{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Microsoft Research","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research","author_name":"Peter Key","author_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/people\/peterkey\/","title":"Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders - Microsoft Research","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"j117PXuMQM\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/mechanism-design-for-mixed-bidders\/\">Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/mechanism-design-for-mixed-bidders\/embed\/#?secret=j117PXuMQM\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders&#8221; &#8212; Microsoft Research\" data-secret=\"j117PXuMQM\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","description":"The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction has appealing properties when ads are simple (text based and identical in size), but does not generalize to richer ad settings, whereas truthful mechanisms such as VCG do. However, a straight switch from GSP to VCG incurs significant revenue loss for the search engine. We introduce a transitional mechanism [&hellip;]"}