

# Fairplay — A Secure Two-Party Computation System

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## Abstract

Advances in modern cryptography coupled with rapid growth in processing and communication speeds make secure two-party computation a realistic paradigm. Yet, thus far, interest in this paradigm has remained mostly theoretical.

This paper introduces Fairplay [28], a full-fledged system that implements generic secure function evaluation (SFE). Fairplay comprises a high level procedural definition language called SFDL tailored to the SFE paradigm; a compiler of SFDL into a one-pass Boolean circuit presented in a language called SHDL; and Bob/Alice programs that evaluate the SHDL circuit in the manner suggested by Yao in [39].

This system enables us to present the first evaluation of an overall SFE in real settings, as well as examining its components and identifying potential bottlenecks. It provides a test-bed of ideas and enhancements concerning SFE, whether by replacing parts of it, or by integrating with it. We exemplify its utility by examining several alternative implementations of *oblivious transfer* within the system, and reporting on their effect on overall performance.

## 1 Introduction

**Motivation.** Modern cryptography is usually considered to have its beginning in the landmark papers of Diffie and Hellman [16], who introduced the concept of public key encryption, and of Rivest, Shamir and Adelman [35] who suggested a concrete public key system. The fundamental theoretical studies along these lines originate in the late 1970's, and the results - the well-known cryptographic primitives of public key encryption, authentication and digital signature - have been widely applied in practice during the 1990's.

However, theoretical cryptography provided additional, powerful (and perhaps less intuitive) tools. One of the most attractive paradigms in this category is a secure function evaluation (SFE). It allows two par-

ticipants to implement a joint computation that, in real life, may be implemented using a trusted party, but does this digitally without any trusted party. A classic simple example of such a computation is the Millionaires' problem [39]: Two millionaires want to know who is richer, without any of them revealing to the other his net worth. More generally, informally, the two-party SFE problem is the following. Alice has an input  $\vec{x} = x_1, \dots, x_s$  and Bob has an input  $\vec{y} = y_1, \dots, y_r$ . They both wish to learn  $f(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$  for some publicly known function  $f$ , without revealing any information on their inputs that cannot be inferred from  $f(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$ . (We refer the reader to, e.g. [20], for a formal introduction to SFE.) SFE is a universal building block, and many interesting cryptographic protocols can be formulated as instances thereof, e.g., zero knowledge proofs, private database mining, electronic auction and negotiation, and voting protocols.

Thus far, SFE techniques are rarely applied in practice, and are typically considered to have mostly theoretic significance. In this paper, we suggest that it is prime time to start translating these theoretical results into practical applications. We see three main forces converging to make this transition possible:

**1. New applications:** new applications are driven by advances in the communication infrastructure (such as the ubiquity of the Internet or the emergence of web services), coupled with increased demand for information based relationships (e.g. for business or homeland security purposes). These applications often involve sensitive information related to issues such as pricing, business processes, or personal information, and their security often relies on trusting a designated trusted party (such as eBay in the case of auctions). Not all users feel completely confident giving this trust, especially when high stakes are involved. SFE offers a solution for unmediated e-commerce applications such as auctions and web services [32, 17].

**2. New cryptographic techniques:** we have lately

seen a growing theoretical effort to overcome the main efficiency bottlenecks of previous theoretical solutions. Such efforts include more efficient cryptographic solutions for specific tasks such as auctions and certain database access tasks (e.g. [31, 13]), as well as general theoretical results improving on various efficiency parameters (e.g. [29, 30, 24]).

**3. Improved CPU and communication speeds:** while sending megabytes of communication, or spending GigaFlops of processing power would have seemed unreasonably expensive only a few years ago, such effort is certainly acceptable now. It is not unreasonable to spend such an effort even for tasks whose monetary value is a few dollars. Even Gigabytes of communication, and TeraFlops of processing power are reasonable for important tasks.

The goal of this work is to provide the first full fledged secure two-party computation tool that is readily deployed by the community. Fairplay provides the first solid answers to questions regarding the efficiency of the overall computation, and its breakdown into parts. Thus, using this tool, we are able to tell for the first time the overall price of solving a problem like the above mentioned Millionaires' problem in real network settings (the answer is  $\approx 4$  seconds over a wide area network, see Section 6). We further discern the cost of different components of the SFE, and assess their relative effect on overall elapsed time. Thus, for example, in Section 6 we analyze the relative contribution of the public key operations performed as part of the SFE protocol, and conclude that while 27%-77% of the time is due to public key operations over a fast LAN, only 9%-42% is accountable to public key operations over a wide area link.

Fairplay also serves as a test-bed of new ideas and algorithmic variations. For demonstration, we already considered several flavors of oblivious transfer (OT) algorithms within our tool. Specifically, we have implemented the original scheme by Bellare and Micali from [6, 7], the enhancements suggested by Naor and Pinkas in [30], and straight-forward communication batching. Our experiments show a remarkable matching of the predicted 30% speedup of the enhancement in [30] over [6]. The effect of communication batching is observed to be up to nearly nine-fold speedup (see Section 6). Thus, our platform provides valuable guidance in trading different parameters.

**Technical approach.** The first issue we tackle is the compilation paradigm. The correct paradigm for addressing the computation is to adopt the trusted party model for the definition of tasks, and to compile these definitions into protocols that do not use any trusted party. In this way, the user specification is completely

oblivious to the actual protocol that implements it. This is the common definition of secure computation used in cryptography<sup>1</sup> (we refer the reader to cryptographic literature, e.g. to [10, 12, 20], for an exact definition). Specifically, a definition of a task using a trusted party involves the following elements:

1. Exact specification of the interaction of the trusted party with the participants. This includes specification of what the participants tell and what they learn from the trusted party.
2. Exact specification of the internal computations of the trusted party.

In support of the user's high level view of the computation, we provide our own high-level definition language called *Secure Function Definition Language* (SFDL). SFDL is a procedural language that resembles a subset of Pascal or C, and is tailored to our purpose. For convenience, a syntax-driven GUI is provided that guides the program developer.

Once such a specification is given, a compiler generates an intermediate level specification of the computation in the form of a one-pass Boolean circuit. Whereas classical theory on SFE was satisfied with the fact that it is provably possible to reduce any function to a canonical Boolean representation, we tackle for the first time actually automating the transformation, while keeping efficiency in mind.

The language used for describing the Boolean circuit is named *Secure Hardware Definition Language* (SHDL). Developing an SFDL-to-SHDL compiler is a novel endeavor in itself, because unlike common hardware compilers, our compiler may use no registers, no loops or goto's, and moreover, may use every gate only once. Its complete obliviousness makes compiling even the most primitive operations like array indexing (e.g., "a[i]") a daunting task: it must create essentially a multiplexer, such that all possible values of "i" are hardwired into it. Thus, the SFDL-to-SHDL compiler includes many novel tricks for reducing the number of resulting gates in the circuit, and for optimizing the use of wires. The final component of Fairplay is a Bob/Alice pair of programs, whose input is an SHDL circuit, which together carry a secure computation protocol of the circuit in the manner suggested by Yao. The entire computation structure of Fairplay is depicted in Figure 1.

**Security.** The main security property guaranteed by the system is the equivalence to the specified trusted party. I.e., each user is guaranteed that whatever the other participant does, including using completely different software for communicating with him, his security is assured to the same level that the trusted

party would have assured it. In particular, the function is correctly computed on the reported values and no information about the input of one party is leaked to the other (beyond what is implied by the specified output). Note, however, that, in principle, there is no way to “force” any party what to tell the trusted party (e.g. force it to report its “true” input), and that in two-party secure computation it is also impossible to prevent one party from terminating the protocol prematurely, before the other party learns its output – this is detected, but cannot be recovered from.

The Fairplay system provides the guarantee above based on common and widely accepted cryptographic assumptions. We describe the security properties of Fairplay in more detail in Section 5. The level of security provided is asymmetric: Alice can only cheat with negligible probability, but Bob can potentially cheat with probability  $1/m$ , where  $m$  is a parameter that can be chosen at will and there is an overhead that is proportional to  $m$ .<sup>2</sup>

**Summary of Contributions.** We contribute a generic two-party computation engine that we make available for use by the security community. The tool is available at Fairplay’s web-site [28]. It includes a specially tailored high level description language (SFDL) that describes a secure computation in the trusted third-party model. It tackles the challenge of efficient compilation of SFDL into a one-pass Boolean circuit. And it provides a Bob/Alice implementation that securely evaluates the circuit.

Fairplay enables experimenting with mechanisms related to secure function evaluation, whether by replacing a component of it, building on top of it, or interacting with it. Our preliminary investigation introduces results concerning the overall cost of the SFE paradigm in today’s Internet settings; it presents a breakdown of costs into components and bottlenecks; and it examines various enhancements that were introduced in the literature.

## 2 System Overview

We start by a general overview of the computation being performed, which also allows us to present the main entities and components of our system. Fairplay comprises two applications that are activated by the two players, who want to engage in two-party secure function evaluation (SFE). By convention we call these players/applications *Bob* and *Alice*. Prior to executing the SFE protocol, the two players must define and coordinate the function-to-be-evaluated. In order to do that, they use the *Secure Function Definition Language (SFDL)*, a language which was designed especially for this purpose. The SFDL is a high-level

programming language, which allows humans to specify the function-to-be-evaluated in the form of a computer program. Another language that the system uses is the *Secure Hardware Definition Language (SHDL)*. The SHDL is a low-level language designed for specifying Boolean circuits. The SFE computation is done in several stages as shown in Figure 1.

- An SFDL program file is written by the users using an SFDL editor.
- The SFDL program is translated by an SFDL compiler to an SHDL circuit file. The circuit is optimized before it is passed on to the next stage.
- The SHDL circuit is parsed. The resulting circuit is in the form of a Java object.
- Bob constructs  $m$  garbled/encrypted circuits and sends them to Alice. Alice randomly chooses one of the circuits that will be evaluated.
- Bob exposes the secrets of the other  $m - 1$  garbled/encrypted circuits, and Alice verifies them against her reference circuit.
- Bob specifies his inputs, and sends them to Alice in garbled form. Alice inserts Bob’s inputs in the garbled/encrypted circuit that she chose to evaluate.
- Alice specifies her inputs, and then Bob and Alice engage in Oblivious Transfers (OTs) in order for Alice to receive her inputs (in garbled form) from Bob, while Bob learns nothing about Alice’s inputs.
- Alice evaluates the chosen circuit, finds the garbled outputs of both her and Bob, and sends the relevant garbled outputs to Bob.
- Each party interprets his/her garbled outputs and prints the results.

## 3 The SFDL, SHDL and their Compiler

### 3.1 Motivation

The secure function evaluation protocol requires that the function to be evaluated be given as a Boolean circuit. Designers, however, will desire the function to be given in a more convenient high-level form. In the context of secure protocols, this is even more important than the strong usual reasons for writing in high-level programming languages. The starting point of any attempt of security is a clear, formal, and easily-understandable definition of the requirements. Such




Figure 1: Computation overview

clarity of definition is almost impossible, for humans, using low-level formalisms such as Boolean circuits. Clear high-level languages are needed.

The compiler will thus accept a function written in a high-level programming language and compile it into a Boolean circuit that evaluates the same function. In our case the compiler compiles an SFDL program into an SHDL circuit. In addition to bridging the semantic gap between high and low level languages, as done by every compiler, a compiler into hardware has to bridge another semantic gap: that of obliviousness. Boolean circuits are oblivious – they perform the same sequence of operations independently of the input (i.e. compute the values of the gates one after the other). Normal high-level languages change their flow of control according to the input: they execute statements conditionally, loop for a variable number of steps, etc.

This semantic gap is not a technicality, but rather the central issue in hardware compilers. On one hand

this is one of the key reasons why it is humanly difficult to design efficient Boolean circuits. On the other hand, the key reason why Boolean circuits were used as the computation model for secure function evaluation protocols (rather than, e.g., a Turing machine) is their obliviousness. Non-oblivious computations would seem to leak information from the very identity of the operation being simulated (existing solutions for running RAM based computations obliviously are quite complex [22]).

There do exist “hardware compilers” that compile a high-level language into low level Boolean circuits. These hardware compilers are used for actual hardware construction, and serve to ease the development effort. Most commonly used are the high level hardware description languages VHDL [14] and Verilog [37] that do not “look” like “normal” programming languages. There are also many compilers that do aim to use languages that “look” like usual programming

languages, e.g. the C programming language (see e.g. [9, 18, 33, 38, 19]). There are some similarities and some differences between the goals of such languages and our goals. The similarities are concerned with issues like making conditional execution oblivious and the “single assignment” issue – each hardware bit can only be assigned a value once, but software allows reassigning values, e.g. in statement like **x=x+1**.

The main difference comes from the required output. In our case the output should be a “theoretician’s Boolean circuit”: purely combinatorial, with no sequential logic. Compilers into real hardware are actually mostly concerned with the use (and re-use) of registers. Thus, for example, consider a command like **for i = 1 to 16 do sum = sum + a[i]**. Our compiler should produce a circuit that has 16 copies of the addition circuit. Real hardware compilers would produce a circuit with a single register (sum) and a single addition circuit, where in each of the 16 clock cycles, one value  $a[i]$  is added to the register’s contents. Additionally, our optimization metric is very simple: the number of gates (weighed by the the gate size). We are not bound at all by technological restrictions such as FPGA structure, delay considerations, or wiring issues.

### 3.2 The Secure Function Definition Language (SFDL)

Let us begin with the simple example of the Millionaires’ problem:

```
program Millionaires {
    type int = Int<4>; // 4-bit integer
    type AliceInput = int;
    type BobInput = int;
    type AliceOutput = Boolean;
    type BobOutput = Boolean;
    type Output = struct {
        AliceOutput alice, BobOutput bob};
    type Input = struct {
        AliceInput alice, BobInput bob};

    function Output out(Input inp) {
        out.alice = inp.alice > inp.bob;
        out.bob = inp.bob > inp.alice;
    }
}
```

First, note that the syntax is quite conventional, borrowing heavily from the C and Pascal programming languages. Now, let us look at some of the main ingredients of this program as well as the language in general. A full description of the language may be found in Appendix A.

**Type system.** The SFDL supports a full type system. The primitive types are Boolean, integer, and enumerated. For maximum efficiency and since there is no pre-wired hardware word size, integers may be declared to be of any bit-length and are always signed 2’s-complement. Similarly, enumerated types are allocated the minimal number of required bits. Structures and arrays create more complex types from simpler ones. Structure entries are accessed using dot-notation,  $s.f$ , and array entries using the standard array notation  $a[i]$ . Access to arrays has a potential for non-obliviousness if the index is not a constant expression. This is handled by the compiler, but users should be aware of the high price of such access. Pointers do not exist – this is in order to maintain obliviousness. Beyond their usual role as defining variable types, the type system is used to formalize the input and output of the function to be evaluated. The special types *AliceInput*, *AliceOutput*, *BobInput*, *BobOutput*, must be defined in every program, specifying the respective input and output types of the two players. The types *Input* and *Output* are always defined to be structures encapsulating the inputs (resp. outputs) of both players.

**Program Structure and Functions.** An SFDL program consists of a sequence of functions (as in C, no nesting is allowed) preceded by declarations of global constants and types. Functions receive parameters and return values using the Pascal-like syntax of assignment to a variable whose name is identical to the function name. As in Pascal, a function must precede any function that calls it. Unlike Pascal, no “forward” clause exists, and no recursion is allowed. The lack of recursion is critical in order to maintain obliviousness. Functions may define and use local variables; in the current implementation we forbid global variables. The last function in the program is the one computing the desired output from the inputs. By convention it is named *output*. It accepts a single parameter of type *Input* and produces the result of type *Output*.

**Assignments and expressions.** Expressions use the standard notations: they combine constants, variables (including, recursively, array entries and structure items), and function calls using operators and, optionally, parenthesis. The allowed operators include arithmetic addition and subtraction, Boolean logical operators (bitwise, for integers), and the standard comparison operators. Due to their cost, multiplication and division are not provided as primitive operators, but rather should be implemented as functions. Data types of different widths may be combined, and sign-extension is used.

**Loops and Conditional Execution.** The SFDL has the standard if-then and if-then-else statements.

It should be noted that conditional execution is not oblivious, and thus the compiler generates hardware that always computes both sides of the branch. General loops are not oblivious and are not possible in the language. The language does provide a for-loop where the number of iterations is known in advance (a compile-time constant).

### 3.3 The compiler

The compiler reads the input program written in SFDL, and performs a sequence of transformations on it. In the end of the sequence of transformations, a data structure that corresponds to the hardware is obtained, and is then output in SHDL format. The following example shows part of the SHDL output produced for the Millionaires' problem above. Each line in the SHDL output file specifies a "wire" in the generated circuit that is either an input bit or a Boolean gate with given truth-table and input wires. This format is in a verbose form, in particular containing comments (automatically generated, but ignored by the secure evaluation protocols).

```

0 input //output$input.bob$0
1 input //output$input.bob$1
2 input //output$input.bob$2
3 input //output$input.bob$3
4 input //output$input.alice$0
5 input //output$input.alice$1
6 input //output$input.alice$2
7 input //output$input.alice$3
8 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 0]
  inputs [4 5]
9 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0]
  inputs [4 5]
10 gate arity 2 table [0 1 0 0]
  inputs [8 6]
11 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 1]
  inputs [8 6]
12 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 1]
  inputs [10 7]
13 gate arity 2 table [0 0 0 1]
  inputs [4 0]
14 gate arity 3 table [0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1]
  inputs [13 9 1]
15 gate arity 3 table [0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1]
  inputs [14 11 2]
16 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0]
  inputs [12 3]
17 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0]
  inputs [15 16]
18 output gate arity 1 table [0 1]
  inputs [17] //output$output.alice$0
...

```

Additionally, the compiler outputs another file that gives formatting instructions enabling the secure function evaluation protocol to input and output values in a convenient user-friendly format. E.g. in the SHDL circuit produced above the first 4 wires (numbered 0–3) while treated as just 4 arbitrary bits inside the circuit, should be read from the user as an integer. The following example is produced for the Millionaires' problem above:

```

Bob input integer "input.bob"
[0 1 2 3]
Alice input integer "input.alice"
[4 5 6 7]
Alice output integer "output.alice" [18]
Bob output integer "output.bob" [29]

```

Here is a short description of the sequence of steps performed by the compiler:

**1. Parsing.** Simple syntactic analysis and parsing, resulting in a memory-resident data structure. Due to the simplicity of the language we have not used any compiler-compiler tools.

**2. Function inlining and loop unfolding.** all function calls are treated as macros and simply inlined where they are called. All for-loops are simply unfolded (note that the number of iterations is a compile-time constant). These two transformations may seem quite inefficient at first sight but that is not the case: they are absolutely required in order to maintain obliviousness.

**3. Transformation into single-bit operations.** Every command that deals with multi-bit values is transformed into a sequence of single-bit operations. In the simplest case, an assignment of the form  $a = b$  where  $a$  and  $b$  are 4-bit integers is converted into the four single-bit assignments  $a_0 = b_0, a_1 = b_1, a_2 = b_2, a_3 = b_3$ . In the case of expressions, first a complex expression is transformed into a sequence of operations, e.g.  $a = b + c + d$  is converted into  $temp = b + c, a = temp + d$ . Then, each multi-bit operator is converted into its hardware implementation. E.g. an operation  $a = b + c$ , where  $b$  and  $c$  are 4-bit integers is converted into a sequence of 4 "full-adders", implemented using 8 ternary gates.

**4. Array access handling.** Handling array indices that are compile-time constants is simple: each array entry is treated as a separate variable, and the array access logic is thus completely compile-time and incurs no hardware cost. Handling array indices that are expressions must incur a significant hardware cost due to the semantic gap that must be bridged. In particular, every access to a single array entry results in  $O(n)$  produced hardware gates, where  $n$  is the total array size.

An access to the value of an array entry, as in  $a = b[i]$  is obtained by constructing a multiplexor whose  $n$  inputs are the entries of  $b$ , and whose selection input bits are the bits of  $i$ . Assigning a value to an array entry, as in  $a[i] = b$ , is obtained essentially by using a demultiplexer. More precisely by using, in effect, the sequence of  $n$  if-commands that contain only constant array access indices: if ( $i = 0$ ) then  $a[0] = b$ ; if ( $i = 1$ ) then  $a[1] = b$ ; ...

**5. Single variable assignment.** Normal code commonly assigns values to variables multiple times, as in  $a = b + c; \dots; a = a + 1$ . Hardware, does not allow this: each "variable", actually, wire, is assigned a single value computed as an obviously known operation on other wires. One of the main challenges of every hardware compiler is to eliminate multiple assignments of values to variables, and to transform them into single assignments. This issue has received much attention in the literature (see e.g. work on SSA form [15]). It seems that our algorithm for this problem is new and superior to previous approaches. In particular, it runs in linear time as long as the nesting depth of if statements in the program is bound by a constant.

Let us first look at the simple case shown above  $a = b + c; \dots; a = a + 1$ . The single assignment transformation defines a new copy of the variable for each assignment:  $a1 = b + c; \dots; a2 = a1 + 1$ . Things get more complicated, when the different assignments are interleaved with conditional execution, e.g.  $a = b + c$ ; if ( $x$ ) then  $a = a + 1$  else  $a = a + 2$ ; In this case, we must create new copies of  $a$  for each branch, and an additional copy combining them together after the loop ends:  $a1 = b + c; a2 = a1 + 1; a3 = a1 + 2; a4 = x?a2 : a3$ , where the last assignment uses the C-language "?:" operator notation, which in hardware is a simple multiplexor. Note also that this transformation has eliminated the "if" statement, yielding an oblivious circuit. The algorithm for the general case is of independent interest and is described in the next subsection.

**6. Optimization.** At this point we have obtained an in-memory image of a Boolean circuit. This circuit is now optimized, i.e., its size is reduced. The optimization step is crucial, often reducing the size of the circuit by an order of magnitude. The optimization is done in linear time, and has three components:

- Peekhole optimization: local simplifications of code, e.g.  $(x \text{ and } \text{true} \rightarrow x)$ ,  $(x \text{ or } \text{not } x \rightarrow \text{true})$ , etc.
- Duplicate code removal: a hash table of all values computed in the circuit is kept. If some value is computed twice, then one of the duplicates is removed and replaced with direct access to the other wire.

- Dead code elimination.

Peekhole optimization and duplicate removal are done in a single pass in topological order over the circuit. Dead code elimination is then done in an additional single pass in reverse topological order.

### 3.4 The single assignment algorithm

The input to this algorithm is code that contains assignment statements, where each variable may be assigned a value multiple times and (possibly nested) if statements. The output is straight line code where each variables is assigned a value only once.

**Data structure.** Our basic data structure is a stack of hash tables. It maintains a running version number for each identifier. It supports the following operations:

- **new(id):** increases the version number of this identifier (and returns the new version number). The first time an id is declared, its version number is assigned to 1.
- **get(id):** returns the current version number of the identifier.
- **push-scope():** starts a new version scope for all identifiers. The version numbers of all identifiers are initialized to the current version numbers, but all further *new(id)* commands will only affect the new scope.
- **pop-scope():** ends the current version scope. All version numbers of all identifiers are reset to their value in the previous scope.
- **enum-scope():** enumerate all the variables in the current scope.

The implementation uses a new hash table for each version scope. A *new()* command updates the version number in the current scope. A *get()* command traverses the stack of hash tables (from the most recent backwards) until it finds an instance of the desired identifier. Its running time is proportional to the stack depth.

**Algorithm.** Assume that the input is a sequence of statements  $s_1 \dots s_n$ . For ease of exposition, let us assume that all assignment commands involve two variables on the RHS, and that all if-statements contain no else clauses. (An "if ( $x$ ) then  $y$  else  $z$ " command is equivalent to "if ( $x$ ) then  $y$ ; if ( $\text{not}(x)$ ) then  $z$ ".) The algorithm is now given by:

```
For  $i = 1..n$  do {
  if  $s_i$  is a statement of the form
```

```

" a = f(b, c) " then {
  i = get (b)
  j = get (c)
  k = new (a)
  output: " ak = f(bi, cj) "
}

if si is a statement of the form
" if(x) then {r1...rm} " then {
  push-scope()
  recursively process {r1...rm}
  Let V = enum-scope()
  For each v ∈ V do
    jv = get (v)
    pop-scope()
  For each v ∈ V do {
    i = get (v)
    j = jv
    k = new (v)
    output: " vk = x?vj : vi "
  }
}
}
}

```

## 4 Bob-Alice Two-Party SFE

This section describes the specific two-party SFE protocol that was implemented in Fairplay, based on the protocol suggested by Yao in his seminal work that introduced the notion of secure function evaluation [39]. We start with a general overview and then describe in detail how Bob constructs garbled circuits and how Alice evaluates one. Finally we discuss the oblivious transfer (OT) variants that were implemented thus far. We do not prove here the security of the protocol, since it was mostly borrowed from existing theoretical constructions (however, Section 5 states the security guarantees of the protocol, describes the reasoning for the choice of the specific cryptographic operations that we use, and suggests some variants of the current protocol).

### 4.1 General overview

Our SFE computation is given as input a Boolean circuit  $C$  made of gates and wires, described using SHDL. Then Alice and Bob interact in order to evaluate  $C$  securely. The version of Yao's protocol that we implemented requires a single OT per each *input wire* of  $C$ . In this version Bob constructs the circuit  $C$ , and converts it into a garbled circuit. The garbled circuit is transferred to Alice. Then Bob and Alice execute an OT once per each input wire. After this step Alice evaluates the circuit independently without further interaction with Bob.

Thwarting malicious behavior by Alice is guaran-

teed by Yao's protocol and is based on the security of the symmetric function used for encoding the secret (SHA-1, which is modeled, for this purpose, as a pseudo-random function) and on the security of the OT protocol against malicious behavior. The same properties also prevent malicious behavior of Bob, if we can guarantee the correctness of the circuit encoding that he constructs. This last property was implemented using a cut-and-choose technique. Specifically, Bob sends  $m$  garbled circuits to Alice, and Alice randomly chooses one circuit that will be evaluated. Bob must then reveal the secrets associated with the circuits that were not chosen by Alice for evaluation. Alice verifies that these  $m - 1$  circuits indeed represent the function  $f$ , by comparing them to a reference circuit that she constructed herself. The two parties then evaluate the circuit Alice has chosen. This method allows to catch a cheating Bob with probability  $1 - 1/m$ . In real-world scenarios, where cheating leads to bad reputation, this may be enough. We leave implementation of more complex cut-and-choose techniques for future enhancements.<sup>3</sup>

### 4.2 Circuit preparation and evaluation

This section describes how Bob converts the Boolean circuit  $C$  into a garbled circuit, and how Alice evaluates that garbled circuit.

**Circuit preparation.** We use the notation  $W_k, k = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$  to denote all the wires that compose the circuit  $C$ . All the gates in SHDL circuits have a single Boolean output. The number of inputs into a gate can be either 1, 2 or 3 (SHDL itself allows more inputs, but the compiler produces only unary, binary or ternary gates). For simplicity of exposition, in the description below, we focus only on binary gates. The conversion of  $C$  into a garbled circuit works as follows.

1. Bob assigns to each wire  $W_k \in C$  two random  $t$ -bit strings  $v_k^0, v_k^1$  ( $t$  is a security parameter that was set to 80). The string  $v_k^0$  represents the bit 0 for  $W_k$ . The string  $v_k^1$  represents the bit 1 for  $W_k$ . Bob also assigns to each wire  $W_k \in C$  a random binary permutation (i.e., a bit)  $p_k$ , and appends it to the pair  $v_k^0, v_k^1$  as follows:  $w_k^0 = v_k^0 \parallel (0 \oplus p_k), w_k^1 = v_k^1 \parallel (1 \oplus p_k)$ . We let  $w_k^0, w_k^1$  denote the final result.
2. For each gate  $g \in C$  whose output wire is  $W_k$  and whose input wires are  $W_i, W_j$  (see Figure 2)
  - (a) The original truth table of  $g$  consists of four 0/1 entries. Bob constructs the Garbled-Truth-Table (GTT) of  $g$  by replacing every 0 or 1 in the truth-table with  $w_k^0$  or  $w_k^1$ , respectively.




Figure 2: A gate in a circuit

- (b) Bob constructs the Encrypted-Garbled-Truth-Table (*EGTT*) of  $g$  in the following way. For entry  $(x, y)$  in  $g$ 's *GTT*, define  $x' = x \oplus p_i$ ,  $y' = y \oplus p_j$ . The entry is encrypted using  $v_i^x, v_j^y$  as encryption-keys and  $k, x', y'$  as an IV:  $EGTT[x, y] = Encrypt_{v_i^x, v_j^y, k, x', y'}(GTT[x, y])$ . The encryption is done by hashing  $v_i^x || k || x' || y'$  and  $v_j^y || k || x' || y'$  using SHA-1, and XORing the two results to the plaintext (see Section 5 for explanations).
- (c) Bob constructs the Permuted-Encrypted-Garbled-Truth-Table (*PEGTT*) of  $g$  by swapping the entries in  $g$ 's *EGTT* based on the permutation bits assigned to  $g$ 's input wires, namely  $p_i, p_j$  (the role of these permutations is to make the position of a certain string in a *PEGTT* meaningless). I.e., if  $p_i = 1$  then the first two entries of the table are swapped with the last two entries. If  $p_j = 1$  then the first and third entries are swapped with the second and fourth entries.
- (d) For each wire which carries a bit of Alice's output, Bob sends an appropriate translation-table that allows Alice to interpret the circuit's output from the garbled value of the wire. Namely, for every output wire  $k$  Bob sends a table of the form  $\langle (H(w^0), 0), (H(w^1), 1) \rangle$ , where  $H$  is a collision resistant hash function, which we implemented as SHA-1.

**Interaction.** Initially, Bob sends to Alice  $m$  garbled circuits as well as commitments to his garbled inputs to each circuit. Out of these, Alice chooses at random  $m - 1$  circuits which are opened by Bob to prove that the circuits were prepared properly.<sup>4</sup> Bob then opens the commitments to the garbled strings that represent his input bits of the remaining unopened circuit. Note

that Alice cannot interpret these strings back to Bob's input bits, because the circuit is garbled. Alice then uses oblivious transfer (OT) in order to obtain from Bob the garbled strings that match her input wires. The OT protocol that was implemented is discussed in the next subsection. For now assume that for each input bit Alice obtains the corresponding garbled string.

**Circuit evaluation.** Alice proceeds to evaluate the garbled circuit gate by gate. Let  $g$  be a specific garbled gate whose output wire is  $W_k$  and whose input strings are  $w_i, w_j$ . Let the least significant bits of  $w_i, w_j$  be  $x, y$  and the rest of the bits be  $v_i, v_j$  respectively. For each such gate:

1. Alice uses  $x, y$  as indices into an entry to be decrypted in  $g$ 's *PEGTT*.
2. Alice uses  $v_i, v_j$  as decryption-keys, and  $k || x || y$  as an IV. Namely, Alice sets  $w_k = Decrypt_{v_i, v_j, k, x, y}(PEGTT[x, y])$ . The decryption is done by hashing  $v_i || k || x || y$  and  $v_j || k || x || y$  using SHA-1, and XORing the two results to the ciphertext.

Throughout the evaluation all that Alice obtains are garbled strings. These do not leak information on the values of the bits flowing through the circuit. When Alice finds the garbled values of the output gates she uses the translation tables to interpret the circuit's true output. As for Bob's output, Alice sends him the garbled values of his output wires. Bob associates them with the corresponding 0 or 1 values. (Note that in the case of a wire that carries an output bit which should be revealed to Bob alone, Alice cannot decipher the value, or change it without being detected by Bob. In the case of a wire that carries an output bit which is revealed to both Bob and Alice, Alice can, of course, decrypt the value but she cannot change it without finding a collision in the hash function.)

**Malicious vs. Semi-honest parties.** If the parties are assumed to be semi-honest (i.e. follow the protocol) then there is no need for using cut-and-choose methods for verifying the circuits constructed by Bob, and we can set  $m = 1$ . The OT protocol, too, can be simplified, since the current implementation is secure against malicious parties.<sup>5</sup>

### 4.3 Oblivious Transfer

Two OT variants were implemented thus far (the system can be easily extended to employ more variants). Both variants are based on the Diffie-Hellman problem (and are implemented over a group  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ , which is a sub-group of prime order  $q$  of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , where  $p$  is prime and

$q|p-1$ ). The first one is the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer ( $OT_1^2$ ) protocol due to Bellare and Micali [6], which was adapted to using random oracles [7]. The second protocol, which was proposed by Naor and Pinkas in [30], is an optimization of the first one, that uses the same  $g^r \bmod p$  value for multiple OT executions ( $g$  is a generator of the group  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ ,  $r$  is a random exponent). A detailed description of both protocols can be found in [30]. Both these OT protocols are secure in the random oracle model and were implemented using the SHA-1 hash function. (There are constant-round OT protocols secure in the standard model [2, 30]. The SFE application requires multiple concurrent invocations of these protocols, but on the other hand it is only required that the SFE implementation, and not necessarily each OT invocation, provide both privacy and correctness.)

## 5 Cryptographic Background

This section describes the rationale behind the choice of specific cryptographic operations for Fairplay and suggests several additional variants. We do not provide here proofs of the correctness and security of the implementation, as it is mostly based on existing constructions.

The protocol we implemented provides security guarantees which depend on the following three assumptions:

1. SHA-1 is modeled as a random oracle.
2. The oblivious transfer protocol is secure (the security of the OT protocol can be based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [2, 30], but we use random-oracle based protocols which are more efficient).
3. Alice does not terminate the protocol before sending Bob's output to him.

We get the following guarantees:

- *Bob is guaranteed that an interaction with a malicious Alice is not different than an interaction with the trusted third party, except for a negligible error probability.*
- *Alice has the same guarantee with relation to Bob, with error probability of  $1/m$ .*

Note that these guarantees means that (1) a malicious party cannot learn more information about the other party's input than it can learn in the trusted party model, and (2) a malicious party cannot change the computed function. Also, if we are assured that Bob does not change the circuit he provides to Alice then his cheating probability is also negligible.

**Garbling the circuit.** The basic symmetric cryptographic function that we use is SHA-1. We preferred it to using a block cipher (such as AES) since it supports a variable input length. The encoding of the circuit (garbling) can be implemented using a pseudo-random function (as is described in detail, for example, in [31]), where the output of the function is used as a pad that masks the values in the table representing a gate in the circuit. We use the masking values  $SHA-1(w_i||k||x||y)$ ,  $SHA-1(w_j||k||x||y)$  for entry  $(x, y)$  of the table of gate number  $k$ , whose input wires are  $i$  and  $j$ . (Note that wires  $i$  and  $j$  could be input into multiple gates.) The underlying security assumption is that SHA-1 is pseudo-random function keyed by  $w_i$  or  $w_j$  and applied to other parameters.

**OT.** The OT protocols are based on the random oracle model and the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Alternative two-round OT protocols that are secure in the standard model and use only  $O(1)$  exponentiations were described in [30, 2]. We preferred not to use them in order to reduce the number of exponentiations.

**Cut-and-choose.** Bob commits to his garbled inputs before the cut-and-choose step. This is done in order to prevent him from choosing his input based on Alice's choices in this step. We leave it for future work to let Alice choose more than one circuit for evaluation. This will reduce the cheating probability of Bob to be exponentially small in the number of circuits that are evaluated, but implementing this variant requires Bob to prove that he provides the same input to all circuits, and this step incurs additional overhead. (An alternative method for verifying the garbled circuit constructed by Bob is to require him to prove, in zero-knowledge, that the tables are correct. To the best of our knowledge, this approach requires an even higher overhead.)

**Bob's output.** The protocol provides Alice with the garbled values of Bob's output wires. If the value of an output wire should become known only to Bob (and not to Alice) then she receives no information about the relationship between actual and garbled values of this wire. If the output is used by both Bob and Alice, she receives hash values of the garbled values corresponding to 0 and to 1. However, she is not able to provide Bob with a garbled value that corresponds to a different output than the one she computed, since this would mean that she can invert the hash function.

## 6 Experimental results

The first, immediate contribution of a system such as Fairplay is that it can provide answers to very basic, concrete questions like:

- How much time does it take to execute the two-party SFE protocol for the quintessential Millionaires' problem?
- What would be the time-penalty if the two tycoons in question were actually Billionaires and not just Millionaires?

The experiments that we conducted using our system gave a very definite answer, that even the tougher Billionaires' problem (i.e., using 32 bit inputs) can be solved in very reasonable time. It took our system only 1.25 seconds to solve the Billionaires' problem using fast communication, and 4.01 seconds when communication was slow. More generally, in this paper we report results for four functions, which produced circuits ranging in size from tens of gates to thousands of gates. A summary of the various size parameters of these four functions is shown in Table 1 (their SFDL source code can be found in Fairplay's web-site [28]).

Function	Number of circuit gates		
	Total	Inputs	Alice inputs
AND	32	16	8
Billionaires	254	64	32
KDS	1229	486	6
Median	4383	320	160

Table 1: The four functions

The details of the four functions are as follows:

- AND - performs bit-wise AND on two registers. The input size for both Alice and Bob is 8 bits. Total circuit size is 32 gates, out of which 16 are inputs and 16 are outputs.
- Billionaires - compares two integers. The input size for both Alice and Bob is 32 bits. Total circuit size is 254 gates, out of which 64 are inputs and 2 are outputs.
- Keyed Database Search (KDS) - Bob has a database of 16 items, each item is keyed by a 6-bit key and comprises of 24 data bits. Alice privately retrieves the data of one item by specifying its key. The input size for Bob is 480 bits and for Alice 6 bits. Total circuit size is 1229 gates, out of which 486 are inputs and 24 are outputs.
- Median - finds the median of two sorted arrays. The input for both Alice and Bob are ten 16-bit

numbers. Total circuit size is 4383 gates, out of which 320 are inputs and 32 are outputs.

The AND function was chosen as an example of the simplest possible circuit, whose size is of the same order as the number of its inputs. The KDS function demonstrates a circuit in which the size of Alice's input (which defines the number of OTs) is much smaller than either the number of Bob's inputs or the number of gates. The median function demonstrates a circuit whose size is much greater than the number of inputs.

**Communication vs. computation.** Another important contribution of a working system is that it enables a systematic, realistic investigation of the relative cost of its various ingredients. This can be done by utilizing profiling tools, and by performing supervised experiments, in which the cost of the different sub-components is measured in isolation. One specific question that we found interesting in this area is the following: what is the relative cost of the public key operations required by the two-party SFE protocol? Since this relative cost is affected by the cost of communication, and since communication delays vary dramatically in different environments, we conducted our experiments in two extreme settings - LAN and WAN. The LAN's latency is 0.4 ms, and its effective throughput is 617.8 MBPS (Mega bit per second). The WAN's latency is 237.0 ms, and its effective throughput is 1.06 MBPS. By activating our system on the four functions described above, and profiling it under the LAN/WAN environments, we discovered that the public key operations were responsible for 27%-77% of the total delay in the LAN setting, while in the WAN setting the relative cost of the public key operations was only 9%-42%. These results suggest that, at least for some interesting functions, the relative cost of the communication is rather significant, especially in a WAN environment where communication is slow. In light of this, we also calculated the slowdown factor caused by moving from LAN to WAN, which was found to be at least 2.34 and at most 6.89.

**Communication optimization using batching.** Communication batching means that instead of sending  $k$  big integers (associated with different OTs) in  $k$  separate messages, we aggregate them together and send them in one big message. It is useful because of the relatively large constant overhead associated with any message being sent regardless of its size, and also due to internal implementation details of TCP/IP. By implementing and measuring the performance of two variants of the SFE protocol, with and without communication batching, we were able to assess its contribution. The observed speedup factors due to communication batching in a LAN setting were between

Function	LAN					WAN				
	IPCG	CC	OTs	EV	EET (sec)	IPCG	CC	OTs	EV	EET (sec)
AND	1.5%	18.8%	79.5%	0.2%	0.41	0.2%	58.4%	41.4%	0.0%	2.57
Billionaires	3.2%	5.4%	91.1%	0.3%	1.25	0.8%	45.2%	53.9%	0.1%	4.01
KDS	40.4%	2.8%	54.1%	2.7%	0.49	5.9%	64.3%	29.4%	0.4%	3.38
Median	13.2%	7.2%	78.7%	0.9%	7.09	4.7%	45.8%	49.2%	0.3%	16.63

Table 2: Elapsed execution times and their breakdown into sub-tasks

1.89-2.72, while in a WAN setting they were between 2.11-8.75.

**OT optimization.** We have also implemented an optimization technique for OT that was proposed by Naor and Pinkas in [30], in which the sender uses the same value of  $g^r \bmod p$  for multiple OTs, improving both computation and communication. The maximum speedup factor of this optimization method that was observed in our system was 1.32.

There are many additional optimization techniques that may be considered, implemented and tested (e.g., turning multiple 1-out-of-2 OTs to a single 1-out-of- $n$  OT [30], or using computation batching of multiple modular inverses). This is an area for future research (see Section 8).

We conclude this section by presenting Table 2. This table shows the elapsed execution times required for the aforementioned functions in both LAN and WAN settings, and their breakdown into four main sub-tasks. These sub-tasks are: IPCG - initializations, parsing and circuit garbling, CC - circuits communication, OTs - Oblivious Transfers, EV - circuit evaluation. (Note that the cost of the OTs includes contributions from both calculating public key operations, and communicating their results back and forth.) The results shown in Table 2 were obtained using the most optimized method currently available in our system (namely, communication batching and Naor-Pinkas  $g^r$  optimization with no communication/computation tradeoff). The EET columns present the elapsed execution time (in seconds), which was required for Alice to execute the entire two-party SFE protocol excluding SFDL-to-SHDL compilation.<sup>6</sup> The number of garbled circuits for the cut-and-choose algorithm was set to  $m = 2$ , and the size of the DL parameters  $p, q$  was 1024 and 160 bits, respectively. Both Alice and Bob used Intel 2.4 GHz Linux machines. The system was implemented in Java, and it used the TCP/IP protocol for communication via Java sockets. The measurements were taken as the average of 100 repetitions (10 for the Median function) of the protocol. All iterations used a single TCP/IP connection, which was established in the beginning.

Part of the future work includes a more fine grained analysis of the performance. Namely, expressing the

expected execution time as a function of the number of OTs (Alice’s input bits), the number of gates, and the security parameter  $m$ .

## 7 Related work

There are very few previous actual implementations of secure computation, and even fewer automated compilers that generate an implementation of a secure protocol from a program description in a higher level language.

Kühne implemented a translator that takes a trusted-party specification of a multi-party protocol and generates a specification for running the protocol using the BGW paradigm [25]. (This implementation is based on the specific construction of Hirt and Maurer [23].) However, that project does not have an “evaluator” part, which performs a distributed implementation of the resulting BGW protocol.

MacKenzie et al. [27] implemented a compiler that automatically generates protocols for secure two-party computation that use arithmetic functions over groups and fields of special form. The compiler receives a specification of a protocol that uses a secret key, e.g., for signature generation or for decryption, and implements a threshold crypto protocol where the key is shared between two parties and only the two of them together can perform the protocol. The key is generated by a TTP and is given to the parties. Compared to Fairplay, this is a compiler for a restricted but important class of functions, which is particularly suitable for applications where the secret key has to be closely guarded using threshold cryptography. In principle this type of functions can be implemented by a Boolean circuit, but the result would be an overwhelmingly large circuit.

An example of an automated security toolkit in a different domain is AGVI, a toolkit for Automatic Generation, Verification, and Implementation of Security Protocols [36]. AGVI receives as input a system specification and security requirements, and automatically finds protocols for the specific application, proves their correctness (using efficient search of a space representing the protocol execution), and implements them in Java.

TEP [3] is a secure multi-party computation system

that employs a trusted third party. The trusted platform co-joins participants in a joint computation, passing authenticated information among participants over guarded communication channels. TEP users need to annotate their program with information flow labels in order to automatically verify that no information on any private data is leaked through the TEP channels to other participants. In comparison, our system does not employ a TTP, and does not require information flow labels by the user.

The *secure program partitioning* technique of [40] takes a user program written in a security-typed language, and automatically provides a distributed partitioning of the program. The user annotated program contains static information flow labels that specify which program components may use what data and how. An automated compiler splits the program to run on heterogeneously trusted hosts. Compared with their approach, the secure program partitioning is beneficial only for programs that naturally break into communicating components, in a manner dictated by the user’s annotation.

## 8 Future Work

The current implementation of the secure two-party computation system can be extended in many ways.

**Improving the performance.** The elapsed execution time is a function of the communication delay and bandwidth, and of the processing time. Ideally the network and the processor should run in parallel, and none of them should be idle waiting for the other one to finish its job. The current implementation does not perform this optimization.

The main computational overhead is incurred by running invocations of the oblivious transfer protocol. It would be interesting to explore deployment of further recent enhancements of OT, such as extending a small number of OTs into a large number of OTs using symmetric cryptographic operations alone [24], or using OT variants which are based on the hardness of breaking RSA, rather than the DDH assumption.

**Security against malicious parties.** The basic SFE protocol of Section 4 provides a weak security against malicious parties. Namely, the cut-and-choose method guarantees with probability  $1/m$  that the circuit that Bob prepares is correct. Some additional care must be taken if we want to reduce Bob’s cheating probability to be exponentially small in  $m$  (see, e.g., [34]).

**Fair termination.** No implementation can prevent a malicious party from aborting the protocol prematurely (e.g. after learning its output and before the other party learns its output).<sup>7</sup> Although there is no

perfect solution for this issue and existing solutions are quite complex, some solutions can be implemented (e.g. [34]). We are currently extending our system with fair termination mechanisms borrowing from [34].

**Reactive secure computation.** Reactive secure computation is an SFE which consists of several steps, where each step operates based on inputs from the parties and a state information that it receives from the previous step. For example, in each step the parties could compare two numbers and receive the result of the comparison, which they use to decide which inputs to provide to the following step. In addition, secret state information is communicated from round to round, and the inputs to all rounds are used by the protocol for computing the output of the final round (but should otherwise remain hidden from the parties). This scenario, as well as appropriate security definitions and constructions, was described in [10, 12]. (A protocol that uses reactive computation for securely computing the median, in the presence of malicious parties, was presented in [1].) In order to implement secure reactive computation each step should transfer a secret and authenticated state-information string to the following step. In the two-party case this property can be enforced using a modified implementation of Yao’s protocol, see [1].

**Integrating other SFE primitives.** While the generic construction of Yao can be used to implement any functionality, more efficient constructions can be designed for specific tasks (e.g. for bignum operations, computing comparisons or intersections, evaluating polynomials, or querying a database). A secure protocol for a more complex task can use a circuit whose inputs are the results of specialized constructions (for example, the protocol in [11] runs a circuit that computes statistics based on the results of secure database queries, and the protocol in [26] runs a circuit that uses the results of oblivious polynomial evaluation).

**Multi-party computation.** The system we built implements secure computation between *two* parties. There is also a large body of research on secure multi-party computation, for either combinatorial or algebraic circuits, and using different trust assumptions (see e.g. [21, 8, 5]). A natural next step is to implement the compilation paradigm in the multi-party scenario. An additional open challenge is to devise fair termination techniques for multiple participants.

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<sup>1</sup>An alternative definition uses simulation. The two definitions are identical if the parties are assumed to be semi-honest, but the trusted party definition is preferable for the case of malicious parties and for defining secure composition of protocols.

<sup>2</sup>While in principle logarithmic overhead should suffice, it seems that this is still not practical using current techniques.

<sup>3</sup>Bob's cheating probability can be reduced to be exponentially small in  $m$  if the protocol lets Alice check a constant fraction (e.g.  $m/2$ ) of the circuits that Bob constructed, evaluate the remaining  $(m/2)$  circuits and output the majority result. In that case, however, the protocol must have additional, measures for ensuring that Bob provides the same input to all the circuits evaluated by Alice (see e.g. [34]).

<sup>4</sup>Care must be taken to ensure that a circuit can only be opened in a single way. In our implementation this depends on the assumption that it is infeasible to find  $\alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta'$  such that  $H(\alpha) \oplus H(\alpha') = H(\beta) \oplus H(\beta')$ , where  $H$  is SHA-1.

<sup>5</sup>An OT protocol for semi-honest parties is very simple: Alice sends to Bob two strings, one of them random and the other being the public key corresponding to a private key of her choice. Bob encrypts each of the input items using the corresponding string, and Alice is able to decrypt only one of them.

<sup>6</sup>Compilation can and should be done by the two parties off-line.

<sup>7</sup>On the other hand, a premature termination of the protocol by one party is detected by the other party, which in many scenarios can then take measures against the corrupt party. This is different than other types of malicious activity which are not easily detected.

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## A SFDL Overview

Programs in SFDL instruct a virtual "trusted party" what to do. The SFDL compiler compiles it into a "Boolean circuit" low level format that instructs a true client/server pair what to do. When the client/server pair run the compiled form of the program, they implement correctly and securely the fictional trusted party.

### A.1 Program Structure

```
program <program-name> {
  <type declarations>
  <function declarations>
}
```

In the first part of a program, the type declarations, the programmer defines the data types that he will use. The data types supported are Booleans, integers, structs (records), and arrays. Of particular importance are the following data types that must be defined in every program:

1. **AliceInput** - the data type of Alice's input
2. **BobInput** - ditto for Bob
3. **AliceOutput** - the data type of Alice's output
4. **BobOutput** - ditto for Bob

The data types *Input* and *Output* are automatically defined for each program to be the structures of both inputs and both outputs, respectively:

1. type Input = struct {  
 AliceInput alice, BobInput bob};
2. type Output = struct {  
 AliceOutput alice, BobOutput bob};

In the second part of the program, the function definitions, the programmer defines a sequence of functions. Each function may call the previous ones (but not later ones nor itself). The main functionality of the program is the evaluation of the last function defined. This function must be called *output* and must receive a single parameter of type *Input* and return a value of type *Output*.

### A.2 Type declarations

Constant definitions may appear in the <type declarations> segment. The syntax is standard, e.g.:

```
const numberOfBits = 16;
```

Data types can be defined using the *type* command. Here are the supported data types:

1. Boolean: `false/true`
2. Integer types: e.g. `Int<30>` - a 30-bit integer (signed). Any number of bits is allowed.
3. Enumerated types: e.g. `enum {red, blue, green}`. Enumerated types are assigned the smallest possible number of bits (in this case 2).
4. Structures: e.g. `struct { Boolean ranked, Int<7> level }`
5. Arrays: e.g. `Boolean[7]` - has entries indexed 0 .. 6

New data types can be defined using the *type* statement:

1. `type Short = Int<16>;`
2. `type Byte = Boolean[8];`
3. `type Void = struct {};`
4. `type Color = enum {red, blue, green};`
5. `type Pixel = struct {Color color, Int<10>[2] coordinates};`

### A.3 Function Declarations

**Function Structure.** The function header defines the number of parameters to the function, their types, and the return data type. Function must always return a value. After the header come local variable declarations, and finally the statements themselves.

```
function <return data type>
  <function name>
  ( <arg1 type> <arg1 name>, ... )
{
```

```

<var declarations>
<function body>
}

```

Function values are returned Pascal-style, by assigning a value to a variable with the function's name. E.g.:

```

function Int<9> double(Int<8> x) {
    double = x + x;
}

```

### Variable Declarations.

```

var <type> <var name>, <var name>,
    ... , <var name>;

```

For example:

1. var Int<10> xCoord, yCoord;
2. var Color[8] palette;

All variables are initialized to 0.

**Expressions.** Expressions are used for computing values. They are used in assignment statements, to denote conditions, to send arguments to functions, etc. Expressions are built from atomic values using operations. The following are the atomic values allowed:

1. A Boolean constant: false, true.
2. An integer constant: e.g. 34, -56, 0, 123456789123456789.
3. A variable name: e.g. i, price.
4. A field in a struct using x.y notation. (Here x is a struct, and y is a name of a field defined in that struct.)
5. An array entry using x[i] notation. (Here x is an array and i is an integer expression.)

The following operators are defined:

1. +,- : addition and subtraction (in 2's complement). Accepts k-bit long integers and return a (k+1)-bit long result.
2. &, |, ~, ^ : and, or, not, xor bitwise Boolean operations. Accept k-bit long arguments and return k-bit long arguments.
3. <, >, ==, >=, <=, != : 2's complement comparison operators. Accept k-bit long arguments and return a 1-bit result.

4. function call: e.g. f(x, y), where f is a previously defined function and x, y, .. are arbitrary expressions that are passed as parameters by value.

Narrow and wide operands may be combined in an operation, and the narrower value is always widened using sign-extension.

### Commands.

1. Assignment:  $x = <\text{expression}>$ ; – any expression may appear on the RHS, and any "lvalue" may appear on the LHS. An lvalue is a variable, a field of a struct, or an array entry.
2. If: if (<Boolean expression>) <statement>
3. If-else: if (<Boolean expression>) <statement> else <statement>
4. For: for <index>=<low val> .. <high val> <statement> – the range of the for loop must be a compile-time constant.
5. block { statement, . . . , statement }