The “Evil Bit” Revisited:
Blocking DDoS Attacks with AS-Based Accountability

Daniel R. Simon
Microsoft Research

Sharad Agarwal
Microsoft Research

David A. Maltz
Microsoft Research

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Microsoft Research
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
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Daniel R. Simon    Sharad Agarwal    David A. Maltz
Microsoft Research

Abstract—DDoS attacks expose two seemingly contradictory expectations of the Internet: end hosts should be able to access services in an open and flexible manner, yet a service should be able to prevent a group of end hosts from rendering it unavailable to others. While the majority of prior work has focused on distinguishing malicious traffic from valid traffic, we argue that networks also need to provide an essential property to prevent attacks: accountability. We define a network to be accountable when the sources of all traffic within it can be accurately and reliably identified, and receivers have the ability to effectively block traffic to them from any such source. We propose a simple approach to directly providing accountability within a group of ASes. It combines a regime of strict ingress filtering on all edge traffic, to ensure that its source information is accurate, with an AS-based infrastructure that allows hosts to request that traffic to them from specific other hosts be blocked at the source. We sketch the necessary mechanisms for implementing this approach, including a detailed design for a filter request service.

As with most new techniques designed for the Internet, we do not expect complete adoption by all networks or ASes overnight. Our design accounts for this difficulty by using the previously proposed “evil bit” in IP headers, in a way that allows a group of ASes that implement accountability to collectively reduce the impact of DDoS attacks for end hosts and services within their portion of the Internet, even in the presence of unaccountable ASes. We also present evidence of the economic and technical feasibility of our approach.

I. INTRODUCTION

Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have graduated from amateur recreation to for-profit crime [17]. Major content providers and server operators currently spend millions of US dollars each on resources to cope with attacks that cost less than a thousand US dollars each to launch. So long as this disparity remains, there will be an incentive to use DoS attacks to extort “protection money” or harm business competitors.

DoS attacks work by diverting the target’s resources away from dealing with legitimate traffic. Hence, all defenses more sophisticated than extreme overprovisioning involve finding a way to distinguish legitimate traffic and concentrate resources on it. However, a network-layer DoS attack floods a target with so many attack packets that legitimate traffic might never even reach the target. To be effective, then, a defense against network-layer DoS must involve the network itself — targets must be able either to preferentially welcome recognized legitimate traffic or to “turn off” unwanted traffic closer to its source. We choose the latter approach.

In addition to effectiveness, we argue that a practical system for dealing with network-level DoS must have the following properties:

- **Incremental deployability**: individual pairs or peered groups of willing ASes should be able to implement it and see benefits. A system that requires every AS on the Internet to participate will never get deployed.
- **Separability**: independent “clouds” of ASes should be able adopt their own versions of the system.
- **Software-only deployment**: no changes should be required of deployed router hardware.
- **Backward compatibility**: The end result must be that traffic from non-participating ASes to servers in participating ASes will see performance roughly equivalent to that of today, where legitimate traffic can sometimes be swamped by DoS traffic, but is otherwise unaffected.
- **Economic viability**: The solution must not cost more than the approaches used to cope with DoS today (e.g., overprovisioning, in-network scrubbers).

Our proposal describes a set of techniques that together create an architecture for Internet accountability. Inside this architecture, hosts receiving unwanted packets can cause these packets to be filtered close to the source. The elements of this architecture include:

**Deployment of general and on-demand ingress filtering.** We present a practical approach to ingress filtering deployment, thus ensuring that DoS targets can distinguish network-level DoS traffic from legitimate traffic based on its (accurate) source address. We then provide a mechanism for allowing DoS targets to request that traffic sent to them from a particular source be filtered at the source.

**Distinguishing traffic by source AS.** Crocker [8] proposed using a bit in the packet header to indicate whether or not the packet originates from “well-maintained machines.” We extend this idea by using a bit in the packet header to distinguish the traffic of ASes that deploy our accountability architecture from the traffic of those ASes that do not. By distinguishing traffic in this way, our system helps create a working ecosystem out of pairwise trust among providers, which we then leverage to associate filters with persistent entities. We also provide ways for ASes to discover and “evict” peer ASes who break this trust. In deference to an “April’s fools” joke RFC by Bellovin [4], we refer to the
bit in the packet header as the “evil-bit.”\footnote{Steve Bellovin proposed the addition of an “evil bit” to the IP packet header: all applications and hosts with malicious intent would be required to set this bit to 1, and all routers would preferentially drop evil traffic.}

Section II discusses related work and contrasts it with our own. Section III explains and justifies our definition of the DoS problem and Internet accountability. Section IV describes how accountability can be achieved among a club (not necessarily a clique) of ASes with pairwise trust. Sections V to VI explain how accountability can be used to block DoS traffic, and how to deal with ASes who misbehave within the club of accountable ones. Finally, Section VII examines the economics of accountability, compared with the current state of affairs.

## II. Related Work

To date, DoS defense has followed one of two approaches. The first approach involves applying enough resources to absorb the attack — for example, placing “scrubber boxes” between the attackers’ traffic and the targeted servers and provisioning these scrubbers with sufficient resources and algorithms to separate the attack traffic from the desired traffic. This approach and its costs are explored in more detail in Section VII.

The second approach is to change the Internet’s architecture so that DoS traffic is easily identified and dealt with. Since our approach is also architectural, we briefly review the three major types of proposed anti-DoS architecture.

**Source Identification:** Source identification mechanisms, such as ingress filtering [11], PKI-based IPSec [16] and IP Traceback [24], provide a method by which DoS targets can distinguish attack traffic from other traffic based on its source. However, source identification mechanisms, by themselves, provide little benefit until they are deployed universally — since attackers can simply avoid their range of effectiveness — and hence don’t justify the cost of partial deployments. Moreover, IP addresses alone are in some cases too transient to be useful source identifiers. Finally, the ability to identify DoS traffic once it arrives at its target doesn’t by itself protect the target entirely — for example, its last-hop bandwidth may overwhelmed regardless.

**Pushback:** “IP Pushback” [14] involves in-band signaling among adjacent routers near an attacked end host that specific links are being overwhelmed, presumably by DoS traffic. Because it does not attempt to identify DoS traffic except in the aggregate, Pushback can only achieve partial filtering of unwanted traffic, along with much wanted traffic, as well. Moreover, pushback requests require an authentication infrastructure, lest they themselves become a tool for DoS attacks, and may also require router hardware changes. Finally, reflection attacks [23] (see Section IV-E), in which the attacker rapidly shifts the apparent source of the DoS traffic by bouncing it off any of the innocent hosts in the Internet, can render Pushback ineffective.

**Packet-carried Capabilities:** In capability-based systems [28], [2], [29], routers generate per-path labels, which

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In summary, our solution is different from prior work in that it leverages AS relationships and the evil bit to achieve both incrementally-deployable ingress filtering and on-demand filtering without router changes or a PKI. The next sections explain our versions of ingress and on-demand filtering, and how the combination is sufficient to achieve accountability.

## III. Accountability and (D)DoS

The goal of a DoS attack is to impair the target’s functioning by forcing it to spend resources (bandwidth, processing time, or storage space) handling the attacker’s traffic. If the resources needed to handle the attacker’s traffic are a large enough fraction of the target’s total available resources that the remainder is insufficient to handle legitimate traffic, then the attack succeeds.

Once a DoS attack is in progress, the target’s only defense is to attempt to distinguish between DoS traffic and legitimate traffic — typically, based on its source — and reduce the cost of dealing with DoS traffic. Note that the cost of making this distinction places a lower limit on the resources the target must devote to attack traffic. Hence, no system can save a target if new DoS sources continually appear faster than the target can recognize them as DoS
sources. However, an effective defensive system must at least minimize the target’s resources expended on traffic from sources already recognized as DoS sources.

The attacker’s resources are measured in the number of hosts the attacker has at its disposal, since that number gives a rough approximation of the resources that the attacker can muster. For example, the attacker may control a large “botnet” consisting of compromised end hosts. 2

At the application layer, numerous end-host-based strategies may be available to the target for distinguishing DoS sources from others. For example, the target may use a handshake (such as the TCP handshake) to identify hosts by network location, and detect and blacklist hosts that use up abnormally large amounts of the target’s resources. Or the target may attempt to distinguish hosts controlled interactively by humans from those generating traffic automatically [15] under the assumption that the application has the property that all legitimate traffic will be in the former category. The attacker may in turn attempt to counter each of these defenses, of course—say, by taking advantage of DHCP to change network addresses frequently, or by attempting to simulate interactive human controllers in software.

But even before traffic can be treated differently at the application layer, it must first pass through the network layer, where its processing consumes resources—especially bandwidth. If the attacker can cause enough resource consumption at this layer, then application-level distinctions will be useless. And in practice, it is common for botnets to flood a target with many times more traffic than even peak loads of legitimate traffic ever reach.

For example, a fairly large Website (or Web-hosting site) might plan for a peak load, during “flash crowds” of (legitimate) traffic, reaching as high a volume as 100,000 legitimate “hits” (HTTP requests) per second, with each such hit, on average, requiring the transmission of 5KB of data. This level of traffic can be handled by a 4Gbps connection. However, a botnet of 4,000 nodes, each using a 1Mbps broadband connection, can completely saturate a 4Gbps line. Such botnets are by no means uncommon, and are reputedly available for rental at a rate of 10 cents per bot, or $400 [17].

Hence, unless the target can distinguish and block DoS traffic in the network layer, DoS defense will require, at the very least, a large outlay for otherwise completely superfluous network capacity and per-packet processing. (We discuss these costs in detail in Section VII.) Minimizing these network-layer costs is thus a prerequisite for effective DoS defense.

A. Defining Accountability

In light of the need, noted above, to distinguish and block DoS traffic in the network layer, we define accountability in a network as having two components:

1) Identification: the originators of traffic can be identified by some persistent attribute—that is, one that is relatively difficult to create, re-create or change. The originator’s IP address itself might be difficult to create or change, for example—or it might be easy to create or change, but reliably associated, at any given moment, with another more permanent attribute (e.g., legal name or credit card number).

2) Defensibility: destinations are able to prevent traffic from a source with a particular address or persistent attribute from affecting their use of the network. Note that defensibility requires, but does not necessarily follow from, identification: a network that doesn’t provide identification cannot provide defensibility—since the latter requires that traffic be distinguishable by originator—but a network that provides identification can still fail to provide defensibility (and hence, full accountability).

The reason why identification must be by a persistent attribute should be clear from the definition of defensibility: the latter is useless if the originators of unwanted traffic are able to escape identification merely by changing the attribute that identifies them. For example, if a traffic originator’s IP address is easily and quickly changed—as it can be, in some circumstances—then identifying him or her by IP address alone does little to help stop the unwanted traffic. The originator can, after all, resume sending the traffic using a different IP address.

In an accountable network, once a destination identifies incoming DoS traffic, it creates a filter request listing the source IP address and source port number of the offending traffic. This filter request is routed to the ISP responsible for that source IP address, where the ISP identifies some persistent attribute of the traffic’s source. The ISP then uses that persistent attribute to block all further (DoS) traffic from that source to that destination, and thus eliminates the destination’s costs of processing traffic from that source. If new attackers join the attack more slowly than they are identified, then the attack traffic will eventually disappear, along with the costs of handling it.
IV. MAKING THE INTERNET ACCOUNTABLE

This section outlines the five steps involved in creating accountability among a group of ASes, where peering ASes have a contractual basis for trust, shared keys, and agreement on operating procedures, but non-peered ASes in the group need not have any trust or shared keys with each other. This assumption is no stronger than the kind upon which the Internet already relies, where peered ASes must agree on the meaning and use of BGP community strings for interdomain routing to function properly [25].

A. Step 1: Identifying the customer

Accountability is based on the network having the ability to associate the source IP address of a packet with a particular customer. We define the customer of an AS as an entity to which the AS has issued one or more subnets of IP addresses, agreeing to deliver traffic to those IP address to that entity. (We call an AS with customers an ISP.) Some customers, such as DSL customers, may have only a single IP address in their subnet. Others (e.g., small companies), might have many addresses.

To track the association between source IP address and customer, we require ISPs to upgrade their customer relationship management (CRM) systems so that each customer record stores not only the billing information of the customer, but also the IP addresses assigned for use by that customer. The most common methods for connecting to an ISP already create such an association, and the few methods that do not meet it are easily changed to ones that do. For example, companies connecting over a leased-line (e.g., a T1) can be associated when the leased-line is physically connected. DSL customers connect to their ISP through a Broadband Remote Access Server (BRAS) that identifies and authenticates the customer by either the Permanent Virtual Circuit (PVC) or the user name and password of the PPPoE connection over which they connect. Cable companies authenticate their users at the Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS) by the cable loop and modem MAC address over which they connect.

For ISPs that dynamically assign customers IP addresses, either through DHCP or by employing NAT and assigning customers different port numbers behind a single IP address, the ISP will need to retain DHCP and NAT logs for some limited period of time. With these logs, the combination of an IP address, port number(s) and time precisely identifies an individual customer. 3

B. Step 2: Per-customer ingress filtering

For defensibility to be possible, a host receiving a packet must be able to extract enough information from the packet to uniquely identify the customer that sent the packet. To ensure that the source IP address of a packet can be traced back to the customer that sent it, participating ISPs deploy strict ingress filtering [11] over all their customers. This means that as a customer connects, the router configuration management system will configure a packet filter on the interface/port to which the customer has connected that drops any packet with a source IP address outside the subnet(s) assigned to the customer.

C. Step 3: Defensibility through at-source filtering

We implement defensibility by creating a system of Filter Request Servers (FRSes) that take a target host’s request that traffic to it from an IP Address be stopped, and relay the request to the FRS in the ISP where the customer using that IP address is connected. Since the customer’s immediate ISP is the only entity that can easily map an IP address to a customer, it is uniquely capable of implementing filtering based on persistent attributes, regardless of any tricks the customer might use to evade it. For example, should the customer change its IP address (say, if it is connecting via a “hotspot” network), the FRS can ensure that filters requested against the customer are updated with its new address, and move with it.

The technical difficulty in implementing near-the-source filtering is in verifiably conveying filtering requests from target hosts to source hosts’ ISPs. If it were possible to spoof, forge or replay filter requests, then the filtering mechanism itself could be used for DoS attacks. Section V describes our design for such a verifiable system.

Performing filtering in the ISP actually connected to the source has several additional advantages: downstream ASes are spared the unwanted traffic; multiple paths, requiring multiple filters, are less likely to exist at the filtering point; and habitual offenders that continually provoke filtering requests can be recognized and dealt with.

Cases where the “customer” consists of a large number of hosts may be handled in one of two ways. If the customer — say, a university or enterprise — has a relatively well-managed network, and wants to avoid all-or-nothing filtering, then it can deploy its own FRS, and become the equivalent of an ISP serving its end hosts as if they were individual customers. Thus accountability will be preserved, and a single rogue end host can be filtered without interrupting service to the customer’s other hosts.

Alternatively, the customer — say, a public wireless “hotspot” — may be unwilling to take the trouble to police its hosts. In that case, its best course of action is simply to have its ISP treat it as if it were a separate ISP that has not deployed our Internet accountability system. We explain next how our system deals with traffic from such ISPs.

D. Step 4: Dealing with the outside world

Not all ISPs will implement Internet accountability, and yet communication between hosts in participating and non-participating ISPs must continue as least as well as it
does today. Packets coming from an unaccountable ISP may have spoofed source addresses and will almost certainly not be impeded by filter requests, so there must be some mechanism beyond the FRS to deal with them. Our solution is to leverage the existing relationships among ASes. Participating, hence accountable, ASes will configure their border routers to set the “evil bit” on any packet entering from a non-participating, unaccountable, AS. Packets entering from other participating ASes will have their evil bit left unchanged. With this simple change, customers of an accountable ISP receiving a packet with the evil bit clear will know that the source address of the packet can be tied to a customer, and therefore that traffic from that customer will stop in response to a filter request. Packets with the evil bit set, on the other hand, are not necessarily malicious, but they may be, and moreover their source addresses may have been forged.

To prevent unaccountable traffic from overwhelming a host, router, or link, accountable ISPs and servers preferentially drop packets with the evil bit set when an overload condition exists. The evil bit and this priority scheme can be implemented using the DiffServ [5] hardware and configuration commands that already exist in essentially all ISP routers. The evil bit could either be assigned from the six bits in the DiffServ Code Point (DSCP) [20] or represented by a well-known value of the DSCP.

E. Step 5: Stopping Reflection attacks

In a “reflection attack” [23], the attacker, instead of sending packets directly to the target, sends packets to arbitrary hosts that cause those hosts to send packets in turn to the target. In the simplest example, the attacker sends TCP SYN packets to an arbitrary host, with the target’s IP address as the source address. The host then sends its SYN-ACK packets to the target. The result is that the attacker is subjected to the same volume of traffic, but from a far larger number of sources.

Reflection attacks are of little concern on the Internet today, where source address spoofing can be used to achieve exactly the same effect. In a universally accountable Internet, ingress filtering would make source address spoofing, and hence reflection attacks, impossible. On partially accountable networks, however—such as the Internet after partial deployment of accountability—reflection attacks provide a means by which attackers in unaccountable parts of the network can “launder” their attack traffic of the evil bit that would normally be attached to it, by reflecting it off hosts in accountable networks. Targets of a reflection attack in an accountable network could request filters, but the attack traffic can easily dodge this filtering by choosing different reflectors, even through the originator of the attack may reside in an unaccountable network.

A simple solution to this problem is for hosts to ensure that every response to an incoming packet preserves the “evil bit state” of the packet to which it is responding. For example, every TCP SYN-ACK should bear an evil bit with the same value as its corresponding TCP SYN. Thus, reflection attack traffic is rendered effectively no different from direct attack traffic, and can be filtered or rate-limited along with all other unaccountable traffic during an attack.

Of course, this solution requires that hosts be upgraded to recognize and preserve evil bit state, and ISPs will have to set the evil bit on all packets from hosts that do not preserve it. Fortunately, testing whether a host has upgraded is easy: for each protocol vulnerable to reflection attacks (TCP, ICMP, and so on), and each port number, the ISP sends an initial packet to the host being tested, with its evil bit set. The host “passes” the test if and only if the response to these probes always has the evil bit set.

While the idea of updating end-host network stacks may seem onerous, our observation is that reflection attacks represent a fundamental problem. By their nature, reflectors allow an attacker to cause an upstanding, innocent host to send traffic to a target of the attacker’s choosing. This means that any approach to controlling DoS will involve either (1) forbidding end-hosts from responding to any packet which they cannot verify as coming from the source IP address listed in the packet, or (2) implementing inheritance of some property of the incoming packet in the response packet. Option 1 seems too draconian—it implies that hosts on an accountable network cannot communicate at all with hosts on an unaccountable one (or even one using a different accountability mechanism). Option 2 is the option we propose, and the option that capability-based DoS prevention schemes must choose as well.

The next section describes the FRS in more detail, examines attacks on the system, and explains how untrustworthy ASes are discovered and evicted.

V. FILTER PROPAGATION

Our solution requires a complete system for relaying filter requests among accountable ASes, to effect defensibility. In this section, we give a detailed design of such a system.

A. Goals and Assumptions

The system must have the following properties:

- **Effectiveness**: The system should be effective in blocking all traffic traveling (solely) through participating ASes, from a particular source to a destination that has requested that traffic from that source be blocked.
- **Security**: A request should only be honored if it actually emanates from the IP address that is requesting the blocking.
- **DoS Resilience**: The mechanism itself should be robust to DoS attacks of any kind.
- **Deployability**: The system should avoid prohibitively complicated or expensive infrastructure (such as a global PKI), or out-of-band mechanisms in the normal case.

Note that the first goal is quite limited, since it says nothing about traffic passing through non-participating ASes.
B. The System

1) Filter Request Servers: Every accountable AS and ISP must run a Filter Request Server (FRS). Customers request a filter by sending their own ISP’s FRS a filter request consisting of the IP address whose traffic should be blocked, the time the offending traffic was received, the source/destination port numbers (if any), and for how long the traffic should be blocked. The time and port numbers may be needed by the FRS at the traffic’s source to match the traffic to a customer if DHCP or NAT are being used. Since the ISP running the FRS is accountable, it will already be enforcing ingress filtering on its customers, and the FRS can easily identify the customer making the request.

2) Filter Request Processing: First, the FRS determines if that customer is entitled to issue a filter request. By default, customers should have very limited ability to do so, since they should have little need. The ISP may forbid most of its customers to issue filter requests at all, or it may allow them to issue requests at a very low rate, in response to harassment from individual users.

However, on request, and presumably upon paying a mild premium, a customer—typically, a server operator—would be allowed to issue filter requests on a large (that is, essentially unlimited) scale. Customers of this type would also be allowed, if they desire, to issue filter requests from a single IP address on behalf of a block of IP addresses belonging to the same customer—perhaps only from the particular designated IP address of a relatively secure host (to minimize the threat of a single host compromise resulting in a flood of requests).

3) Filter Request Forwarding: When two peered ASes agree to implement accountability with each other, they tell each other the IP addresses of their FRSes.

Upon authorizing an incoming request, the FRS then determines, based on the IP address specified as the traffic source, a “next hop” AS to which to forward the request. By running an iBGP session with any local router, the FRS can obtain this “next hop AS” information. The FRS then forwards the request to the next-hop AS’s FRS, appending the correct source address from which the sending FRS received the request. With the source address verification provided by ingress filtering, the next-hop FRS can verify that the request has indeed been forwarded from a neighboring AS’s FRS. (For extra security, the FRSs can also share an IPSec SA. The overhead will be small, given the small number of neighboring ASes for a given AS, but ought not to be strictly necessary.)

The request builds up a chain of addresses as it travels, starting with the originator of the request, and continuing with a sequence of AS’ FRS IP addresses. When the request reaches the FRS of the ISP that owns the IP address in question, the ISP acknowledges the request, by passing the acknowledgment back along the same chain of FRSs as the one the request took. This backtracking mechanism prevents asymmetric routes from causing acknowledgments to pass through non-participating ASes.

The FRS in the ISP of the offending traffic source uses the IP address, time and port number listed in the request to determine which customer’s traffic needs to be filtered, and then translates that customer identity into a filter location and source/destination IP addresses to filter. The FRS then contacts the AS’s router configuration system, requesting the application of the appropriate filter at the appropriate location. With filter requests themselves, the instructions from the local FRS can be authenticated based on their originating IP address—assumed reliable, given full source address verification—or based on an IPSec SA, for extra security.

Filter requests may include an expiration time—say, a day, or a week, or a month—to allow for the possibility of the target “reforming” (for example, repairing a compromised end host that had been incorporated into a botnet). The requested duration of a filter would likely be chosen by the requesting customer based on the frequency and volume of unwanted traffic emanating from the source being filtered.

ISPs may also take additional measures beyond application of the filter. For example, if a particular customer repeatedly triggers numerous filters against itself, thus imposing extra costs on the ISP, then the ISP may respond by imposing extra limitations on the customer. These might include rate-limiting of traffic; imposing extra charges; or, more positively, offering to sell root-kit scrubbing or computer maintenance services to the customer. The effort required from an ISP to respond to filters against a customer is bounded, because if a customer has more filters requested against than the ISP has resources to handle (e.g., due to router limitations), then ISP can set the “evil” bit on all packets emanating from the customer.

Consider the example shown in Figure 1. ASes 1, 2, 3 and 4 are all accountable and are interconnected as shown. AS1 is a large DSL provider. Its customers connect to the network through a DSLAM (DSL Access Multiplier). The DSLAM connects to the rest of the network via router R1. R2 and R3 provide connectivity to other ASes. Since this AS is accountable, it runs an FRS, which communicates with the local CRM (Customer Relationship Management) system to access customer information, and has the credentials to implement filters at routers and DSLAMs. AS2 and AS3 are large transit providers and do not have any end-hosts. For accountability, they need to only house FRSs. AS4 is a large web-hosting provider and has a server W1 which is under attack. W1 sends a filter request to FRS-4. FRS-4 has an iBGP peering session with R6 and learns about BGP routes to the offending IP address, which resides in AS1. It decides to forward the filter request to AS2. It looks up AS2 in its list of FRS’s that it knows about and sends the request to FRS-2. FRS-2 similarly then forwards the request to FRS-1. FRS-1 looks up the IP address in the local network routing protocol, such as OSPF or IS-IS,
3. Attacks

At R4 and R5, it would be their responsibility to implement the home FRS to allow traffic from AS1 to not be marked as evil, it would be their responsibility to implement the filter nonetheless allowed traffic from AS1 to not be marked as evil, it would consider requesting rate limiting of evil traffic from it would most likely be marked as evil, and then the path does not matter as long as a chain of trusted FRSs is accepted. However, if a packet were sent by the home FRS, it could have contained the request for the filter itself to be executed. A compromised server coming from R1 will be robust to DoS attacks of any kind, otherwise it will suffer.

3.1 Spoofing Attacks.

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The filter request system must itself be robust to DoS attacks of any kind, otherwise it will suffer.

3.1.1.1 The application of the three major classes of DoS Attack and how the FRS deals with them.

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3.1.1.1 Requesting numerous filters for innocent customers, with an ISP refusing to apply more filters to them, allowing them to launch DoS attacks without hindrance. All requests from customers whose traffic is actually desired will be granted, and requests from customers whose traffic is not actually desired will be blocked. The number and timestamp in the filter request.

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3.1.1.9 Requesting numerous filters for innocent customers, with an ISP refusing to apply more filters to them, allowing them to launch DoS attacks without hindrance. All requests from customers whose traffic is actually desired will be granted, and requests from customers whose traffic is not actually desired will be blocked. The number and timestamp in the filter request.

3.1.1.10 Requesting numerous filters for innocent customers, with an ISP refusing to apply more filters to them, allowing them to launch DoS attacks without hindrance. All requests from customers whose traffic is actually desired will be granted, and requests from customers whose traffic is not actually desired will be blocked. The number and timestamp in the filter request.

3.1.1.11 Requesting numerous filters for innocent customers, with an ISP refusing to apply more filters to them, allowing them to launch DoS attacks without hindrance. All requests from customers whose traffic is actually desired will be granted, and requests from customers whose traffic is not actually desired will be blocked. The number and timestamp in the filter request.

3.1.1.12 Requesting numerous filters for innocent customers, with an ISP refusing to apply more filters to them, allowing them to launch DoS attacks without hindrance. All requests from customers whose traffic is actually desired will be granted, and requests from customers whose traffic is not actually desired will be blocked. The number and timestamp in the filter request.

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the filters themselves.

VI. ISP (OR OTHER AS) MISBEHAVIOR

The greatest threat to our accountability scheme is a an ISP that claims to be following the accountability regimen — thus exchanging traffic without the evil bit being set — while in fact not bothering to implement either identification (i.e., ingress filtering) or defensibility (i.e., on-request filtering).

Detecting an ISP that fails to apply on-demand filtering is easy, as other ISPs’ customers will immediately notice that their filter requests are being ignored, and can raise the alarm that that ISP is not honoring its agreements. The more difficult case is that of an ISP who fails to honor its commitment to apply proper ingress filtering to its customers. In that case, its customers may launch DDoS attacks that do not implicate the ISP—indeed, they may implicate other ISPs.

Cases of ISP malfeasance at ingress-filtering are likely to be rare (as malicious BGP misconfiguration is rare), but involve out-of-band methods to resolve. For example, if an ISP receives complaints that another ISP is failing to filter attack traffic (claiming to be) from its customers, it can sample the traffic arriving from peer ASes, find the ASes from which the attack traffic is arriving, and demand that those ASes deal with the problem—either by properly filtering customers, or by enforcing contractual terms to ensure that upstream ASes do likewise. Those ASes in turn can follow the same procedure, and eventually an AS that fulfills its obligations will confront one that doesn’t. The former, having not been satisfied with the latter’s effort to stop the flow of DoS traffic, will then simply evict the AS from the accountability club by setting the evil bit on all traffic from the evicted ISP.

This approach is very different from statistical approaches to DDoS defense, such as IP traceback. In IP traceback, every DoS attacker has to be identified individually, by IP address, for each target in turn, so that its traffic can be ignored. In our approach, ASes only need identify sources at the granularity of the offending AS, and only need to identify one consistently unfiltered attack traffic source, once, to implicate an AS. Finally, beyond simply blocking traffic from a particular attacker, the community of network operators has recourse — an exposed AS can be designated as unaccountable and its traffic treated accordingly. Moreover, such identification may include penalties specified in the ISP’s peering agreements. If these penalties are severe enough, then we can expect that their deterrent effect will make the need for this kind of sampling-and-tracking procedure quite rare.

VII. ECONOMIC VIABILITY

In this section, we assess the economic viability of our proposal, by comparing the cost of its deployment with the costs currently incurred by DoS victims.

A. Economic Cost of DDoS: Price of conventional defenses deployed within an AS

A conventional tactic that some enterprise networks use for DoS defense is the combination of “scrubbing” devices with heavy over-provisioning of WAN connectivity. A scrubber is a network device that is typically placed at the edge of the enterprise network, facing the WAN connection. The scrubber inspects all inbound traffic and filters out “malicious” packets and connections. However, this can only protect connectivity within the enterprise network — since the WAN connection can still be flooded, the enterprise network. Thus typically the WAN connection it is heavily over-provisioned to match the expected attack volume, and enough scrubbers are deployed to handle the size of the connection. An example of a scrubber device is the Cisco Guard XT 5650, which can scrub traffic at a line rate of 1Gbps and rents for roughly $68,000 [6].

Instead of keeping the scrubber device continually in the path between the local network and the WAN, and thus paying a latency penalty, it can be coupled with a Cisco XT 5600 Traffic Anomaly Detector, which will detect a potential DoS situation and then shunt traffic to the 5650. A Cisco XT 5600 retails for about $45,000 [7]. The administrators of an enterprise network would estimate the volume of the largest attack that they wish to defend against in multiples of OC-12s, and then lease that much connectivity from multiple ISPs. They would then couple each OC-12 (622 Mbps) with one Cisco XT 5650 and possibly an XT 5600. An OC-12 from a “tier-1” ISP will cost about $30,000 per month [13], [26].

B. Economic Cost of DDoS: Price of defense services offered by ISPs

An alternative strategy available to enterprise networks today is to take advantage of scrubbing services provided by large ISPs such as MCI [22] and Saavis [12]. The MCI service costs between $2,000 per month for a T-3 line (45Mbps) and $69,000 per month for an OC-48 line (2,448Gbps). This is in addition to the cost of raw IP connectivity, which we previously quoted as $30,000 for an OC-12 (622Mbps). Setup fees range from $200 to $2,500. Thus for an organization wishing to defend itself against an attack stream of X Mbps for Y years, the total cost will be about $( (30000 * 12) Y + (45000 + 68000 + 6000)) X / 622 which is about $(580 X Y + 190 X).

C. Economic Cost of Accountability: Implementing ingress filtering and deploying FRGs

Estimating the cost in dollars that an ISP would have to pay to upgrade its network to support our system is not easy. The bulk of the expense will not be the new
equipment and software that must be purchased — an FRS is, after all, no more complicated than a load-balanced cluster of machines running a database application. Rather, the majority of the cost will come from integrating the FRS into the ISP’s existing systems. New fields will need to be added to the databases in the Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems. New software interfaces to the router configuration management systems will need to be updated. Customer service personnel will have to be trained on new procedures and customer documentation updated. Activities like these are carried out continuously at major ISPs, using internal staff and external contract consultants, but ISPs rarely disclose the resulting costs.

However, we can bound the costs of implementing accountability by analogy to two network upgrades for which there is data in the public record. In 2002, cellular carriers in the US were required by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to upgrade their networks to support Number Block Pooling and Local Number Portability (a.k.a. wireless number portability). Number Block Pooling increases the granularity of phone number allocations, roughly analogous to Classless Interdomain Routing (CIDR). Local Number Portability allows customers to keep their phone numbers, even if they change carriers. Each of these upgrades required changes far more extensive than would be necessary to implement accountability.

Sprint Wireless operates a network supporting 13M subscribers, and estimated the cost of its Number Block Pooling upgrade at $59M. Implementing Local Number Portability required changes to over 70 systems inside the carrier, from their routing architecture to their external websites, and was estimated to cost $36M [10]. Leap Wireless, which provides service in dozens of cities across the US, estimated the costs of number pooling at $6M, and local number portability at an additional $2M [9]. They have a subscriber base of 1.62M as of September 2005 [18]. According to the US Congressional Budget Office, the 30 OECD nations have 55.8M broadband subscriptions [21], and about 17M websites. Thus, if we use the cost of Number Block Pooling as representative of the cost of implementing accountability for all the broadband connections in the OECD nations, we arrive at about $188M to $231M. If we instead rely on Local Number Portability, we arrive at $63M to $141M.

An additional cost component is related to upgrading end host stacks to respond to evil bit traffic with the evil bit set in their replies. Since our accountability system allows incremental deployment, this update to end host OSes can also occur incrementally. This update can be included with any more critical updates and does not require special user attention or intervention, thus minimizing the cost for the user.

**D. Comparing the Economic Cost of DDoS to the Economic Cost of Accountability**

Recall that we’ve estimated the rough cost of conventional protection for an organization against an X Mbps DDoS attack for Y years to be somewhere between $(338 XY^2 + 191 X)$. We assume that organizations acquiring this protection will expect to be protected against a DDoS attack consisting of up to 50,000 broadband hosts, each with a minimum of 128Kbps upstream bandwidth—that is, an attack stream of up to 6.4Gbps. If we consider DoS defense over 3 years, the cost of conventional protection for 1 organization is roughly $6.5M to $12M. We estimate the cost for implementing accountability to be in the range $63M to $231M. Hence if there are at least 36 networked organizations that are afraid of being attacked by a large botnet army, it will be cheaper for the entire Internet to implement accountability.

While the ISPs willing to spend money to defend themselves against DoS are different from the ISPs that tend to serve compromised end hosts, we believe that competitive pressure among ISPs that serve large organizational customers will eventually drive them towards the less expensive option of subsidizing the widespread implementation of accountability, in order to allow them to undercut competitors offering the more expensive alternatives.

**VIII. Conclusions**

This paper proposes a simple approach to blocking DoS attacks. It requires strict ingress filtering and the ability for end hosts to impose filters on traffic destined towards them. It thus allows hosts to stop receiving undesired traffic without imposing any limitations on the bandwidth of unfiltered traffic sent to them, while allowing ISPs to identify habitual offenders within their network. Our system also employs an “evil bit” label on packets, to allow a subset of the Internet to implement accountability and still obtain some relief from DoS. It thereby solves the issue of incremental deployment that ingress filtering and other DoS prevention techniques have faced in the past.

In a fully accountable Internet, botnets will be easily blocked, either via filters requested by victims, or via rate limits on “evil” traffic. Our system does require changes to ISP operations, and thus introduces costs, but since the current Internet is prone to DoS attacks, any solution will require change, and will therefore have a cost component to it. We have made rough estimates of the cost of deploying accountability, and compared it to the amount that organizations are willing to spend today to defend themselves against attacks. Our analysis shows that if there exist today at least a few organizations (say, 36 large corporations) that wish to defend themselves against large botnet attacks for a few years, then implementing our system for the entire Internet will cost less than the currently available alternatives. We believe that far more than 36 such corporations exist on the Internet today.

**REFERENCES**


