{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Microsoft Research","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research","author_name":"Brendan Lucier","author_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/people\/brlucier\/","title":"On Revenue in the Generalized Second Price Auction - Microsoft Research","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"aQTB01fMJf\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/revenue-generalized-second-price-auction\/\">On Revenue in the Generalized Second Price Auction<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/revenue-generalized-second-price-auction\/embed\/#?secret=aQTB01fMJf\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;On Revenue in the Generalized Second Price Auction&#8221; &#8212; Microsoft Research\" data-secret=\"aQTB01fMJf\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","description":"The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for selling sponsored search advertisements. In this paper we consider the revenue of this auction at equilibrium. We prove that if agent values are drawn from identical regular distributions, then the GSP auction paired with an appropriate reserve price generates a constant fraction (1\/6th) [&hellip;]"}