{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Microsoft Research","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research","author_name":"Brendan Lucier","author_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/people\/brlucier\/","title":"Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design - Microsoft Research","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"IG7G7Wu0Jw\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/bayesian-algorithmic-mechanism-design\/\">Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/bayesian-algorithmic-mechanism-design\/embed\/#?secret=IG7G7Wu0Jw\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design&#8221; &#8212; Microsoft Research\" data-secret=\"IG7G7Wu0Jw\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","description":"The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatible mechanisms, namely that of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves; and the central approach for circumventing computational [&hellip;]"}