Price Theory and Merger Guidelines
Cooperation in Two Person Games, Revisited
Optimizing Merchant Revenue with Rebates
Reputational Bargaining Under Knowledge of Rationality
Two players announce bargaining postures to which they may become committed and then bargain over the division of a surplus. The share of the surplus that a player can guarantee herself under first-order knowledge of…
“We Will be Right With You”: Managing Customers Expectations with Vague Promises and Cheap Talk
Delay announcements informing customers about anticipated service delays are prevalent in service-oriented systems. How to use delay announcements to manage the service system in an efficient manner is a complex problem which depends on both…
Efficient Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is to merge the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. In this talk we will consider the problem of designing…