When Can Formal Methods Make a Real Difference?

November 9, 2004
Peter Neumann | SRI International Computer Science Lab

This talk will consider a few cases from the ACM Risks Forum archives (http://www.risks.org) for which the sensible use of formal methods could have made a decisive difference in avoiding serious consequences – with respect to requirements, specifications, human interfaces, implementation, and even operation, typically in systems that were supposedly safe, reliable, or secure. This will provide a view to the future in terms of things we can learn about the past.

Speaker Details

Peter G. Neumann has doctorates from Harvard and Darmstadt. After 10 years at Bell Labs in Murray Hill, New Jersey, in the 1960s (including deep involvement in the Multics development, 1965-1969), he has been in SRI’s Computer Science Lab since September 1971. He is concerned with computer systems and networks, security, reliability, survivability, safety, and many risks-related issues such as voting-system integrity, crypto policy, social implications, and human needs including privacy. He moderates the ACM Risks Forum, edits CACM’s monthly Inside Risks column, chairs the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, co-chairs the ACM Advisory Committee on Security and Privacy, and chairs the National Committee for Voting Integrity (http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting).He co-founded People For Internet Responsibility (PFIR, http://www.PFIR.org). His book, Computer-Related Risks, is in its fifth printing. He is a Fellow of the ACM, IEEE, and AAAS. He is a member of the U.S. General Accounting Office Executive Council on Information Management and Technology, and the California Office of Privacy Protection Advisory Council. He has taught at Stanford, U.C. Berkeley, and Maryland. For further background, see his Web site (http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann).