Trojan:AndroidOS/AndroRat

Trojan:AndroidOS/AndroRat’s payload is based on the standard Android Application Package (APK). Threat actors embed malicious components into this archive while maintaining the appearance of a legitimate application. Critical artifacts within the manipulated APK include the classes.dex file, which contains the core remote access trojan logic; the AndroidManifest.xml file, which declares excessive permissions and background services; and native libraries or asset folders that may hold secondary payloads or configuration data. This modular design activates the straightforward "trojanization" of legitimate apps, where malicious code is appended to a host application. 

To maintain a persistent presence on a device, Trojan:AndroidOS/AndroRat registers itself to respond to key system events. It typically configures a background service that launches when the device boots completes (BOOT_COMPLETED intent) or when the user unlocks the screen. More advanced variants implement resilience mechanisms, such as a dedicated process that periodically checks and restarts the malicious service if it is terminated. A particularly effective method for bypassing standard security controls is the abuse of Android's Accessibility Services. Once a user is tricked into activating this feature for the malicious app, it can automatically grant itself permissions, capture keystrokes across other applications, read screen content from messaging apps, and even interfere with attempts to uninstall it. 

Its functionality is directly allowed by the permissions it acquires. These commonly include READ_PHONE_STATE to gather device identifiers, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION for GPS tracking, RECORD_AUDIO to activate the microphone, and READ_SMS to intercept text messages. Collected data is often staged locally within the application's private directory (for example, /data/data/[package_name]/) in SQLite databases or XML files before exfiltration. Communication with attacker-controlled infrastructure has evolved from simple TCP sockets on predictable ports (like 1337) to more stealthy methods. Modern variants may use encrypted HTTP/S traffic to blend with normal web traffic or leverage services like Firebase Cloud Messaging for efficient command signaling. Commands sent from the server to the infected device are often specific strings (for example, _kontak_ to steal contacts, _ambrc_ to record audio) that trigger these surveillance modules.