{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Microsoft Research","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research","author_name":"Jeff Running","author_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/people\/jeffrunn\/","title":"From Algorithms to Auctions - Microsoft Research","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"TJ7iDBJOnO\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/video\/from-algorithms-to-auctions\/\">From Algorithms to Auctions<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/video\/from-algorithms-to-auctions\/embed\/#?secret=TJ7iDBJOnO\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;From Algorithms to Auctions&#8221; &#8212; Microsoft Research\" data-secret=\"TJ7iDBJOnO\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/from-algorithms-to-auctions-1.jpg","thumbnail_width":320,"thumbnail_height":240,"description":"An auction designer faces an optimization problem with a twist. The designer&#8217;s goal is to allocate resources effectively, but the input to this allocation problem is held by rational participants who may misrepresent their private values for personal gain. To combat this manipulation one might ask for allocation rules that are incentive compatible, so that [&hellip;]"}