Portrait of Brendan Lucier

Brendan Lucier



I am a Researcher at Microsoft Research, New England.  I study algorithmic game theory, social networks, and other topics in the intersection of economics and theoretical computer science. I’m especially interested in developing ways to sell complex goods and services using simple, transparent pricing methods and auction rules.


Virtual Algorithms Center (VIRAL)

Established: December 27, 2013

MSR has a strong group of scientists working on algorithm design, analysis, and experimental evaluation, as well as researchers in related areas (e.g., coding theory), but no formal algorithms group. The Virtual Algorithms Center (VIRAL) brings these individuals together. The goals of the center is to enhance collaboration between algorithms researchers and the rest of MSR, provide internal consulting, and give an external view of the algorithms research at MSR.









Dueling Algorithms
Nicole Immorlica, Adam Kalai, Brendan Lucier, Ankur Moitra, Andrew Postlewaite, Moshe Tennenholtz, in Proceedings of the forty-second annual ACM symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), 2011, ACM Press, June 6, 2011, View abstract, Download PDF








[01/2017] Slides from my WINE 2016 tutorial on prophet inequalities and pricing can be found online here.

Selected Publications

  • Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities.  Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier.  In Submission.  View external link
  • The Price of Anarchy in Large Games.  Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis.  STOC 2016.  View external link
  • Non-Optimal Mechanism Design. Jason Hartline, Brendan Lucier. American Economics Review, 2015.  View external link
    A conference version titled Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design appeared in STOC 2010, and is available here.
  • Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices.  Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier.  SODA 2015. View external link 
  • A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer.  Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg. FOCS 2014. View external link 
  • On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism.  Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme. EC 2014. View external link   
  • Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient.  Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier. STOC 2014. View external link
  • Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time.  Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, Brendan Lucier. SODA 2014.  View external link 
  • Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions.  Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin.  SICOMP 2017.
    A conference version titled Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions appeared in SODA 2010, and is available here.