of these systems have users that will stop providing service in response to this attack. However, the exact way that the attack is carried out and the overall impact of the attack on the system varies significantly.
Consider the case of BAR Gossip. In most gossip protocols, nodes randomly select partners to pass updates on to so that the updates spread through the entire system. However, this allows nodes to free ride by receiving updates while not using their own bandwidth to pass them on to anyone else. BAR Gossip encourages rational nodes to provide service by having nodes give away updates on an exchange basis. The downside is that a node following the protocol will not continue to provide service when there are no more updates for it to receive. If an attacker successfully distributes all of the updates to a large percentage of the nodes in the system, then the majority of interactions will result in no updates being exchanged. For those nodes being satiated by the attack, this is a wonderful outcome; they are receiving perfect service. However, those nodes that are not receiving the updates from the attacker will have few opportunities to get the updates they need. Since the updates in the intended application of BAR Gossip (for example, a streaming video service) are time sensitive, this minority of nodes will miss updates and may find the service unusable. By changing who is satiated over time, the attacker could even make the service intermittently unusable for all nodes.

Another context where this attack can be effective is in a scrip system. In these systems users are paid for providing service in scrip, a currency issued by the system. They can then redeem this scrip later in exchange for service. An optimal strategy for a rational agent in such a system is to choose a threshold and provide service only when he has less than that threshold amount of scrip [14]. If an attacker can ensure that an agent has a large amount of money (either by giving money away, or providing cheap service to him), the agent will stop providing service. By targeting a user or users who control important or rare resources, the attacker could prevent all users from receiving certain kinds of services. This type of behavior occurs regularly in the traditional economy when companies sign an exclusive contract or put particular lawyers on retainer to deny others access to them.

Despite the attack being possible in BitTorrent, it seems likely to do significantly less damage. In BitTorrent, peers (known as leechers) cooperatively download a file. Each leecher has \(k\) other unchoked peers to whom he provides pieces of the file. These unchoked peers are mainly leechers that have recently provided it with the most service, but some may be chosen randomly (optimistic unchokes) to try and find better peers. It is quite possible to ensure that, excluding these random choices, all of his unchoked peers are controlled by the attacker. However, since most leechers are downloading more than they upload, this is often actually a net benefit to the torrent. Even targeting users that are uploading more than they download seems likely to only modestly impair the progress of the torrent, especially since the attacker must contribute significant bandwidth of his own to make sure he stays unchoked. The attacker could try and target leechers who have rare pieces to artificially create a “last pieces problem,” but BitTorrent’s rarest first policy does a good job of resolving this problem [15].

These three examples are cases where, to varying extents, a lotus-eater attack can impair the performance of a system. In order to understand how the attack works in general and why the effectiveness varies, we state an informal theorem that characterizes the conditions under which an attacker can cause nodes in a system to stop providing service, and develop a simple model of how this lack of service can be used to harm the system. Using that model we examine design principles that make systems resilient to lotus-eater attacks. Two of these are traditional: tolerating non-random failures and making satiation hard by the use of coding or a scrip system. The other two are newer principles that have received relatively little study: making use of obedient nodes and encouraging altruism.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we examine in detail the effectiveness of a lotus-eater attack on BAR Gossip as well as changes to the algorithm that can make it more robust. In Section 3 we present a model that abstracts the general structure of systems built on tit-for-tat style mechanisms and state an informal theorem that captures the essential nature of the attack and the possible avenues for preventing it. In Section 4 we examine design principles relevant to preventing the attack and some of the subtleties involved in implementing them. We conclude in Section 5 with discussion of some open questions raised by this attack.
### Table 1: Simulation Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Nodes</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updates per Round</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update Lifetime (rds)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copies Seeded</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt. Push Size (upd)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Attacking BAR Gossip

In a BAR Gossip system, a broadcaster is releasing updates that nodes need to collect within a certain period of time. For example, in a streaming video application, the updates are frames of the video that need to be received in time to display. Each round, the broadcaster sends each of the updates for that round to a random subset of the nodes. Nodes then gossip the updates through two protocols, which each node can initiate once with a pseudorandomly chosen partner (nodes have no control over who their partner will be). In a balanced exchange, nodes exchange as many updates as possible on a one-for-one basis. In an optimistic push, the node initiating the push sends a list of recently released updates it has to offer and a list of updates expiring relatively soon it needs. The other node can then receive a limited number of the recent updates in exchange for older updates or junk data. The push is optimistic on the part of the initiator because he hopes he receives useful updates in return. In particular, if a node has no missing older updates, he has nothing to gain by initiating an optimistic push and a rational node will not. These protocols are described in greater detail in [16].

To mount an attack on BAR gossip, the attacker divides the nodes into two groups. The first group is the satiated nodes, to whom the attacker attempts to provide as many updates as possible. The second group is the isolated nodes, to whom the attacker provides no service. If the attacker provides enough updates to the satiated nodes, they will make relatively few and small balanced exchanges because most of their updates are provided by the attacker. This also means they will rarely be missing very old updates and so will rarely initiate optimistic pushes. Since isolated nodes receive no service from attacking nodes and limited service from satiated nodes, they have few opportunities to trade for each update.

In our experiments, the attacker attempts to satiate 70% of the system (including whatever percentage he controls). The reason for our choice of 70% will be explained shortly. Figure 1 shows the results of three versions of the attack on a BAR Gossip system using the same parameters as and an updated version of the simulation from [16]. The parameters are summarized in Table 1. In their simulation, nodes need to receive more than 93% of the updates for the stream to be usable. The results in Figure 1 and later figures are given for isolated nodes; satiated nodes receive near perfect service.

The curve labeled “crash attack” provides a baseline where the attacker simply does nothing. He may simply have crashed or be a Byzantine node following the strategy of initiating but never completing exchanges to waste bandwidth (this was the strategy used by Byzantine nodes in [16]). With this attack, the attacker needs to control 42% of the system to ensure fewer than 93% of the updates are delivered. This curve is very similar to Figure 6 of [16] where colluding nodes provide very little service to others because they receive most updates from other colluding nodes. This curve also guided our decision to choose 70% as the fraction to satiate; it strikes a balance between the need to satiate enough nodes to limit trade opportunities for isolated nodes and a desire to isolate as many nodes as possible.

The “ideal lotus-eater attack” curve assumes that attacking nodes can immediately send updates to all satiated nodes as soon as they receive them. This might be the case if the attacker can exploit the implementation of the protocol to send updates to nodes with whom he has not started an exchange. Attacking nodes never trade, merely forwarding all updates they receive from the broadcaster. Note that this means...
that satiated nodes will have to trade for any updates the attacker did not receive from the broadcaster. With this attack, the attacker can control as few as 4% of the system and still make service unreliable. Note that with so few nodes under his control, the attacker is receiving only 39% of the updates. This shows that frequent partial satiation can be sufficient to attack the system.

The “trade lotus-eater attack” curve makes the typically more reasonable assumption that the attacker can give updates to nodes only during interactions dictated by the protocol. However, he is able to give nodes more updates than a normal node would (every update he has). Because the attacker needs to control enough nodes to communicate with satiated nodes reasonably often, he needs significantly more nodes than in the ideal lotus-eater attack; with this version of the attack, the attacker needs to control at least 22% of the nodes in the system, far less than the approximately 42% percent that the more traditional crash attack required. This may make it possible to launch a lotus-eater attack in some settings where a crash attack would be impossible. We should note, however, that this does require enough bandwidth at each attacking node to satiate multiple nodes every round while the crash attack requires essentially no bandwidth beyond that needed to maintain the nodes in the system.

In anticipation of coming discussion, we also investigate the impact of two changes on the effectiveness of lotus-eater attacks. First, Figure 2 shows the effect of increasing the maximum size of an optimistic push to 10 updates. This has the effect that nodes that are willing to initiate optimistic pushes will be a more altruistic
towards other nodes; they are willing to give away more updates at the risk of receiving junk. This makes partial satiation much less effective, so the ideal lotus-eater attack now requires at least 15% of the nodes in the system, which is enough to allow him to provide 85% of the updates to satiated nodes. It also makes the trade lotus-eater attack impractical, by nearly doubling the required fraction of nodes to 40%. This change does have two downsides. First, rational nodes might no longer be willing to participate in optimistic pushes if they tend to receive significantly more junk updates due to the higher push size. Second, Byzantine nodes can create more work by asking for a larger number of updates.

![Figure 3: Obedient nodes reduce effectiveness.](image)

The other change we consider is to the behavior of the nodes in the system. In addition to Byzantine and rational nodes, the BAR model includes the possibility of obedient “altruist” nodes who are willing to follow the protocol even if it is not optimal. One way we could exploit this is by allowing balanced exchanges to be slightly unbalanced. We modified the protocol so that nodes are willing to give one more update than they receive, assuming they are receiving at least one update. Since the node already has the overhead of a balanced exchange, it doesn’t seem unreasonable that a node would be willing to upload a little extra data. Incentives to free ride or exploit by Byzantine agents are minimal because there must already be a balanced exchange occurring and there is only a single additional update involved. Figure 3 shows the effects of this change on a trade lotus-eater attack, both alone and in conjunction with a more modest increase in the push size to 4. The combination of these two small changes is enough to increase the fraction of the system the attacker needs to control by almost 50%.

3 Understanding the Lotus-eater Attack

In this section, we develop an understanding, at an abstract level, of how lotus-eater attacks work and what can be done about them. We first examine what properties of a system allow an attacker to use a lotus-eater attack, and state a “theorem” that encapsulates the essence of the attack. We then examine how this attack, which is not directly harmful, can be used to harm a system. To do this, we develop a simple model whose parameters characterize features of systems that affect the viability of an attack.

A system is characterized by a graph $G = (V, E)$. The nodes are the users, each of which is a state machine implementing some protocol. The edges are the pairs of nodes that can potentially communicate. There is a set $T$ of labeled tokens; one feature of a node’s state is the set of tokens that the node currently has. A node may reach the point where it has all the tokens that it wishes to collect. This is captured by a satiation function $s$, a monotone function that maps a user $i$, a time $t$, and a set $T' \subseteq T$ of tokens to $\{true, false\}$. Intuitively, $sat(i, t, T') = true$ if $i$ is does not need any more tokens at time $t$ if it has all the tokens in $T'$. A state $s$ for $i$ is satiated at time $t$ if $sat(i, t, T') = true$, where $T'$ is the tokens associated with $s$ at time $t$. 
In a satiated state, a node has all of its current desires met. It may eventually leave the state if new tokens enter the system or it loses some of its current tokens, but until that time it can gain no benefit from other nodes. Many protocols have the property that a node in a satiated state will not provide service to other nodes. In many cases this design is due to a desire to make the protocol incentive-compatible. We adopt the term *satiation-compatible* to describe protocols where nodes in a satiated state do not provide service.\(^1\) With these definitions in place we can state our “theorem.”

**Observation 3.1** In a system where a satiation-compatible protocol is used, an attacker that can provide a node with tokens sufficiently rapidly can prevent it from ever providing service.

The observation is trivial. In the extreme case, if an attacker provides a full set of tokens instantaneously, then clearly the node will be satiated when a message arrives. The importance of this observation is it helps abstract out the two key factors that allow the lotus-eater attack to stop a node from providing service: a satiation-compatible protocol and an attacker that provides tokens “sufficiently rapidly.” These two factors are what a protocol designer must target in order to mitigate lotus-eater attacks. In Section 4, we will analyze these two factors in more detail.

While the observation tells us that an attacker can cause nodes to stop providing service using a lotus-eater attack, it does not say anything about why this would be a bad thing. Indeed, for a (well-designed) system this attack should have little or no negative impact. In order to get a sense of the ways this attack can actually damage a system, we consider a simplified model of a token-collecting system. This system uses a simple protocol. In each round, each node \(i\) selects up to \(c\) communication partners from among its adjacent nodes and \(i\) gets a copy of the tokens that each partner has, while each partner gets a copy of the tokens \(i\) has (for simplicity, assume all of these events happen simultaneously). Once \(i\) has a copy of all the tokens (i.e., once \(i\) is satiated), he stops communicating. In many real systems, rather than stopping service entirely, nodes actually continue to provide some service even through they are satiated (for example seeding in BitTorrent). We allow for this possibility in our model by having the probability that a node responds to requests even when satiated be nonzero. A system in this model is a tuple \((G, T, sat, f, c, a)\) where:

- \(G = (V, E)\) is the underlying graph, which we assume to be connected;
- \(T\) is a finite set of tokens;
- \(sat(i, t, T') = true\) iff \(T' = T\) (i.e. every node wishes to collect every token);
- \(f : V \rightarrow T\) is an initial allocation of tokens to nodes;
- \(c\) is a bound on the number of nodes that each node can contact each round;
- \(a\) is the probability that a node responds to requests even if satiated. This captures the amount of altruism in the system.

We assume that, at the start of every round, an attacker chooses a subset of the nodes and gives each node in the set all the tokens. Clearly this overestimates the power of the attacker in most real systems, and ignores the possibility that \(T\) will grow over time. However, this simple model suffices to help us see where problems may lie.

Of the six parameters in our model, \(T\) and \(sat\) are typically beyond the control of the designer (although, as we discuss in Section 4, techniques like coding, which can be viewed as changing the set of tokens, may be of some use in specific cases). Knowledge of \(G, f,\) and \(c\) can help an attacker know what to target; we discuss each of these three parameters in turn, and then consider the role of \(a\).

\(^1\)Note that incentive-compatible and satiation-compatible are not equivalent notions. It is easy to construct protocols that satisfy one property and not the other.
Suppose that the underlying graph \( G \) is a grid. Then at any time the attacker can partition the graph with relatively little cost by removing any set of nodes that constitutes a cut. If some side of the cut is missing a token, nodes on that side of the cut will never be able to collect all the tokens. Clearly, an attacker can always make a cut around a single node, but doing this on a large scale is expensive. While finding inexpensive cuts depends on the structure of \( G \), the damage is significant only if some side of the cut is missing a token. Whether this is the case depends (in part) on \( f \), the initial allocation. If many nodes start with each token and those nodes are well spread, this attack is likely to be ineffective. (Note that, in a real system, what we are calling the “initial allocation” may actually include some of the initial exchanges, because an attacker cannot always satiate instantly.) This version of the attack is also likely to be ineffective in random networks, but in, for example, sensor networks, there is often an inherent structure an attacker may be able to make use of.

Even in the absence of significant structure, knowledge of the initial allocation may help an attacker, particularly if one or more of the tokens is rare. In the extreme case where some token is initially at a single node, an attacker can deny the entire system access to that token for the cost of satiating one node. This version of the attack may be relevant to networks set up for file sharing, grid computing, and other similar applications, where some resources is often rare. Furthermore, in these systems it tends to be relatively easy to determine what the rare resources and who has them.

As an alternative to targeted removals, an attacker with sufficient resources may simply attempt to satiate a large fraction of the system. Here the parameter \( c \) is relevant. This parameter is, in a sense, a measure of how many “trade opportunities” a node gets each round. If the attacker can successfully reduce the number of trade opportunities, the overall rate at which tokens spread through the system may decrease. This approach is what we used in the case of BAR Gossip, and it was particularly damaging there because the updates had hard deadlines.

The final parameter \( a \) is a factor that helps mitigate lotus-eater attacks. A system with \( a > 0 \) is not truly satiation-compatible (and generally not truly incentive-compatible either, because agents can often free ride on altruistically provided service). However, adding a little bit of altruism can make a big difference in reducing the harm of attacks, since satiated nodes can still provide some service. For our simple model, any system with \( a > 0 \) will eventually end up with all nodes satiated. Although we capture the degree of altruism here by the probability of responsiveness even when satiated, altruism can be introduced into the system in other ways. For example, seeding and optimistic unchokes in BitTorrent and optimistic pushes in BAR Gossip can all be viewed as ways to introduce some altruism into the system. We discuss ways that altruism can be leveraged in greater detail in Section 4.

### 4 Preventing the Lotus-eater Attack

Our observation says that if a satiation-compatible protocol is used in a system, then a lotus-eater attack succeeds if an attacker can provide service “sufficiently rapidly.” This suggests that one way to prevent lotus-eater attacks is to abandon satiation-compatibility entirely. In general this seems undesirable as many popular systems are satiation compatible. Furthermore, it seems difficult to design a robust incentive-compatible system that is not also satiation-compatible. Most designs for incentive-compatible systems are tit-for-tat-like; they rely on some notion of reciprocity to provide incentive-compatibility. Satiation-compatibility is a natural consequence of this, because when a node is satiated there is no room for reciprocity. Despite being among the simplest systems in which to analyze the incentives of users, even BitTorrent is still vulnerable to free riding [11, 18]. So abandoning these relatively simple systems to try and maintain incentive-compatibility while avoiding satiation-compatibility seems likely to introduce as many problems as it solves. Since we do not wish to abandon satiation-compatibility entirely, we focus on ways to tolerate lotus-eater attacks. In this section, we examine four design principles that can help do this: being resilient to non-random failures, making satiation difficult, leveraging obedience, and encouraging altruism.

Of the four principles, resilience to non-random failures is the best studied; we have nothing new to add.
As we saw in Section 3, attacks based on the structure of \( G \) and \( f \) are essentially independent of the fact that we are using a lotus-eater attack. These attacks work by removing key nodes from the system; the way they are removed is essentially incidental. A system vulnerable to this type of attack is also vulnerable to many others, and may experience difficulties even without an attack if key nodes happen to become satiated. We thus assume that \( G \) and \( f \) have been chosen to prevent this.

The second principle, making satiation hard, is more interesting. As a general principle, it is good even when an attack is not underway, because less satiation means more opportunities for useful work to be done. In the context of our model, making satiation hard means focusing on \( T \) and \( sat \). While there may be an underlying set of tokens that a user wants to collect, using a scrip system or reputation system effectively allows the set of relevant tokens to be changed. In such a system, a node will determine satiation based on its current amount of money or reputation. This generally makes it easy to satiate a few nodes, but difficult to satiate a large number of nodes. For example, in a scrip system there is generally a fixed amount of money. While it is easy for an attacker to accumulate enough money to satiate a few nodes, there may not even be enough money in the system to satiate a significant fraction of the nodes. This suggests that scrip could be the basis for an incentive-compatible gossip system that is robust against lotus-eater attacks.

In many systems, the goal is to collect a complete set of tokens. A node might need the complete set of updates or the all the pieces of a file. If a node only has a few tokens, he may be unable to trade with most agents because they already have them making him “effectively satiated.” Similarly, a node with almost every token may have a hard time finding nodes with the remaining tokens he needs. Another way to make satiation hard is to adopt policies that increase the likelihood that nodes in such a situation will be able to make a useful exchange. BitTorrent uses a number of optimizations for these cases. In general it tries to avoid this effective satiation by using a “rarest-first” policy, where leechers will target rare pieces first. When first joining the system, leechers will request random pieces to get pieces to trade as quickly as possible. Finally, BitTorrent has a special “endgame mode” to allow for the rapid acquisition of the final pieces [4]. Another approach is to use ideas from network coding, as done by Avalanche [6], to change the requirements so that nodes need to collect only enough independent tokens to reconstruct the full information rather than the complete set of tokens.

The last two principles, leveraging obedience and encouraging altruism, are perhaps the most interesting, in terms of broad both applicability and directions for future research. Work in fault tolerance typically considers all nodes to be either good or bad; work in game theory considers all nodes to be rational. But in practice, even in a system with rational nodes, there will be a pool of users running the default client on the default settings as long as this serves them reasonably well. The BAR model [2] bridges this gap by considering systems with a mix of Byzantine, rational, and altruistic nodes. (We prefer to use the term obedient for what Aiyer et al. call “altruistic,” since these are nodes that simply follow the protocol, and use the term altruistic somewhat differently, using it to refer to nodes that provide service even when satiated. Of course, such nodes may be obedient as well, if they are simply following the protocol.) We know of only one protocol that explicitly seeks to exploit these obedient nodes [17]. In the remainder of this section, we examine how obedience and altruism can be used to prevent lotus-eater attacks.

One use of obedience is to prevent sufficiently rapid satiation, by limiting the rate at which an attacker can provide service. Doing this represents a radical departure from the typical design goal for most P2P systems. In general a designer strives to provide as much service as rapidly as possible. Now the goal becomes that of providing service at a reasonable pace, and enforcing that pace. At first glance, reducing the rate at which a node provides service seems like a silly idea. However, there are a number of cases beyond lotus-eater attacks in which this might be beneficial. In general, the incentive for a user to contribute to a system is that the service he would receive if he free-rides is inferior. If the service provided to free-riders is good, there is little incentive for participation. Limiting the amount of service provided can increase the incentives for cooperation and, in some cases, even make all nodes better off. For example, in a scrip system, if altruists are not handled appropriately they can cause what would otherwise be a thriving economy to crash, making
all agents worse off because they now receive only the level of service altruists are providing \[14\].

The BAR Gossip protocol \[16\] gives some insight into how the number of nodes an attacking node contacts each round can be limited, but limiting the amount of service the attacker provides in each trade is more subtle. Only two people know if an attacker provides excessive service: the attacker and the node that benefits from it. Suppose that we require a node to report if it is getting excessive service from another node. Since this excessive service is to its benefit, a rational node might not report it. But an obedient node would, if its protocol required it. A node can use the signed messages generated by BAR Gossip to prove that excessive service occurred, and get the reported node removed from the system. If there are sufficiently many obedient nodes in the system, then we can essentially prevent a lotus-eater attack. Moreover, the cost of obedience will be low if the attack is successfully prevented, so it seems reasonable to expect that a reasonable proportion of nodes will in fact be obedient.\(^2\)

Even if an attacker successfully satiates a large fraction of the nodes, this will have no negative impact if the remaining nodes still receive sufficient service. One way to achieve this would be to increase the opportunities that the remaining nodes have to trade. The parameter \(c\) describes the bound on the number of peers a node has. BitTorrent has caps on both the number of open connections to maintain and the number of those connections to un choke. BAR Gossip limits the number of exchanges per round to minimize the damage Byzantine nodes can do. However, these systems need to make sure that \(c\) is still large enough that the system performs well. Thus, selecting a good value for \(c\) involves a careful balancing by the system designer. We have seen that an attacker who can satiate a large fraction of the nodes can effectively decrease \(c\) to the point where performance becomes unacceptable. This could be prevented by increasing \(c\) but, to guarantee the desired robustness, \(c\) might have to be unacceptably high. An alternative is to increase the value of \(a\). Adding enough altruism means that isolated nodes will still receive service despite the attack.

One way to encourage altruism is to provide incentives for rational nodes to behave in a way that ends up being altruistic. This can be done by having nodes optimistically provide service in exchange for the hope of return service. If this generally ends up being a net benefit for the node, a rational node will still participate even though he might get away with providing less service. In BitTorrent, even if every other leecher is satiated, a leecher will still receive service through optimistic unchokes. When a leecher in BitTorrent optimistically uncho kes another leecher, he is picking someone to send data to in hopes of finding a reliable partner for the future. We saw another example of this with the optimistic push protocol of BAR Gossip in Figure 2. Rational agents may be willing to participate in large optimistic pushes if there is a reasonable chance it will get them an update they would otherwise miss.

Another way to add altruism to a system is to leverage obedience by having a protocol that requires nodes to behave altruistically. In BitTorrent, an isolated leecher gets service from seeds (who have already downloaded the complete file). Seeding in BitTorrent is not an incentive-compatible behavior. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many leechers never remain to seed or seed only for a limited time. However, a sufficient number do seed to maintain reasonably popular torrents. In the context of BAR Gossip, Figure 3 shows that having nodes perform slightly unbalanced exchanges can make lotus-eater attacks more difficult.

Increasing \(a\) does make systems more robust, but there is a tradeoff. The same mechanisms also provide a limited amount of free service to all nodes, whether attacked or not. If this amount is too generous, nodes have an incentive to free ride using just this amount of service. For example, in BitTorrent, a node that connects to a large number of peers can get good service even if it never uploads any data \[18\]. In many cases this incentive can be eliminated if nodes have to perform nonproductive work in exchange for the altruistic service. For example, in BAR Gossip, nodes that receive updates through an optimistic push that have no updates to return must upload junk data.

\(^2\)We remark that this is an example of the more general phenomenon that maintaining cooperation often requires the existence of players willing to incur costs \[8, 13\].
5 Conclusion

The lotus-eater attack is, at least in the context of incentive-compatible systems, an attack on the incentives of agents. As incentive-compatible systems grow in popularity, we expect that other ways will be found for an attacker to target systems through the incentives of their users. On a theoretical level, this points to the need for a better understanding of equilibria in the presence of Byzantine agents. Some work has been done in this direction with solution concepts like $k$ fault tolerant Nash equilibria [5], $(k, t)$-robust equilibria [1], and BAR games [3]. The last is the solution concept used to analyze BAR Gossip. What that definition in particular excludes (at least with the assumption of risk-averse agents, which is typically made in practice) is the possibility for Byzantine and rational nodes to collude either explicitly or, as in the case of the lotus-eater attack, implicitly. Thus, to the extent that we want to provide guarantees about system performance in the presence of both Byzantine and rational agents, we need a solution concept that considers the possibility of such collusion.

Another concrete open problem that arises from this attack is how we can design a system that limits the rate at which nodes can provide service. As we saw in Section 4, this potentially is a strong technique for preventing lotus-eater attacks by preventing an attacker from providing service sufficiently rapidly to satiate targeted nodes. This problem seems to be relevant for other attacks on incentives as well, since typically these require the attacker to be “too nice.” Even if they are not explicitly attacking, nodes that provide a disproportionate amount of service can become a point of centralization in what is otherwise a decentralized system.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Harry Li and Lorenzo Alvisi for allowing us to use their BAR Gossip simulation.

References


