{"id":368519,"date":"2017-03-02T12:34:39","date_gmt":"2017-03-02T20:34:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/?post_type=msr-research-item&#038;p=368519"},"modified":"2018-10-16T21:37:39","modified_gmt":"2018-10-17T04:37:39","slug":"secure-computation-minimal-interaction-revisited","status":"publish","type":"msr-research-item","link":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/secure-computation-minimal-interaction-revisited\/","title":{"rendered":"Secure Computation with Minimal Interaction, Revisited"},"content":{"rendered":"<p id=\"Par1\" class=\"Para\">Motivated by the goal of improving the concrete efficiency of secure multiparty computation (MPC), we revisit the question of MPC with only two rounds of interaction. We consider a minimal setting in which parties can communicate over secure point-to-point channels and where no broadcast channel or other form of setup is available.<\/p>\n<p id=\"Par2\" class=\"Para\">Katz and Ostrovsky (Crypto 2004) obtained negative results for such protocols with <span id=\"IEq1\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-1-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><mi>n<\/mi><mo>=<\/mo><mn>2<\/mn><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-1\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-2\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-3\" class=\"mi\">n<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-4\" class=\"mo\">=<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-5\" class=\"mn\">2<\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">n=2<\/span><\/span><\/span> parties. Ishai et al. (Crypto 2010) showed that if only one party may be corrupted, then <span id=\"IEq2\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-2-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><mi>n<\/mi><mo>&#x2265;<\/mo><mn>5<\/mn><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-6\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-7\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-8\" class=\"mi\">n<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-9\" class=\"mo\">\u2265<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-10\" class=\"mn\">5<\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">n\u22655<\/span><\/span><\/span> parties can securely compute any function in this setting, with guaranteed output delivery, assuming one-way functions exist. In this work, we complement the above results by presenting positive and negative results for the cases where <span id=\"IEq3\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-3-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><mi>n<\/mi><mo>=<\/mo><mn>3<\/mn><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-11\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-12\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-13\" class=\"mi\">n<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-14\" class=\"mo\">=<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-15\" class=\"mn\">3<\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">n=3<\/span><\/span><\/span> or <span id=\"IEq4\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-4-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><mi>n<\/mi><mo>=<\/mo><mn>4<\/mn><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-16\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-17\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-18\" class=\"mi\">n<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-19\" class=\"mo\">=<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-20\" class=\"mn\">4<\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">n=4<\/span><\/span><\/span> and where there is a <em class=\"EmphasisTypeItalic \">single malicious party<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p id=\"Par3\" class=\"Para\">When <span id=\"IEq5\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-5-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><mi>n<\/mi><mo>=<\/mo><mn>3<\/mn><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-21\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-22\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-23\" class=\"mi\">n<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-24\" class=\"mo\">=<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-25\" class=\"mn\">3<\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">n=3<\/span><\/span><\/span>, we show a 2-round protocol which is secure with \u201cselective abort\u201d against a single malicious party. The protocol makes a black-box use of a pseudorandom generator or alternatively can offer unconditional security for functionalities in <span id=\"IEq6\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-6-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><msup><mrow class=\"MJX-TeXAtom-ORD\"><mi mathvariant=\"normal\">N<\/mi><mi mathvariant=\"normal\">C<\/mi><\/mrow><mn>1<\/mn><\/msup><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-26\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-27\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-28\" class=\"msubsup\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-29\" class=\"texatom\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-30\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-31\" class=\"mi\">N<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-32\" class=\"mi\">C<\/span><\/span><\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-33\" class=\"mn\">1<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">NC1<\/span><\/span><\/span>. The concrete efficiency of this protocol is comparable to the efficiency of secure two-party computation protocols for <em class=\"EmphasisTypeItalic \">semi-honest<\/em> parties based on garbled circuits.<\/p>\n<div id=\"Par4\" class=\"Para\">\n<p>When <span id=\"IEq7\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-7-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><mi>n<\/mi><mo>=<\/mo><mn>4<\/mn><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-34\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-35\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-36\" class=\"mi\">n<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-37\" class=\"mo\">=<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-38\" class=\"mn\">4<\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">n=4<\/span><\/span><\/span> in the setting described above, we show the following:<\/p>\n<div class=\"UnorderedList\">\n<ul class=\"UnorderedListMarkDash\">\n<li>\n<p id=\"Par5\" class=\"Para\">A <em class=\"EmphasisTypeItalic \">statistical VSS<\/em> protocol that has a\u00a01-round sharing phase and 1-round reconstruction phase. This improves over the state-of-the-art result of Patra et al.\u00a0(Crypto 2009) whose VSS protocol required 2 rounds in the reconstruction phase.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p id=\"Par6\" class=\"Para\">A 2-round statistically secure protocol for <em class=\"EmphasisTypeItalic \">linear functionalities<\/em> with guaranteed output delivery. This implies a 2-round 4-party fair coin\u00a0tossing protocol. We complement this by a negative result, showing that there is a (nonlinear) function for which there is no 2-round statistically secure protocol.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p id=\"Par7\" class=\"Para\">A 2-round computationally secure protocol for <em class=\"EmphasisTypeItalic \">general functionalities<\/em> with guaranteed output delivery, under the assumption that injective (one-to-one) one-way functions exist.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p id=\"Par8\" class=\"Para\">A 2-round protocol for general functionalities with guaranteed output delivery in the <em class=\"EmphasisTypeItalic \">preprocessing model<\/em>, whose correlated randomness complexity is proportional to the length of the inputs. This protocol makes a black-box use of a pseudorandom generator or alternatively can offer unconditional security for functionalities in <span id=\"IEq8\" class=\"InlineEquation\"><span id=\"MathJax-Element-8-Frame\" class=\"MathJax\" style=\"box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-table; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal; font-size: 17px; text-indent: 0px; text-align: left; text-transform: none; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;\" tabindex=\"0\" data-mathml=\"<math xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\"><msup><mrow class=\"MJX-TeXAtom-ORD\"><mi mathvariant=\"normal\">N<\/mi><mi mathvariant=\"normal\">C<\/mi><\/mrow><mn>1<\/mn><\/msup><\/math>\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-39\" class=\"math\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-40\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-41\" class=\"msubsup\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-42\" class=\"texatom\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-43\" class=\"mrow\"><span id=\"MathJax-Span-44\" class=\"mi\">N<\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-45\" class=\"mi\">C<\/span><\/span><\/span><span id=\"MathJax-Span-46\" class=\"mn\">1<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><span class=\"MJX_Assistive_MathML\">NC1<\/span><\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"Par9\" class=\"Para\">Prior to our work, the feasibility results implied by our positive results were not known to hold even in the stronger MPC model considered by Gennaro et al.\u00a0(Crypto 2002), where a broadcast channel is available.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Motivated by the goal of improving the concrete efficiency of secure multiparty computation (MPC), we revisit the question of MPC with only two rounds of interaction. We consider a minimal setting in which parties can communicate over secure point-to-point channels and where no broadcast channel or other form of setup is available. Katz and Ostrovsky [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"msr-url-field":"","msr-podcast-episode":"","msrModifiedDate":"","msrModifiedDateEnabled":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"_classifai_error":"","msr-author-ordering":null,"msr_publishername":"Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg","msr_publisher_other":"","msr_booktitle":"","msr_chapter":"","msr_edition":"","msr_editors":"","msr_how_published":"","msr_isbn":"","msr_issue":"","msr_journal":"","msr_number":"","msr_organization":"","msr_pages_string":"359-378","msr_page_range_start":"359","msr_page_range_end":"378","msr_series":"","msr_volume":"9216","msr_copyright":"","msr_conference_name":"Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 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